I. S. Konev
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Page 13 of 13
Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation
WITH it is read that the offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge began on August 3, but this is not entirely true. As early as July 16, German troops located in the area of the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, fearing flank attacks by Soviet troops, began to retreat to their original positions under the cover of powerful rearguards. But Soviet troops were unable to immediately begin pursuing the enemy. Only on July 17, units of the 5th Guards. army and 5th Guards. tank armies were able to shoot down the rearguards and advance 5-6 km. On July 18-19 they were joined by the 6th Guards. army and 1st tank army. The tank units advanced 2-3 km, but the infantry did not follow the tanks. In general, the advance of our troops these days was insignificant. On July 18, all available forces of the Steppe Front under the command of General Konev were to be brought into battle. However, before the end of July 19, the front was regrouping its forces. Only on July 20 did the front forces, consisting of five combined arms armies, manage to advance 5-7 km.
On July 22, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched a general offensive and by the end of the next day, having broken through the German barriers, they basically reached the positions that our troops occupied before the start of the German offensive on July 5. However, further advance of the troops was stopped by German reserves.
Headquarters demanded that the offensive be continued immediately, but its success required a regrouping of forces and replenishment of personnel and materiel. After listening to the arguments of the front commanders, Headquarters postponed the further offensive by 8 days. In total, by the beginning of the second phase of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, there were 50 rifle divisions in the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps and, in addition, 33 tank brigades, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments. Despite the regrouping and replenishment, the tank and artillery units were not fully staffed. The situation was somewhat better at the Voronezh Front, in the zone of which more powerful counterattacks by German troops were expected. Thus, at the beginning of the counteroffensive, the 1st Tank Army had 412 T-34, 108 T-70, 29 T-60 tanks (549 in total). 5th Guards the tank army at the same time consisted of 445 tanks of all types and 64 armored vehicles.
Artillerymen of a fighter brigade (combined arms type) pursue a retreating enemy.
The offensive began at dawn on August 3 with a powerful artillery barrage. At 8 am, infantry and breakthrough tanks went on the offensive. German artillery fire was indiscriminate. Our aviation reigned supreme in the air. By 10 o'clock the advanced units of the 1st Tank Army crossed the Worksla River. In the first half of the day, infantry units advanced 5...6 km, and the front commander, General Vatutin, brought the main forces of the 1st and 5th Guards into battle. tank armies. By the end of the day, units of the 1st Tank Army had advanced 12 km into the German defense and approached Tomarovka. Here they encountered powerful anti-tank defense and were temporarily stopped. Units of the 5th Guards. The tank army advanced significantly further - up to 26 km and reached the Good Will area.
In a more difficult situation, units of the Steppe Front advanced north of Belgorod. Without such reinforcement means as the Voronezh one, its offensive developed more slowly, and by the end of the day, even after the tanks of the 1st Mechanized Corps were brought into battle, units of the Steppe Front advanced only 7...8 km.
On August 4 and 5, the main efforts of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were aimed at eliminating the Tomarov and Belgorod corners of resistance. On the morning of August 5, units of the 6th Guards. The armies began fighting for Tomarovka and by evening cleared it of German troops. The enemy actively counterattacked in groups of 20-40 tanks with the support of assault guns and motorized infantry, but to no avail. By the morning of August 6, the Tomarov resistance center was cleared of German troops. At this time, the mobile group of the Voronezh Front advanced 30-50 km deep into the enemy’s defenses, creating a threat of encirclement for the defending troops.
On August 5, troops of the Voronezh Front began fighting for Belgorod. Troops of the 69th Army entered the city from the north. Having crossed the Northern Donets, the troops of the 7th Guards reached the eastern outskirts. army, and from the west Belgorod was bypassed by the mobile formations of the 1st mechanized corps. By 18:00 the city was completely cleared of German troops, and a large amount of abandoned German equipment and ammunition was captured.
The liberation of Belgorod and the destruction of the Tomarov resistance center allowed the advancing mobile groups of the Voronezh Front, consisting of the 1st and 5th Guards. tank armies to move into operational space. By the end of the third day of the offensive, it became clear that the rate of advance of the Soviet troops on the Southern Front was significantly higher than the Orel floor. But for the successful offensive of the Steppe Front he did not have enough tanks. By the end of the day, at the request of the command of the Steppe Front and a representative of the Headquarters, the front was allocated 35 thousand people, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 KV-lc tanks for replenishment. In addition, the front was reinforced with two engineering brigades and four regiments of self-propelled artillery.
Grenadier after the battle. August 1943
On the night of August 7, Soviet troops attacked the German resistance center in Borisovka and took it by noon the next day. In the evening our troops took Grayvoron. Here intelligence reported that a large column of German troops was moving towards the city. The artillery commander of the 27th Army ordered that all available artillery weapons be deployed to destroy the column. More than 30 large-caliber guns and a battalion of rocket launchers suddenly opened fire on the column, while new guns were hastily installed in positions and started firing. The blow was so unexpected that many German vehicles were abandoned in perfect working order. In total, more than 60 guns of caliber from 76 to 152 mm and about 20 rocket launchers took part in the shelling. More than five hundred corpses, as well as up to 50 tanks and assault guns, were left behind by German troops. According to the testimony of prisoners, these were the remnants of the 255th, 332nd, 57th Infantry Divisions and parts of the 19th Tank Division. During the fighting on August 7, the Borisov group of German troops ceased to exist.
On August 8, the right-flank 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was transferred to the Steppe Front, and on August 9, the 5th Guards was also transferred. tank army. The main direction of advance of the Steppe Front was now to bypass the Kharkov group of German troops. At the same time, the 1st Tank Army received orders to cut the main railways and highways leading from Kharkov to Poltava, Krasnograd and Lozovaya.
By the end of August 10, the 1st Tank Army managed to capture the Kharkov-Poltava railway, but its further advance to the south was stopped. However, Soviet troops approached Kharkov to a distance of 8-11 km, threatening the communications of the Kharkov defensive group of German troops.
A StuG 40 assault gun, knocked out by a Golovnev gun. Okhtyrka area.
Soviet self-propelled guns SU-122 in the attack on Kharkov. August 1943.
Anti-tank gun RaK 40 on a trailer near an RSO tractor, left after artillery shelling near Bogodukhov.
T-34 tanks with infantry troops in the attack on Kharkov.
In order to somehow improve the situation, on August 11 German troops launched a counterattack in the Bogodukhovsky direction against units of the 1st Panzer Army with a hastily assembled group, which included the 3rd Panzer Division and units of the SS tank divisions Totenkopf and Das Reich " and "Viking". This blow significantly slowed down the pace of advance not only of the Voronezh Front, but also of the Steppe Front, since some of the units had to be taken from the latter to form an operational reserve. By August 12, in the Valkovsky direction south of Bogodukhov, the Germans constantly attacked with tank and motorized infantry units, but were unable to achieve decisive success. How they failed to recapture the Kharkov-Poltava railway. To strengthen the 1st Tank Army, which by August 12 consisted of only 134 tanks (instead of 600), the battered 5th Guards was also transferred to the Bogodukhovskoe direction. tank army, which included 115 serviceable tanks. On August 13, during the fighting, the German formation managed to somewhat wedge itself into the junction between the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards. tank army. The anti-tank artillery of both armies ceased to exist, and the commander of the Voronezh Front, Gen. Vatutin decided to bring the reserves of the 6th Guards into battle. army and all the reinforcement artillery, which deployed south of Bogodukhov.
On August 14, the intensity of German tank attacks subsided, while units of the 6th Guards. The armies achieved significant success, advancing 4-7 km. But the next day, German troops, having regrouped their forces, broke through the defense line of the 6th Tank Corps and went to the rear of the 6th Guards. army, which was forced to retreat to the north and go on the defensive. The next day, the Germans tried to build on their success in the 6th Guards zone. army, but all their efforts came to nothing. During the Bogodukhov operation against enemy tanks, the Petlyakov dive bombers performed especially well, and at the same time, the insufficient effectiveness of the Ilyushin attack aircraft was noted (by the way, the same results were noted during defensive battles on the northern front).
The crew is trying to right the overturned PzKpfw III Ausf M tank. SS Panzer Division "Das Reich".
German troops retreat across the Donets River. August 1943
T-34 tanks destroyed in the Akhtyrka area.
Soviet troops are moving towards Kharkov.
The Steppe Front had the task of destroying the Kharkov defensive unit and liberating Kharkov. Front commander I. Konev, having received intelligence information about the defensive structures of German troops in the Kharkov region, decided to destroy, if possible, the German group on the approaches to the city and prevent the withdrawal of German tank troops into the city limits. On August 11, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive perimeter of the city and began its assault. But only the next day, after all the artillery reserves had been brought in, was it possible to somewhat penetrate it. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the 5th Guards. The tank army was involved in repelling the German snowflakes in the Bogodukhov area. There were not enough tanks, but thanks to the actions of the artillery, on August 13, the 53rd, 57th, 69th and 7th Guards. The armies broke through the outer defensive perimeter and approached the suburbs.
Between August 13-17, Soviet troops began fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov. The fighting did not stop at night. Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. So, in some regiments of the 7th Guards. The army on August 17 numbered no more than 600 people. The 1st Mechanized Corps had only 44 tanks (less than the size of the tank brigade), more than half were light. But the defending side also suffered heavy losses. According to reports from prisoners, in some companies of the units of the Kempf group defending in Kharkov there were 30...40 people left.
German artillerymen fire from an IeFH 18 howitzer at advancing Soviet troops. Kharkov direction, August 1943
Studebakers with ZIS-3 anti-tank guns on a trailer follow the advancing troops. Kharkov direction.
The Churchill heavy tank of the 49th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment of the 5th Tank Army breakthrough follows a broken eight-wheeled armored car SdKfz 232. On the side of the tank’s turret is the inscription “For Radianska Ukraine.” Kharkov direction, July-August 1943.
Scheme of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation.
To enlarge - click on the image
On August 18, German troops made another attempt to stop the troops of the Voronezh Front, striking north of Akhtyrka on the flank of the 27th Army. The strike force included the Grossdeutschland motorized division, transferred from near Bryansk. The 10th motorized division, parts of the 11th and 19th tank divisions and two separate battalions of heavy tanks. The group consisted of about 16 thousand soldiers, 400 tanks, about 260 guns. The group was opposed by units of the 27th Army consisting of approx. 15 thousand soldiers, 30 tanks and up to 180 guns. To repel a counterattack, up to 100 tanks and 700 guns could be brought in from neighboring areas. However, the command of the 27th Army was late in assessing the timing of the offensive of the Akhtyrka group of German troops, and therefore the transfer of reinforcements began already during the German counteroffensive that had begun.
On the morning of August 18, the Germans carried out a strong artillery barrage and launched an attack on the positions of the 166th division. Until 10 o'clock the division's artillery successfully repelled attacks by German tanks, but after 11 o'clock, when the Germans brought up to 200 tanks into battle, the division's artillery was disabled and the front was broken through. By 13 o'clock the Germans had broken through to the division headquarters, and by the end of the day they had advanced in a narrow wedge to a depth of 24 km in a south-easterly direction. To localize the attack, the 4th Guards were introduced. tank corps and units of the 5th Guards. tank corps, which attacked the group that had broken through to the flank and rear.
The Br-2 long-range 152 mm gun is preparing to open fire on retreating German troops.
German artillerymen repulse an attack by Soviet troops.
German troops retreat across the river. August 1943
Soviet counterattack.
Fight on the outskirts of Kharkov. August 1943
"Panthers" shot down on the outskirts of Kharkov.
At the same time, units of the right wing of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th and 47th armies) continued to develop the offensive and advanced 12...20 km, hanging over the Akhtyr group from the north. On the morning of August 19, the 1st Tank Army also launched an attack on Akhtyrka. By noon, the advance of the Akhtyr group in the direction of Bogodukhov was stopped, and by the end of the day its position became precarious due to units of the 40th and 47th armies hanging from the rear. However, on August 20, the Germans tried to encircle two divisions of the 27th Army in the Kotelva area, but this plan failed. In repelling the offensive, the artillerymen and units of the engineering assault brigades especially distinguished themselves. Here the Germans lost 93 tanks, 134 guns and one armored train.
Despite the fact that the attack by the Akhtyrka group was stopped, it greatly slowed down the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and complicated the operation to encircle the Kharkov group of German troops. Only on August 21-25 the Akhtyrsk group was destroyed and the city was liberated.
Soviet artillery enters Kharkov.
T-34 tank on the outskirts of Kharkov.
"Panther", knocked out by a crew of Guards. senior sergeant Parfenov on the outskirts of Kharkov.
While the troops of the Voronezh Front were fighting in the Bogodukhov area, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached Kharkov. On August 18, troops of the 53rd Army began fighting for a heavily fortified forest area on the northwestern outskirts of the city. The Germans turned it into a fortified area, stuffed with machine gun emplacements and anti-tank guns. All attempts by the army to break through the massif into the city were repulsed. Only with the onset of darkness, having moved all the artillery to open positions, the Soviet troops managed to knock down the defenders from their positions, and by the morning of August 19 they reached the Uda River and began crossing in some places.
Due to the fact that most of the retreat routes of the German group from Kharkov were cut off, and the threat of complete encirclement loomed over the group itself, in the afternoon of August 22, the Germans began to withdraw their units from the city limits. However, all attempts by Soviet troops to break into the city were met with dense artillery and machine-gun fire from units left in the rearguard. In order to prevent German troops from withdrawing combat-ready units and serviceable equipment, the commander of the Steppe Front gave the order to conduct a night assault. Huge masses of troops were concentrated in a small area adjacent to the city, and at 2 a.m. on August 23 they began the assault.
“Tamed” “Panther” on the street of liberated Kharkov. August-September 1943
Total losses of tank armies during offensive operations
Note: The first number is tanks and self-propelled guns of all brands, in brackets - T-34
Irreversible losses amounted to up to 31% for T-34 tanks, and up to 43% of total losses for T-70 tanks. The sign “~” marks very contradictory data obtained indirectly.
Units of the 69th Army were the first to rush into the city, followed by units of the 7th Guards Army. The Germans retreated, covered by strong rearguards, reinforced tanks and assault guns. At 4:30 a.m. the 183rd Division reached Dzerzhinsky Square, and by dawn the city was largely liberated. But only in the afternoon did the fighting end on its outskirts, where the streets were clogged with equipment and weapons abandoned during the retreat. On the evening of the same day, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov, but fighting continued for another week to destroy the remnants of the Kharkov defensive group. On August 30, residents of Kharkov celebrated the complete liberation of the city. The Battle of Kursk is over.
CONCLUSION
TO The Battle of Ur was the first battle of the Second World War, in which masses of tanks took part on both sides. The attackers tried to use them according to the traditional scheme - to break through defensive lines in narrow areas and further develop the offensive. The defenders also relied on the experience of 1941-42. and initially used their tanks to carry out counterattacks designed to restore the difficult situation in certain sectors of the front.
However, this use of tank units was not justified, since both sides underestimated the increased power of their opponents' anti-tank defenses. The German troops were surprised by the high density of Soviet artillery and the good engineering preparation of the defense line. The Soviet command did not expect the high maneuverability of German anti-tank units, which quickly regrouped and met counterattacking Soviet tanks with well-aimed fire from ambushes even in the face of their own advance. As practice showed during the Battle of Kursk, the Germans achieved better results using tanks in the manner of self-propelled guns, firing at Soviet positions from a great distance, while infantry units stormed them. The defenders achieved better results by also using tanks “self-propelled”, firing from tanks buried in the ground.
Despite the high concentration of tanks in the armies of both sides, the main enemy of armored fighting vehicles remains anti-tank and self-propelled artillery. The total role of aviation, infantry and tanks in the fight against them was small - less than 25% of the total number of those shot down and destroyed.
However, it was the Battle of Kursk that became the event that prompted the development by both sides of new tactics for the use of tanks and self-propelled guns in the offensive and defensive.
Successful battles south of Kursk in the summer of 1943 were the center of attention of friends and foes of our Motherland, the subject of controversy in the pages of the world press, the cause of disappointment within the Hitler bloc and the greatest joyful event for the Soviet people.
From July 5 to July 12, our troops heroically defended themselves, then launched a powerful counterattack on the Nazi troops and drove them back to the positions they occupied before the start of the offensive. From July 24 to August 2, the troops of the Steppe and Voronezh fronts intensively and thoroughly prepared to break through enemy defenses and launch a decisive counteroffensive. This was the third major counteroffensive during the Great Patriotic War.
The counteroffensive near Kursk consisted of two operations: Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov.
I, the commander of the Steppe Front, would like to talk about the offensive of the front troops in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. It should immediately be noted that the counteroffensive near Kursk cannot be mechanically compared with the famous counteroffensives near Moscow and Stalingrad, since the military-political and economic situation in that period could not be compared logically with the situation in the summer of 1943.
Here, even before the start of the enemy’s offensive, we had powerful strategic reserves concentrated in advance, while the enemy did not have them and was forced to begin a hasty transfer of his troops to the Kursk direction from other sectors of the front, thereby weakening these sectors. Many other facts, which are easy to see even for a non-specialist in military affairs, indicate the incomparability of these operations.
The transition of our troops to a counteroffensive was a complete surprise for Hitler, since the German command never revealed our plan for deliberate defense. Moreover, the Germans, as already noted, had little success, only managing to wedge into our defenses in the Oboyan direction to a depth of 35 kilometers. The offensive of the troops of the Western (commanded by General V.D. Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by General M.M. Popov) fronts, which began on July 12, disrupted the entire enemy defense on the Oryol bridgehead. By the end of July 13, the 11th Guards Army (commanded by General I.Kh. Bagramyan) had penetrated 25 kilometers into the enemy’s defenses, and a week after the start of the offensive it advanced to a depth of 70 kilometers, posing a threat to the main communications of the enemy’s Oryol group from the north. -west. The troops of the Bryansk Front also achieved significant successes.
On July 15, dramatic changes occurred in the course of the struggle on the Oryol bridgehead. In the morning, after artillery and air preparation, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front launched a counteroffensive. The main blow was delivered to Gremyachevo at the center of the enemy group that had previously attacked Kursk. As a result of the fighting, the enemy was thrown back to their original positions.
The scale of the struggle in the Oryol direction was increasingly expanding. A question was being resolved that was of great importance for the further development of the war: how realistic was the German plan to transfer the struggle on the Soviet-German front into stable positional forms.
At a meeting at headquarters on July 26, Hitler demanded from the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Kluge, a rapid retreat of troops from the Oryol bridgehead, thereby reducing the front line and releasing a number of divisions for transfer to other areas.
Events unfolded extremely unfavorably for the enemy on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. By July 23, formations of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts threw the Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group back to their original positions.
By the end of July, the main forces of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts were concentrated north and north-west of Belgorod, which created the conditions for launching a deep frontal attack on the junction of the 4th Tank Army and the Kempf operational group. Based on this, it was decided to carry out a dissecting strike by the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts from the area north-west of Belgorod in the general direction of Valki, Novaya Vodolaga with the aim of splitting the Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and subsequent envelopment and defeat of enemy troops in the Kharkov area.
It is not without interest to present in full the plan of operation reported to Headquarters, which was approved and approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
“To Comrade Ivanov (conventional surname of I.V. Stalin).
We report:
In connection with the successful breakthrough of the enemy front and the development of the offensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, the operation will be carried out in the future according to the following plan.
1. 53A with Solomatin’s corps will advance along the Belgorod-Kharkov highway, delivering the main blow in the direction of Pergachi. The army must reach the Olshany-Dergachi line, replacing Zhadov’s units on this line.
69A advances to the left of 53A in the direction of Cheremoshnoye. Upon reaching Cheremoshnoye 69A, having transferred a couple of the best divisions to Managarov, it itself remains in the front reserve to complete the B area of Mikoyanovka, Cheremoshnoye, Gryaznoye.
69A it is necessary to submit a replenishment of 20,000 people as quickly as possible.
7th Guards And now it will advance from the Pushkarnoye area to Brodok and further to Bochkovka, turning the enemy front from north to south.
From the Cheremoshnoye, Ziborovka line, 7th Guards A will strike at Tsirkuny and will reach the Cherkasskoye, Lozovoye, Tsirkuny, Klyuchkin line.
Part of the forces from the Ziborovka area will advance on Murom and further on Ternovaya in order to help the 57th Army cross the river. Seversky Donets in the Rubezhnoye area, Star. Saltov.
2. It is advisable to transfer 57A of the South-Western Front to the subordination of the Steppe Front and now prepare the attack of 57A from the line Rubezhnoye, Star. Saltov in the general direction to Nepokrytaya and further to the state farm named after. Frunze.
57 And it is necessary to bring the Kutuzovka state farm, state farm named after. Frunze, Rogan (northern).
If 57A remains subordinate to the Southwestern Front, then it must be obliged to go on the offensive in the above direction with Shumilov’s approach to the Murom region.
3. To carry out the second stage, i.e. Kharkov operation, 5 Guards must be transferred to the Steppe Front. tank army, which will reach the area of Olshany, Stary Merchik, Ogultsy.
The Kharkov operation is tentatively proposed to be structured according to the following plan:
a) 53A, in cooperation with Rotmistrov’s army, will cover Kharkov from the west and southwest.
b) Shumilov’s army will advance from north to south from the Tsirkuna-Dergachi line.
c) 57A will attack from the east from the State Farm line named after. Frunze, Rogan, covering Kharkov from the south.
d) 69A (if it is replenished by this time) will deploy at the junction between Zhadov and Managarov in the Olshany area and will advance south to support the Kharkov operation from the south.
69 And it will connect to the line Snezhkov Kut, Minkovka, Prosyanoye, Novoselovka.
e) The left flank of the Voronezh Front must be brought to the line Otrada, Kolomak, Snezhkov Kut.
This task must be completed by Zhadov’s army and the left flank of the 27th Army.
It is advisable to have Katukov’s army in the area of Kovyagi, Alekseevka, Merefa.
The Southwestern Front needs to strike from the Zamosc region in the general direction of Merefa, attacking on both banks of the river. Mzha, with part of the forces to advance through Chuguev to Osnova, with part of the forces it is necessary to clear the forest south of Zamosc from the enemy and reach the Novoselovka, Okhochae, Verkh line. Bishkin, Geevka.
4. To carry out the Kharkov operation, it is necessary, in addition to 20,000 replenishments, to give 15 thousand to replenish the divisions of the 53rd and 7th Guards. armies, to complete the tank units of the front, give 200 T-34s and 100 T-70s, KB - 35 pieces. Transfer four regiments of self-propelled artillery and two engineering brigades. Replenish the front air force with attack aircraft, fighters and bombers in the following quantities: fighters - 90, Pe-2 - 40, Il-2 - 60.
We ask for approval. No. 64, 6. 8. 43.
Zhukov, Konev, Zakharov" [TsAMO, f. 48-A, op. 1691, d. 233, l. 397-401].
As follows from this plan, the attacks of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts split the enemy’s defenses into isolated parts, and conditions were created for the destruction of the enemy group in parts.
What was the enemy grouping like? To defend the Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead, the Germans maintained a large group of troops in the amount of 14 infantry and 4 tank divisions. In addition, during the battle, the enemy transferred another 5 tank, motorized and 4 infantry divisions to this direction.
It should be noted that during the war, Hitler’s troops learned to create a strong, well-equipped and deeply echeloned defense.
The enemy's tactical defense zone consisted of the main and second stripes with a total depth of up to 18 kilometers. At the same time, the enemy’s main defense line, 6-8 kilometers deep, consisted of two positions, each of which was equipped with strong points and resistance units, interconnected by full-profile trenches. The trenches were connected by communication passages. The enemy had a significant number of bunkers at strong points. The second stripe consisted of one position 2-3 kilometers deep. There was an intermediate position between the main and second stripes.
The enemy prepared populated areas for all-round defense. Two ring bypasses were equipped around Kharkov. Belgorod was also well protected by defensive structures, strongholds with many firing points, several rows of barbed wire with a huge number of minefields.
The stone buildings were turned into small "fortresses".
The chalk mountains of Belgorod were used to cover enemy troops.
It is no coincidence that the Germans attached great strategic importance to the Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead. It was the strongest bastion of German defense in the east, the gate blocking our troops’ path to Ukraine. On the territory of this bridgehead was located one of the most important economic and political centers of the Soviet Union, the second capital of Ukraine - Kharkov, as well as Belgorod, Sumy, Akhtyrka, Lebedin, Bogodukhov, Chuguev and other cities.
Kharkov, which was regarded by Hitler as the “eastern gate” of Ukraine, occupied a special position in the enemy’s defense. And this is understandable: Kharkov is the largest railway junction on the routes from Moscow to Donbass, Crimea, the Caucasus, the most important junction of highways and airlines, a city of mechanical engineering, metalworking, chemical, light and food industries. Attaching great strategic importance to Kharkov, Hitler demanded that his generals hold the city at all costs.
The rugged terrain, combined with strong enemy defenses, made our offensive operations difficult.
In the 17th century, the so-called Belgorod line passed here - a defensive line, which was a series of fortresses, earthworks and fortifications that protected the Russian state from raids from the south. New fortifications, more serious than the previous ones, arose on the sites of the ancient settlements.
We have prepared thoroughly to successfully complete the tasks set by Headquarters. It is enough to note that in the directions of the main attacks of the 5th Guards and 53rd armies, operating in the main zone of the main attack, the density of artillery saturation reached 230 barrels per kilometer of front. This created such a fire attack that, according to the testimony of prisoners, many surviving German soldiers lost their minds.
At dawn on August 3, a counter-offensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction began with powerful artillery and aviation preparations. The enemy's defenses were broken through. In the first half of the day, formations of the combined arms armies of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in the direction of the main attack wedged themselves into the enemy’s defenses to a depth of 5-6 kilometers. Soon the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies were introduced into the breakthrough with the task of the advanced brigades to complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone and the main forces to develop success in operational depth.
With the breakthrough of the enemy defenses, the troops of the Steppe Front were practically faced with the task of liberating Belgorod. Knowing that an attack on Belgorod from the north would require a lot of effort, I did everything to ensure that the formations of the right wing of the 53rd Army of General I.M. Managarov and the 1st mechanized corps M.D. operating in its zone. Solomatin to enter the enemy's retreat route to the west. The attack from the front was carried out by the 69th Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkin, and the 7th Guards Army under the command of General M.S. Shumilova (member of the Military Council Z.T. Serdyuk), having crossed the Seversky Donets, was supposed to attack the enemy garrison from the east.
So, before the offensive, the front line of the enemy’s defense was carefully processed, the entire fire system was suppressed. And then, after identifying the remaining unsuppressed firing points, they were destroyed by a repeated artillery raid and aviation of the 5th Air Army under the command of Lieutenant General of Aviation S.K. Goryunova. Artillerymen of divisions and regiments and artillery divisions of the RGK played a major role in processing the enemy’s front line. We must pay tribute to the front artillery commander, Lieutenant General N.S. Fomin and the representative of the Headquarters, General M.N. Chistyakov, who skillfully and creatively organized such a powerful artillery offensive. But, despite all this, on August 4, enemy resistance intensified.
The rate of advance of our troops has slowed down. All our attempts to enter from the flank in order to deliver an outflanking blow to the enemy failed. The main enemy tank group, located in front of our front, offered fierce resistance, although our tank armies were already crushing enemy reserves.
On August 4, troops of the 53rd and 69th armies of the Steppe Front, fighting fierce battles, broke through the second and third enemy defensive lines covering Belgorod from the north.
7th Guards Army consisting of eight rifle divisions (111th and 15th Guards Rifle Divisions of the 49th Guards Rifle Corps, 73rd, 78th, 81st Guards Rifle Divisions of the 25th Guards Rifle Corps, 72 -I, 36th Guards and 213th Rifle Divisions of the 24th Guards Rifle Corps) with many tank and artillery regiments and brigades, wedged into the enemy’s defenses, attacked Belgorod from the east. It liquidated the Mikhailovsky bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets, and its formations began fighting on the western bank.
The German command became worried. On August 4, the 3rd Panzer Corps and the SS Panzer Corps began moving from Donbass to the Kharkov direction. The directorates (headquarters) of these corps were already in Kharkov.
I demanded that the 53rd Army with the 1st Mechanized Corps destroy units of the enemy’s 6th Tank Division and develop an offensive towards Mikoyanovka. The 1st Mechanized Corps managed to reach the Gryaznoye and Repnoye area from behind the army’s right flank and cut off the Belgorod German group’s escape route to the southwest and south.
The 69th Army, with the assistance of the 7th Guards Army, was supposed to capture Belgorod, and the 7th Guards Army was to break through the enemy defenses and reach the Tavrovo, Brodon line in order to, in cooperation with the 69th and 53rd armies, encircle the Belgorod group of Germans .
The fighting for the city became fierce. The first to break into Belgorod at 6 a.m. on August 5 were units of the 270th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 89th Guards Rifle Division (division commander Colonel M.P. Seryugin), as well as units of the 305th and 375th Rifle Divisions under the command of Colonel respectively A.F. Vasiliev and Colonel P.D. Govorunenko. From the east, the city was attacked by the 93rd Guards and 111th Rifle Divisions of the 7th Guards Army.
On August 5, troops of the 69th and formations of the 7th Guards Army of the Steppe Front took Belgorod by storm. On the same day, after intense fighting, Oryol was liberated. The capital of our Motherland, Moscow, celebrated outstanding victories with an artillery salute for the first time during the Great Patriotic War. This was the first artillery salute in honor of the military valor of the Soviet troops. Since then, fireworks in Moscow to commemorate the victories of the Red Army have become a glorious tradition.
Meanwhile, our tank armies, possessing high maneuverability, successfully operated in isolation from the main forces of the combined arms armies. In five days, the formation of the 1st Tank Army, commanded by General M.E. Katukov, advanced more than 100 kilometers into the enemy’s defenses and by the end of August 7 captured Bogodukhov, the 5th Guards Tank Army captured Cossack Lopan and Zolochev. The Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group was cut into two parts.
The offensive of our troops continued to develop rapidly. By August 11, the troops of the Voronezh Front, having significantly expanded the breakthrough in the western and southwestern directions, approached Boromlya, Akhtyrka, Kotelva and cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway, and the troops of the Steppe Front, overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy tank group, approached the outer contour of the Kharkov defensive lines.
The enemy thoroughly prepared for the fight for the city. It was not easy to take such a fortified area. All our attention was focused here, on this fortress, for the construction of which the Nazis brought many thousands of people. The enemy's desire to hold the city was great.
The enemy's defense, according to intelligence data and testimony from prisoners, was a system of bunkers with an overlap of two or three ramps and partially reinforced concrete structures. Flanking and oblique fire was widely used, all resistance units had fire communications, firing points were connected by communication passages, the front edge was reinforced with engineering structures, wire and anti-tank barriers, and minefields.
All stone buildings on the outskirts of the city were turned into a kind of long-term firing points, the lower floors of the Houses were used as firing positions for artillery, the upper floors were occupied by machine gunners, machine gunners and grenade launchers.
Entrances to the city and streets on the outskirts were mined and blocked with barricades. The inner city districts were also prepared for defense with an anti-tank fire system.
For the defense of Kharkov, the German command concentrated a strong group consisting of eight infantry, two tank divisions, artillery units, many SS detachments, police and other units, concentrating them mainly on the northern and eastern fronts of the outer defensive perimeter with significant echeloning of troops in depth. Hitler ordered to hold Kharkov at any cost and demanded that the generals widely use reprisals against soldiers and officers who showed signs of cowardice and unwillingness to fight. He pointed out to Manstein that the loss of Kharkov would create the threat of the loss of Donbass.
To prevent the possibility of deep envelopment of the Kharkov group of troops from the southwest, the Nazi command introduced operational reserves into battle against the troops of the Voronezh Front - tank and motorized rifle divisions transferred from Donbass and from the Oryol direction, which launched strong counterattacks on our troops at Bogodukhovsky, and then and in the Akhtyrsky directions. At the same time, measures were taken to strengthen the troops fighting for Kharkov. SS tank divisions were transferred here: “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Viking”, 3rd Panzer Division and motorized division “Grossdeutschland”.
If the enemy took all measures to hold Kharkov, then we had to take it at all costs. The task was not easy. During the war, Soviet troops launched offensive operations three times to liberate Kharkov. The first offensive was carried out by troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts in May 1942. At first, they broke through the enemy's defenses and advanced to an insignificant depth. However, insufficient preparation and the enemy's significant superiority in manpower and equipment took their toll. The offensive did not achieve its goal.
In February 1943, the liberation of the Kharkov region began again. During this offensive, on February 16, troops of the Voronezh Front liberated Kharkov. But at the end of February the enemy regrouped his forces, brought up fresh reserves and launched a counteroffensive. On March 15, 1943, Kharkov was abandoned again, although the soldiers fought heroically for the city.
It is not my task to analyze the reasons for failures. Participants in the battles and military historians have already spoken about this. Marshal of the Soviet Union K. S. Moskalenko writes about this in particular detail in his book “In the South-Western Direction.” However, at the time when we had to liberate Kharkov for the third time and forever, I remembered the unsuccessful lessons and decided to take into account the experience of previous operations in order to act for sure.
Of course, the strategic situation during the Battle of Kursk was more favorable for us, but this should not have reassured us. I had to think a lot and hard, weigh all the factors, analyze data about the enemy, study the enemy’s defenses, personally check everything. There was a great desire to liberate the city this time with a full guarantee that once again it would not be necessary to give it to the enemy. To do this, it was necessary to completely defeat the enemy, knock him out of Kharkov, causing as little destruction as possible to the city. Under no circumstances should the city or individual districts be allowed to change hands. This leads to the complete destruction of the populated area. We knew this well from the example of Voronezh.
We began to carefully prepare for the upcoming difficult battles for Kharkov. Together with the front artillery commander, tank crews, aviators, army commanders, and in some cases division commanders, we studied the most advantageous approaches to the city. For this purpose, I went to NP P.A. Rotmistrova, I.M. Managarova, N.A. Gagena, M.S. Shumilov, where together we figured out where and with what forces it would be better to strike. Assessing the terrain, the nature of the enemy’s fortifications, they planned a maneuver with their troops, a place where it would be advisable to concentrate the main striking force of the artillery, where it would be more convenient to launch a tank attack, where to target the aircraft. It was a difficult process. It was necessary to take into account everything positive and negative, to find the right key to success.
While visiting General N.A. Gagena, I became interested in the south-eastern direction from Volchansk, but here the development of the attack could be hampered by rivers with steep banks, the enemy would certainly hold on to them.
Just before the NP of General M.S. Shumilov opened a panorama of Kharkov. M.S. Shumilov managed to enter the outskirts of the Kharkov Tractor Plant. It’s more convenient to take the city from here. But with this option, more artillery will be required, since it is necessary for our troops to punch a path through reinforced concrete factory structures. I didn’t want to cause such great destruction to the city’s largest enterprise. And there was no particular expediency in delivering the main blow from here either. The actions of the P.A. tank army will be difficult here. Rotmistrov, who will require a significant regrouping of forces. It is better if the army of General M.S. Shumilova will storm individual factory buildings and conduct street battles.
69th Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkina attacked Kharkov from the north, along the Moscow highway, directly head-on and had very strong strongholds in front of it in the form of factory buildings adapted for defense. It would seem that the direction is the most direct and closest, but it is also the most difficult for the advancing infantry. Leaving the OP, I weighed all the pros and cons in my mind, aiming at Kharkov from all sides, from different directions, and finally came to the final decision: the most advantageous direction for delivering the main attack is the north-west, where the 53rd Army of the general is located THEM. Managarova. Members of the Military Council in the army were generals P.I. Gorokhov and A.V. Tsarev, chief of staff - General K.N. Derevianko. Here are the best approaches to the city, forest, commanding heights from which the whole of Kharkov is clearly visible. Now it was necessary to resolve the issue of ensuring the attack of this army from the west from Lyubotin, from where enemy tank divisions were intermittently counterattacking. We decided to oppose tanks with tanks and conduct an attack on the city in that direction with two armies: the 53rd Army and the P.A. Tank Army. Rotmistrov. True, this army, again returned to the front, was no longer the same as it left us. Fierce fighting weakened it; it had only 160 tanks and self-propelled guns. However, these forces could significantly facilitate the front’s solution to the main task.
Thus, in thought and doubt, the final plan for the capture of Kharkov was born, and the idea of the operation was developed.
My forward command post was located in the sector of the 53rd Army of General I.M. Managarova, i.e. on the main direction.
The day and hour of the decisive offensive was approaching.
Not knowing the position of the troops at the front, but wanting to see Kharkov free as soon as possible, some representatives of the Ukrainian SSR came to me at the command post and expressed displeasure with our slow advance. I confess that I could not give them due attention, explain everything properly, and I did not have the right to disclose the operational plan. Time is running out. I was absorbed in leading the troops.
All these days the front troops conducted active combat operations. There was no respite. The enemy was constantly being pressed, knocked out of fortified units, and beaten by artillery and aircraft. Slowly but surely, the front troops moved forward to come close to the city. Of course, it would be good not only to knock the enemy out of the city, but also to surround him. However, it must be said that a bypass of such a large center as Kharkov, its complete encirclement, given the current disposition of our troops, would be associated with great destruction. This became clear when we were still approaching the city. The enemy at that time still had large tank forces and was constantly maneuvering them, so the encirclement of Kharkov was a difficult task for the front. The Voronezh Front could have helped us with this, but it got involved in tank battles at Bogodukhov. The Southwestern Front could have made a deep detour, but by this time, unfortunately, the offensive of this front had not developed.
On August 8, at my request, by decision of the Headquarters, the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was transferred to our front.
On August 10, I gave a directive to capture Kharkov. Its main idea was to defeat the enemy group defending in the Kharkov region on the approaches to Kharkov, in the field. We clearly understood that the fight in the city, which was so carefully prepared for defense, would require very great efforts from the troops, would be fraught with significant losses of personnel and could become protracted. In addition, fighting in the city could lead to unnecessary civilian casualties, as well as the destruction of residential buildings and surviving industrial plants. Everything had to be done to split and defeat the enemy group in the field, to deprive it of interaction with the tank forces that were launching a counterattack in the Bogodukhov area, and to isolate the city from the influx of tank reserves from the west.
Compared to the original plan of the operation, the plan for taking the city was clarified and consisted of the following: the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of General P.A. Rotmistrova struck west of Kharkov - on Korotich and Lyubotin. The purpose of the strike is to cut off the enemy’s escape route to Poltava and isolate Kharkov from the influx of enemy reserves from Bogodukhov. 53rd Army under the command of General I.M. Managarova and the 1st Mechanized Corps under the command of General M.D. Solomatin attacked the western and northwestern outskirts of Kharkov. 69th Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkina attacked Kharkov from the north along the Moscow highway. 7th Guards Army of General M.S. Shumilova advanced on the northeastern outskirts of the city, and the 57th Army was on the left wing of the front, south of Kharkov.
To ensure a breakthrough of the external defensive contour, the troops of the Steppe Front were reinforced with 4234 guns and mortars with a ratio of 6.5:1 in our favor.
On August 11, fierce battles were already underway with the enemy, who stubbornly defended strongholds and centers of resistance located to the north of the defensive contour and covering the approaches to it. Only by nightfall did the 53rd, 69th and 7th Guards Armies along the entire front come close to the outer Kharkov defensive perimeter.
The 57th Army, having overcome the enemy's second defensive line, captured large centers of resistance and approached with its right flank the intermediate line covering Kharkov from the southeast. In some areas, fierce battles broke out in trenches.
The 69th Army, having eliminated large enemy resistance centers in the Cherkasskoye-Lozovoye and Bolshaya Danilovka areas and destroyed up to a thousand Nazis, came close to the city perimeter on the northern outskirts of Kharkov. With its center, the army wedged itself into the depths of the city's perimeter, capturing Sokolniki - one of the strongholds that were part of the city's defense system.
The 7th Guards Army, having completed the breakthrough of the outer contour, bypassed Kharkov from the northeast; The 57th Army crossed the Roganka River and immediately broke through the intermediate defensive line and outer contour with its right flank.
As a result of very intense battles on August 12 and 13, the troops of our front in a number of sectors came close to the city perimeter and started fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov.
The German command threw everything that could be opposed to our troops for defense, and for four days we had to fight stubborn battles on the achieved lines, repelling the fierce counterattacks of the Nazis, who tried to delay our offensive at any cost. But all their counterattacks were repulsed, and the troops of the 53rd, 5th Guards Tank and 57th armies were preparing to launch new attacks with the aim of deep coverage of Kharkov from the west, east and south.
Particularly brutal battles unfolded from August 18 to 22, when the Germans tried to defeat the main forces of the strike force of the Voronezh Front in the Bogodukhov area in order to achieve a decisive change in the situation in their favor throughout the Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead.
However, these enemy attempts could not change the course of the battle for Kharkov.
On the morning of August 18, the 53rd and 57th armies continued their offensive, trying to more tightly cover Kharkov from the west and southwest. The troops of the 53rd Army had to fight heavy battles northwest of Kharkov to clear the forest area. The offensive of the 299th and 84th rifle divisions of this army on the northern edge of the forest was unsuccessful. Then, together with General I.M. Managarov, we made a decision: to break through the enemy’s defenses with a night attack and take possession of the forest. All division artillery, part of the army artillery and tanks were moved to firing positions for direct fire. After a powerful fire raid by part of the 299th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel A.Ya. Klimenko and the 84th Infantry Division under the command of General P.I. Bunyashin broke the enemy's resistance and captured the forest. The 252nd Infantry Division was brought in from the reserve under the command of General G.I. Anisimova. I observed the actions of the division. Its units quickly and skillfully advanced through the forest and, in cooperation with the 299th and 84th Rifle Divisions, by the morning of August 19, having cleared the forest, they began fighting for the village of Peresechnaya and crossings across the Uda River.
In these battles, the soldiers of the 1st battalion of the 41st rifle regiment of the 81st rifle division under the command of Senior Lieutenant Eremenko especially distinguished themselves. The soldiers of this battalion's companies proved themselves to be heroes in the night hand-to-hand combat. The forest area liberated from the enemy played the role of a good approach and a convenient springboard in the further struggle for Kharkov.
So, units of the 53rd Army captured advantageous positions to strike the western and northwestern outskirts of Kharkov. From a height of 208.6 and from the edge of the forest there was a view of the city. My observation post was equipped at an altitude of 197.3 and combined with the observation post of General I.M. Managarova. From here I led the military operations to liberate Kharkov.
To speed up the capture of Kharkov, I gave the order to concentrate the 5th Guards Tank Army in the forest area south of the village of Polevoe. With a strike on Korotich, it was supposed to cut off the enemy’s escape routes from Kharkov to the west and southwest.
Using crossings and passages through the railway embankment established at night and concentrating its tanks on the southern bank of the Uda, the 5th Guards Tank Army went on the offensive and enveloped the enemy group in the Kharkov region from the west and southwest, and the 57th Army from the south. east.
The enemy group in the Kharkov region faced the threat of complete encirclement. Only one railway and one highway remained at his disposal, and even those were under constant attacks from the 5th Air Army.
At the same time, the neighbor on the right, the 5th Guards Army under the command of General A.S. Zhadov, closely cooperating with the 53rd Army, was advancing west of Kharkov.
During the intense struggle for Kharkov, the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, having successfully completed the Oryol offensive operation, reached the approaches to Bryansk; troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts launched battles for the liberation of Donbass; On the Voronezh Front, enemy counterattacks in the area of Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka did not bring him success, although the troops of this front suffered significant losses in fierce battles on August 17–20. However, according to the testimony of General S.M. Shtemenko, who tells about that period in his book “The General Staff during the War,” the intervention of I.V. Stalin, who pointed out to the commander of the Voronezh Front the inadmissibility of dispersing forces and means, soon rectified the situation [See: Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war. M., 1975, book 1, pp. 245-246].
In the afternoon of August 22, Nazi troops began to retreat from the Kharkov area. In order to prevent the enemy from escaping from the attacks, on the evening of August 22, I gave the order for a night assault on Kharkov.
Throughout the night of August 23, there were street battles in the city, fires blazed, and strong explosions were heard. Warriors of the 53rd, 69th, 7th Guards, 57th Armies and 5th Guards Tank Army, showing courage and courage, skillfully bypassed enemy strongholds, infiltrated their defenses, and attacked their garrisons from the rear. Step by step, Soviet soldiers cleared Kharkov from fascist invaders.
The units of the 183rd Infantry Division, which burst into the city at dawn on August 23, successfully advanced along Sumskaya Street and were the first to reach Dzerzhinsky Square. Soldiers of the 89th Guards Rifle Division walked along Klochkovskaya Street to the State Industry Building and hoisted the Red Banner over it.
By 11 o'clock on August 23, the troops of the Steppe Front completely liberated Kharkov. Most of the group defending the city was destroyed. Its remnants retreated.
During the five months of secondary occupation, the Nazis further destroyed Kharkov. They burned and blew up hundreds of the best buildings, robbed the city completely, even took away tram rails, furniture, store equipment, and firewood. On the territory of the Clinical Town, where the hospital was located, the Nazis destroyed about 450 wounded soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. There were ruins everywhere. The city, which is now home to more than a million inhabitants, then had only 190 thousand people. According to far from complete data, the Nazis destroyed over 60 thousand Kharkov residents in concentration camps, more than 150 thousand were taken to Germany. August 23 became the day of liberation of Kharkov.
Before reporting to I.V. To Stalin about the state of affairs at the front and the liberation of Kharkov, as usual, I called Poskrebyshev. He replied:
– Comrade Stalin is resting. I won't bother him. Then I decided to call myself. The first calls were not answered. I demanded from the telephone operator:
- Call again. I am responsible for the consequences.
- I’m listening...
– I report, Comrade Stalin, the troops of the Steppe Front today liberated the city of Kharkov.
Stalin did not hesitate to answer:
- Congratulations. We will salute in the first class.
It is worth noting that when working at night, Stalin usually rested at this time. I knew about this, but nevertheless, the capture of Kharkov was such an important event that I could not help but report to him personally about the completion of the Kharkov operation.
In the evening, Moscow again saluted the soldiers of the Steppe Front, this time for the liberation of Kharkov, with 20 salvoes from 224 guns.
On August 23, 1943, an order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was announced in all units and formations, which stated that in the battles for Kharkov, all soldiers, officers and generals showed their courage, heroism, bravery and ability to beat the hated enemy. Gratitude was expressed to all frontline personnel. 10 divisions of the Steppe Front - 89th Guards Belgorod Rifle, 252nd, 84th, 299th, 116th, 375th, 183rd Rifle, 15th, 28th, 93rd Guards Rifle – were awarded the high honor of being called “Kharkovsky”. A number of units, as well as a large number of generals, officers, sergeants and Red Army soldiers received government awards.
The rally of soldiers and workers held on August 30 at the monument to T.G. will remain in the memory of the participants in the liberation of Kharkov and residents of the city for a long time. Shevchenko. As we expected, enemy aircraft went on a rampage that day.
Apparently intending to take revenge on us for defeating him during the capture of Kharkov, the enemy decided to destroy Kharkov from the air. But not a single enemy aircraft managed to break through the fire of our anti-aircraft gunners and bypass the dense air cover of the city by the forces of the 5th Air Army. When giving the order to cover the city with aviation during the demonstration, I told the commander of the 5th Air Army that it was necessary to create a reliable “protective umbrella.”
All the surviving residents of the city took to the streets. Kharkov rejoiced. Kharkov residents rejoiced at the complete and final liberation from the Nazi invaders. The square greeted the appearance of representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the government, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. on the podium with stormy applause and cheers of joy. Zhukov, the front command and delegations of party and Soviet organizations of Kharkov, the intelligentsia, workers and peasants. The meeting was opened by the secretary of the Kharkov city committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Churaev. The first word was given to me. In my speech, I noted that in fierce battles, the soldiers of the Steppe Front, with the assistance of the armies of the Voronezh Front, defeated the best German tank divisions and liberated Belgorod, and then the second capital of Ukraine, Kharkov.
The Battle of Kursk was the “swan song” of the German tank forces, since the huge losses they suffered in this battle in tanks and personnel excluded the possibility of restoring their former combat power. Next, I conveyed military greetings from the soldiers, officers and generals of the front to all participants in the rally and congratulated the Kharkov residents on their liberation from fascist captivity.
Then the commander of the 89th Guards Belgorod-Kharkov Rifle Division, General M.P., spoke. Seryugin, professor A.V. Tereshchenko, engineer of the Hammer and Sickle plant Borziy and others. In conclusion, a greeting was read out on behalf of the Communist Party of Ukraine.
The square was crowded with people. White scarves flashed in the crowd every now and then - people were crying with joy.
Remembering these events, I feel a great sense of pride for our Soviet soldiers, for the entire Soviet people, who showed patriotism, courage and heroism unprecedented in history in the fight against the Nazi invaders.
What brief conclusions can be drawn from what was said in this chapter? First of all, it should be noted that both here and in subsequent chapters I will not be able to talk about great events in detail; I am not able to mention everyone, even the most distinguished commanders of formations and units; it is not possible to give a comprehensive analysis of the actions of infantrymen, tank crews, artillerymen, and pilots , signalmen, engineers, etc., although they all deserve it. Therefore, it is difficult to dwell in detail on all issues in conclusions.
As follows from what has been said, victory in the battle for Kharkov was not easy for us. The front troops were advancing against a powerful, not yet resolved enemy tank group, which was striking on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. I would like to at least briefly talk about the combat valor of all branches of the military that showed true heroism in the fight against a strong and experienced enemy. Our infantry, the queen of the fields, having undergone organizational qualitative changes even before the war (it had many of its own automatic weapons, its own artillery and mortars), took on the brunt of military labor.
The very name “infantry” changed; it was renamed “rifle troops,” whose role in battle as the most massive type of troops was enormous. Rifle battalions and regiments, accompanied by the thunder of artillery, together with tanks, with the support of aviation, set the tone for the attack. Advancing, they completed the battle and, together with tanks, artillery and sappers, consolidated the conquered positions.
The Soviet people always lovingly pay tribute to the courage and heroism of the soldiers of the rifle troops. Who now does not know the names of the Heroes of the Soviet Union - Alexander Matrosov, Yuri Smirnov, Meliton Kantaria, Mikhail Egorov and many, many other soldiers of the rifle troops who exalted our Motherland with their exploits!
Our artillerymen, representatives of the fire and strike force, steadfastly held back the enemy's onslaught on the defensive and provided excellent support for offensive operations.
Soviet tank crews also convincingly proved their moral and combat superiority over the enemy. The technical superiority of our T-34 tank was clearly demonstrated on the battlefield. The tactical training of the tank crews also turned out to be significantly higher. Soviet tank forces under the command of generals P.S. Rybalko, P.A. Rotmistrova, S.I. Bogdanova, M.E. Katukova and V.M. Badanov fought skillfully and bravely at all stages of the struggle, and were a powerful striking and maneuverable force of the ground forces.
Experience has confirmed that the created tank armies of the new organization have fully justified themselves as operational formations capable of conducting combat operations in operational depth and in isolation from rifle formations.
Our pilots, commanded by Generals S.A., played a big role in this operation. Krasovsky, S.I. Rudenko, V.A. Sudets, S.K. Goryunov, M.M. Gromov, T.T. Khryukin and N.F. Naumenko.
The command and headquarters played a significant role in the successful conduct of the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. Much credit goes to the entire staff of the front headquarters, which was skillfully led by General M.V. Zakharov.
The military councils of the armies, army commanders, and army headquarters rose to the occasion. In the battle for Kharkov, particularly important tasks fell to the 53rd Army. Its army commander is the strong-willed, experienced and brave General I.M. During combat operations, Managarov, in order to always see the battlefield, was no more than 2-3 kilometers from the line of battle formations. Moreover, the general often risked his life (for which he often received reprimands from senior commanders), was wounded several times, but continued to lead the troops using the same methods.
The Military Council of the 53rd Army stood out for its efficiency and organization, where General P.I. was a member of the Military Council. Gorokhov (I knew him when I was a regiment commander), as well as the army headquarters led by General K.N. Derevianko.
The heroes of Stalingrad, generals M.S., skillfully led the troops of the 7th and 5th Guards armies. Shumilov and A.S. Zhadov. The commander of the 57th Army, General N.A., has repeatedly shown persistence and perseverance in achieving the goal. Hagen and the commander of the 69th Army V.D. Kryuchenkin.
Now it is difficult to name all the commanders and political workers of the formations and units of the front who made a worthy contribution to our victory, but their military deeds did not go unnoticed. The Motherland has repeatedly recognized the merits of generals, officers, sergeants and ordinary soldiers of the Steppe Front with government awards.
The counteroffensive in the Battle of Kursk ended victoriously with the defeat of the enemy group in the Belgorod and Kharkov area and the liquidation of its Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead.
During the offensive battles, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, with the assistance of troops of the Southwestern Front, inflicted a crushing defeat on the strike group advancing on Kursk from the south, and defeated 15 enemy divisions. Already from the second half of July, the counter-offensive of our troops grew into a general offensive of the Red Army and led to the collapse of the Nazi front from Velikiye Luki to the Sea of Azov.
The Battle of Kursk and subsequent offensives were one of the most important and decisive events of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. In this battle, Hitler's offensive strategy suffered a complete collapse and the inability of the German defense to withstand our offensive, which was successfully carried out for the first time on a large scale in summer conditions, was revealed. After the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Soviet Armed Forces firmly retained the strategic initiative in their hands until the end of the war.
The battle was a major contribution to the development of Soviet military art and military science. In this regard, I would like to once again clarify some of the considerations expressed above regarding the concept of the operation and the use of strategic reserves.
As already mentioned, in the area of the Kursk salient, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to switch to deliberate defense. A correct assessment of the situation and prediction of events allowed us to draw the correct conclusion that the main events would unfold in the Kursk region. That is why the Headquarters envisaged bleeding the enemy here in a defensive battle, and then choosing the moment to go on a counter-offensive with the aim of finally defeating the strike forces of Hitler’s troops.
The course of events confirmed the correctness of this decision. As a result of the defensive battle, the enemy was exhausted, bleeding, and brought all his reserves into the battle. At this critical moment for the enemy, our troops launched a counteroffensive and finally defeated him in two strategic operations - Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov. The decisive defeat of the enemy was achieved not in a defensive battle, but in offensive operations. Here we had an outstanding example of the creative approach of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the General Staff, and the front command in determining strategic tasks for the summer of 1943.
The experience of the Battle of Kursk, as well as a number of other operations, teaches that in order to achieve major strategic success it is necessary to have large reserves, which in this case were the troops of the Steppe Front.
The course of the Battle of Kursk showed that thanks to the introduction of strategic reserves, it was possible to create the necessary superiority in forces over the enemy, favorable maneuver conditions, quickly disrupt the enemy’s offensive, and then launch a decisive counteroffensive.
Of course, it would be ideal to preserve the Steppe Front and, if necessary, strike with all its forces. But the situation developed in such a way that the Headquarters demanded that the enemy’s attacks in the Prokhorovsk direction be immediately countered by the nearest reserves. And the Steppe Front was next to the fighting Voronezh Front. That is why, first, at the direction of Headquarters, two tank corps were taken from the Steppe Front, then two armies, and after some time, two more armies. In general, the experience of using strategic reserves in the Battle of Kursk is very instructive and has not lost its significance in modern conditions.
True, the nature and quality of strategic reserves have now changed somewhat, but the question of their creation and the timeliness of their deployment in the direction of the main attack remains one of the main ones in the art of war.
In the organization and conduct of the defense near Kursk, the basic essence of defense in the understanding of Soviet military art, which considers it as a type of military action used to bleed the enemy and create favorable conditions for launching a counteroffensive, was extremely clearly demonstrated.
It is necessary to recall once again that the defense at Kursk was deliberate, and this left its mark on its entire character. It is known, for example, that our troops near Kursk were very rich in artillery, the positions were well equipped, and the battle formations were deeply echeloned. The defense near Kursk was not only more stable, but also more active than near Moscow and Stalingrad. This was expressed primarily in the conduct of powerful artillery and air counter-preparation, in the timely occupation of zones prepared for defense, in a wide maneuver of forces and means, and in conducting counterattacks against enemy troops. The deep, multi-line defense near Kursk was built primarily as an anti-tank defense. It was distinguished by great stability, which was achieved by the correct location of anti-tank strong points and areas, close fire interaction between them, the widespread use of engineering obstacles, minefields linked to the anti-tank fire system, and the maneuver of anti-tank artillery reserves. But the victory in this battle was won by the offensive.
In the Battle of Kursk, the very important problem of organizing a breakthrough of the enemy’s previously prepared and deeply echeloned defense in the Bryansk and Kharkov directions was successfully resolved.
The breakthrough of the enemy's defenses was carried out in relatively narrow sectors of the front, on which forces and means were boldly massed, which ensured numerical and material superiority over the enemy troops. It is enough, for example, to note that the commander of the 11th Guards Army of the Western Front, General I.Kh. Bagramyan concentrated 92 percent of rifle divisions and all means of reinforcement in the breakthrough area, which made up about 40 percent of the army’s total offensive front. The main forces in the direction of the main attack were also concentrated in the troops of the 5th Guards and 53rd armies. Here the operational density was 1.5 kilometers per division, up to 230 guns and mortars and up to 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer of front.
This massing of forces and means, combined with good preparation for the offensive, ensured the successful breaking of the enemy's long-term defense.
Breakthrough is an art, and not just the result of arithmetic calculations. From the experience of the war we know many examples of how sometimes it was difficult to achieve a breakthrough. As a rule, the main content of an operational breakthrough was the defeat of the main enemy forces in the tactical zone and the creation of conditions for the introduction of mobile forces into the breakthrough - tank armies or the second echelons of the front (army).
To develop success in operational depth, in the Battle of Kursk, tank armies were introduced into the breakthrough for the first time, forming a mobile group of the front. Of particular interest is the use of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. Operating side by side, after breaking through the tactical defense zone, they launched a rapid offensive and advanced up to 120–150 kilometers. The 1st Tank Army, advancing in the Bogodukhov direction, marched 20–30 kilometers a day in isolation from the combined arms armies, striking at operational reserves, at the flanks and rear of Nazi troops, forcing them to abandon their defensive positions and retreat.
It should be noted that the Steppe Front included 1,380 armored units. In total, the three fronts in the Battle of Kursk included 4,980 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, which amounted to approximately 50 percent of the armored units of the entire army. This indicates that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command provided for the massive use of armored and mechanized troops in the main strategic direction. The result of this far-sighted planning is well known.
An unprecedented oncoming tank battle, the largest in the history of the Second World War, unfolded near Kursk. In the Prokhorovka area, and then in the Akhtyrka and Bogodukhov areas there was truly a tank massacre. The experience of these battles is very valuable. He showed that the success of the battle of tank armies depends on their interaction with combined arms armies, on the correct organization of artillery and air support, on the rapid concentration of forces in the main direction, on the speed of the attack and continuity of control.
The experience of using air forces in the Battle of Kursk gave a lot of valuable information for the development of the theory of military art. Our aviation has gained complete air supremacy. In the counter-offensive, an air offensive was carried out in full and to great depth. The fight against enemy reserves was carried out effectively. Aviation, both in defense and counteroffensive, was used massively, in close cooperation between several air armies and the country's air defense aviation.
During the Battle of Kursk, the rear of the Red Army carried out a huge amount of work, providing the troops with all types of weapons and military equipment, ammunition and fuel, food and equipment.
A kind word must be said about our glorious doctors who gave all their strength to promptly evacuate to the rear the soldiers and commanders wounded on the battlefield, save the lives of Soviet soldiers and return them to duty.
Speaking about the development of tactics in the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize that organizing and conducting combined arms combat is a very complex form of military art. From commanders and staffs organizing combined arms combat, careful preparation of the offensive, organization of interaction and control are required, because only through the combined efforts of all branches of the military can success be achieved.
The actions of soldiers, units, units, formations and associations near Kursk, Orel and Kharkov, Belgorod were carefully studied and comprehensively reflected in military literature, not only in the interests of history, but also because the experience of the battle of Kursk has not lost its significance even today .
Many general principles in the activities of command, headquarters and troops are of significant interest even now, especially in the theoretical development of a nuclear-free period of war.
The historical victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Battle of Kursk was of enormous international significance.
The freedom-loving peoples of the whole world saw with their own eyes that, despite the absence of a second front in Europe, the military plans of Nazi Germany were failing.
The strategic significance of the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk was also extremely great. “If the battle of Stalingrad,” said J.V. Stalin, “foreshadowed the decline of the Nazi army, then the battle of Kursk confronted it with disaster.”
In the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces won not only a military, but also a major moral and political victory.
The high moral and fighting qualities of the Soviet people and their selfless patriotism were revealed in all their greatness in this battle.
Selfless service to the Motherland, the ability to overcome difficult trials, and readiness for heroism became the norm of behavior, a characteristic of the characters of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers of the Red Army.
The population and local party organizations actively participated in the fight against the hated enemy. At the height of the battle, the partisans launched a “rail war.” By mid-August, the partisans of Belarus, Ukraine, Kursk, Oryol, Bryansk and Smolensk regions intensified their actions, which provided great assistance to the advancing fronts.
More than 100 thousand Soviet soldiers - participants in the Battle of Kursk, Kharkov and Belgorod battles were awarded orders and medals, many of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
The authority of the Soviet Union as a decisive force in the fight against Nazi Germany increased even more. The victory at Kursk strengthened the hopes of the peoples of the countries occupied by the Nazis for early liberation and intensified the struggle of the forces of the anti-fascist Resistance.
The Battle of Kursk marked a major stage in the development of Soviet military art. It will remain for centuries not only as a symbol of the invincible power of the socialist state, born of the Great October Socialist Revolution, and its Armed Forces, but also as an outstanding example of the achievements of advanced Soviet military science.
Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (August 3 - 23, 1943)
The Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was defended by the 4th Tank Army and the Kempf task force. They consisted of 18 divisions, including 4 tank divisions. Here the enemy created 7 defensive lines with a total depth of up to 90 km, as well as 1 contour around Belgorod and 2 around Kharkov.
The idea of the Supreme High Command headquarters was to use powerful blows from troops from adjacent wings of the Voronezh and steppe fronts to cut the opposing enemy group into two parts, subsequently deeply envelop it in the Kharkov region and, in cooperation with the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front, destroy it.
The troops of the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow with the forces of two combined arms and two tank armies from the area northeast of Tomarovka to Bogodukhov, Valki, bypassing Kharkov from the west, an auxiliary attack, also by the forces of two combined arms armies, from the Proletarsky area in the direction of Boromlya, in order to cover the main groups from the West.
The steppe front under the command of General I. S. Konev delivered the main blow with troops of the 53rd and part of the forces of the 69th armies from the area north-west of Belgorod to Kharkov from the north, an auxiliary blow was delivered by the forces of the 7th Guards Army from the area south-east of Belgorod in a western direction.
By decision of the commander of the Southwestern Front, General R. Ya. Malinovsky, the 57th Army launched a strike from the Martovaya area to Merefa, covering Kharkov from the southeast.
From the air, the offensive of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was ensured by the 2nd and 5th air armies of generals S.A. Krasovsky and S.K. Goryunov, respectively. In addition, part of the long-range aviation forces was involved.
To achieve success in breaking through the enemy’s defenses, the command of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts decisively massed forces and assets in the directions of their main attacks, which made it possible to create high operational densities. Thus, in the zone of the 5th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, they reached 1.5 km per rifle division, 230 guns and mortars and 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of front.
There were characteristic features in planning the use of artillery and tanks. Artillery destruction groups were created not only in armies, but also in corps operating in the main directions. Separate tank and mechanized corps were to be used as mobile army groups, and tank armies as a mobile group of the Voronezh Front, which was new in the art of war.
The tank armies were planned to be brought into battle in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army. They were supposed to operate in the directions: 1st Tank Army - Bogodolov, 5th Guards Tank Army - Zolochev and by the end of the third or fourth day of the operation reach the Valka, Lyubotin area, thereby cutting off the retreat of the Kharkov enemy group to the west .
Artillery and engineering support for the entry of tank armies into battle was assigned to the 5th Guards Army.
For aviation support, each tank army was allocated one assault and fighter aviation division.
In preparing for the operation, it was instructive to disinform the enemy about the true direction of the main attack of our troops. From July 28 to August 6, the 38th Army, operating on the right wing of the Voronezh Front, skillfully imitated the concentration of a large group of troops in the Sumy direction. The fascist German command not only began bombing areas of false troop concentrations, but also kept a significant number of its reserves in this direction.
A special feature was that the operation was prepared in a limited time. Nevertheless, the troops of both fronts were able to prepare for the offensive and provide themselves with the necessary material resources.
On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, front troops, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first enemy position. With the introduction of second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To increase the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they had overcome the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12-26 km in depth, thereby separating the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance.
Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy’s resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main defensive line, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and destroyed the nearest operational reserves, the main strike group of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy in the morning of the second day of the operation.
On August 4, troops of the 1st Tank Army from the Tomarovka area began to develop an offensive to the south. Its 6th Tank and 3rd Mechanized Corps, with reinforced tank brigades ahead, advanced 70 km by mid-day on August 6th. In the afternoon of the next day, the 6th Tank Corps liberated Bogodukhov.
The 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing the enemy's centers of resistance from the west, struck at Zolochev and broke into the city on August 6.
By this time, the troops of the 6th Guards Army had captured the enemy’s strong defense center of Tomarovka, surrounded and destroyed his Borisov group. The 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps played a major role in this. Developing an offensive in the southwestern direction, they bypassed the Borisov group of Germans from the west and east, and on August 7, with a swift strike, they broke into Grayvoron, thereby cutting off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and south. This was facilitated by the actions of the auxiliary group of the Voronezh Front, which went on the offensive on the morning of August 5 in its direction.
The troops of the Steppe Front, having completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone on August 4, captured Belgorod by storm by the end of the next day, after which they began to develop an offensive against Kharkov. By the end of August 7, the breakthrough front of our troops had reached 120 km. Tank armies advanced to a depth of 100 km, and combined arms armies - to 60 - 65 km.
The troops of the 40th and 27th armies, continuing to develop the offensive, reached the Bromlya, Trostyanets, Akhtyrka line by August 11. A company of the 12th Guards Tank Brigade, led by Captain I.A. Tereshchuk, broke into Akhtyrka on August 10, where it was surrounded by the enemy. For two days, Soviet tank crews, without communication with the brigade, were in besieged tanks, repelling the fierce attacks of the Nazis who tried to capture them alive. Over two days of fighting, the company destroyed 6 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 5 armored cars and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. With two surviving tanks, Captain Tereshchuk fought out of the encirclement and returned to his brigade. For decisive and skillful actions in battle, Captain I. A. Tereshchuk was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
By August 10, the main forces of the 1st Tank Army reached the Merchik River. After capturing the city of Zolochev, the 5th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Steppe Front and began regrouping in the Bogodukhov area.
Advancing behind the tank armies, the troops of the 6th Guards Army reached northeast of Krasnokutsk by August 11, and the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. By this time, the troops of the Steppe Front had approached the outer defensive perimeter of Kharkov from the north, and the 57th Army, transferred to this front on August 8, from the east and southeast.
The fascist German command, fearing the encirclement of the Kharkov group, by August 11 concentrated three tank divisions east of Bogodukhov (Reich, Death's Head, Viking) and on the morning of August 12 launched a counterattack on the advancing troops of the 1st Tank Army in the general direction on Bogodukhov. An oncoming tank battle unfolded. During this, the enemy pushed back the formations of the 1st Tank Army by 3-4 km, but was unable to break through to Bogodukhov. On the morning of August 13, the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank, 6th and 5th Guards armies were brought into battle. The main forces of front-line aviation were also sent here. It conducted reconnaissance and carried out operations to disrupt the railway and road transport of the Nazis, assisted combined arms and tank armies in repelling counterattacks of the Nazi troops. By the end of August 17, our troops finally thwarted the enemy’s counterattack from the south on Bogodukhov.
However, the fascist German command did not abandon its plan. On the morning of August 18, it launched a counterattack from the Akhtyrka area with three tank and motorized divisions and broke through the front of the 27th Army. Against this enemy grouping, the commander of the Voronezh Front advanced the 4th Guards Army, transferred from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the 3rd mechanized and 6th tank corps of the 1st Tank Army from the Bogodukhov area, and also used the 4th and 5th separate guards tank corps. These forces, by striking the enemy’s flanks by the end of August 19, stopped his advance from the west to Bogodukhov. Then the troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front struck at the rear of the Akhtyrka group of Germans and completely defeated it.
At the same time, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began the assault on Kharkov. On the night of August 23, formations of the 69th and 7th Guards armies captured the city.
The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction, and came close to the Donbass enemy group. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war in the city and region (according to incomplete data), about 160 thousand people were driven to Germany, they destroyed 1,600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions.
Thus, Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and took an advantageous position to launch a general offensive with the aim of liberating Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass.
In preparing this work, materials from the site http://www.studentu.ru were used
Soviet tank armies in battle Daines Vladimir Ottovich
Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation
The Belgorod-Kharkov operation was the final operation of the Battle of Kursk. Its plan was to break through the enemy’s defenses in a 22-kilometer area northwest of Belgorod with a powerful frontal strike from the adjacent wings of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, then cut through the enemy group and then envelop and defeat it in the Kharkov region. At the same time, it was planned to launch an auxiliary attack from the Gotni area to Akhtyrka in order to ensure the actions of the main forces of the Voronezh Front from the west, and with the offensive of the right wing (57th Army) of the Southwestern Front from the Martovaya area to Merefa to assist the Steppe Front in the liberation of Kharkov.
By the beginning of the operation, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts numbered 980.5 thousand people, more than 12 thousand guns and mortars, 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,300 combat aircraft. In addition, 200 long-range aviation aircraft were allocated to support the front troops, part of the forces of the 17th Air Army of the Southwestern Front and the aviation of the country's Air Defense Forces.
The Soviet troops were opposed by the 4th Panzer Army, Task Force Kempf (from August 16 - 8th Army), Army Group South (commander - Field Marshal E. von Manstein) and aviation of the 4th Air Fleet. In total, the enemy numbered about 300 thousand people, up to 600 tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns and mortars, and more than 1 thousand combat aircraft. It was inferior to the Soviet troops by 3.2 times in manpower, by 4 times in guns, mortars, tanks and self-propelled guns, and by 1.5 times in aviation.
The enemy firmly fortified the area of Belgorod and Kharkov. The tactical defense zone consisted of a main and auxiliary zone with a total depth of up to 18 km. The main strip (6–8 km) included two positions; strongholds and resistance nodes were interconnected by full-profile communication passages. The second stripe extended for 2–3 km. Between the first and second there was an intermediate position. Settlements were turned into powerful fortresses, and all stone buildings were prepared for all-round defense.
The tank armies of the Voronezh Front were planned to be used in the main direction as an echelon for developing success in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army. The 1st Tank Army received the task of developing the success of the right flank of this army in the direction of Tomarovka, Bogodukhov, Valki, by the end of the fourth day of the operation to capture the area of Bogodukhov, Valki, Novaya Vodolaga and cut off the retreat routes of the Kharkov group to the southwest. The depth of the task is up to 120 km. The 5th Guards Tank Army was to build on its success in the general direction of Zolochev, Olshany, by the end of the third day of the operation to capture the area of Olshany, Lyubotin and cut off the retreat of the Kharkov group to the west. The depth of the task is about 100 km. The entry of both tank armies was planned to be carried out in narrow zones: the 1st Tank Army in a zone 4–6 km wide, and the 5th Guards Tank Army about 5 km.
By the beginning of the operation, minor changes had occurred in the combat strength of the 1st Tank Army (see table No. 16). In the 3rd Mechanized Corps, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment was added and a motorcycle battalion was removed, the 6th Tank Corps received a motorcycle battalion and a self-propelled artillery regiment, and the 31st Tank Corps received an anti-tank artillery regiment and a separate anti-tank artillery division.
Table No. 16
10 days were allotted to prepare for the offensive. During this time, the tankers studied the terrain in the zone of upcoming actions, the nature of the enemy’s defense, organized cooperation, prepared materiel and replenished supplies. Telephone and radio communications, as well as communications using mobile devices, were organized with all interacting parts and connections. Operational groups were created in the army and corps, which were supposed to move behind the first echelon of advancing troops. Staff officers were given training and exercises on sandboxes to practice command and control of troops. Much attention was paid to carrying out measures to disinform the enemy, which made it possible to attract his attention to the Sumy direction and ensure surprise of attacks in the Belgorod area.
On August 3, after powerful artillery and air preparation, the strike groups of the Soviet fronts went on the offensive. At the same time, the partisans began carrying out Operation Rail War behind enemy lines. On the Voronezh Front, the 5th and 6th Guards armies had advanced only 4–5 km by mid-day. Therefore, to build up the blow, formations of the first echelon of tank armies and the 5th Guards Tank Corps were introduced into the battle. Developing the success of the rifle divisions, they completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone, advanced units to the Tomarovka, Orlovka line, advancing 12–26 km. As a result, the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance were separated.
In the offensive zone of the 53rd and 69th armies of the Steppe Front, the situation was not so favorable. The enemy offered stubborn resistance. Therefore, in order to speed up the breakthrough of the defense, the 1st Mechanized Corps was introduced into the battle. He completed the breakthrough of the enemy's main defense line and entered the area north of Rakov.
On the morning of August 4, the troops of the strike group of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy. The 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army was withdrawn from the battles for Tomarovka and sent behind the 3rd Mechanized Corps, which broke through the second line of enemy defense. Formations of the 69th and 7th Guards armies of the Steppe Front took Belgorod by storm on August 5 and immediately rushed to Kharkov. As a result, the breakthrough front of the enemy defense reached 120 km. Tank armies advanced up to 100 km, and combined arms armies - 60–65 km. This forced the enemy to begin advancing to the Belgorod-Kharkov direction the divisions “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Viking”, the 3rd Panzer Division from Donbass and the motorized division “Great Germany” from the Orel region.
In turn, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal G.K. Zhukov and the commander of the Steppe Front, General I.S. Konev was sent on August 6 to I.V. Stalin proposals for the further development of the operation “Commander Rumyantsev”. It was planned to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army from the Voronezh Front to the Steppe Front, which was supposed to reach the Olshany, Stary Merchik, Ogultsy area. The 1st Tank Army was planned to be concentrated in the area of Kovyagi, Alekseevka, Merefa. On August 6, the commander of the Voronezh Front and the 1st Tank Army was sent Directive No. 13449 of the General Staff on the use of the army’s strike force compactly, without scattering its efforts in several directions.
Troops of the 1st Tank Army, developing an offensive in the southwestern direction, liberated Bogodukhov with a surprise attack on August 7 by the forces of the 6th Tank Corps. The 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing enemy resistance centers in the Orlovka area, broke into Zolochev. The troops of the 6th Guards Army captured a strong defense center - Tomarovka, surrounded and destroyed the Borisov enemy group.
By August 10, the main forces of the 1st Tank Army reached the river. Merchik. The 5th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Steppe Front. Troops of the 6th Guards Army reached the Krasnokutsk region, and formations of the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. The steppe front approached the outer defensive perimeter of Kharkov and hung over it from the north. Units of the 57th Army, transferred to the Steppe Front on August 8, approached Kharkov from the southeast.
On August 10, Stalin gave Marshal Zhukov instructions to use tank armies to isolate the Kharkov enemy group “by quickly intercepting the main railway and highway routes in the directions to Poltava, Krasnograd, Lozovaya and thereby speed up the liberation of Kharkov.” For this purpose, the 1st Tank Army (260 tanks) was supposed to cut the main routes in the area of Kovyaga, Valka, and the 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing Kharkov from the southwest, was supposed to cut the routes in the Merefa area.
Field Marshal E. von Manstein, trying to eliminate the breakthrough of the Soviet troops, pulled up the 3rd Panzer Corps (about 360 tanks) to Kharkov, which he intended to use together with the Kempf task force to strike the eastern flank of the wedged Soviet troops. “At the same time,” writes Manstein, “the 4th Tank Army was supposed to strike the western flank with the forces of two tank divisions returned by the Center group and one motorized division. But it was clear that these forces and the group’s forces in general could no longer hold the front line.”
The advanced tank brigades (49th, 112th and 1st Guards) of the 1st Tank Army reached the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, breaking away from the main forces of the corps at a distance of about 20 km. In the area south of Bogodukhov, they met with the advanced units of the enemy’s 3rd Tank Corps, which was moving to the deployment line to launch a counterattack. As a result, a counter-battle ensued, which lasted all day. “The pressure of the enemy increased every hour,” recalled M.E. Katukov. “Now our army defended itself in a single-echelon formation. All three corps deployed at the front line and, organizing mobile ambushes on heights, edges of groves, and outskirts of populated areas, fought heavy, grueling battles. Fascist attacks did not stop. The Nazis conducted continuous artillery and mortar fire and bombed our battle formations, which were not so dense by that time. So, for example, five tank brigades defending at the Aleksandrovka-Sukhina-Krysino line had only 40 tanks, half of them light.”
The enemy managed with superior forces to encircle the forward detachments of the 1st Tank Army in the Kovyaga area, which on the night of August 12 were forced to break through to join the main forces of the corps. In this difficult situation, the commander of the Voronezh Front ordered the 1st Tank Army and one rifle corps of the 6th Guards Army to strike at the enemy troops that had broken through to Merchik and firmly secure the right flank of the front’s main attack group.
On the morning of August 12, the 1st Tank Army resumed its offensive. At the same time, the enemy brought the main forces of the 3rd Tank Corps into the battle near Bogodukhov in order to defeat the troops of the Voronezh Front that had reached the Bogodukhov area and free the Kharkov-Poltava road. As a result, an oncoming tank battle unfolded, in which 134 tanks participated from the 1st Tank Army, and about 400 tanks from the enemy. The enemy managed to push back the formations of the 1st Tank Army by 3–4 km. In the middle of the day on August 12, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps came to their aid. Together they stopped the enemy. The next day, formations of the 6th and 5th Guards Armies entered the battle. With the support of front-line aviation, ground troops inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and then threw them back to their original position. Although the 1st Tank Army stopped the enemy, it was unable to defeat him and on the night of August 14 went on the defensive.
The transition to defense was carried out in those battle formations in which formations of the 1st Tank Army conducted offensive operations, trying to concentrate the main efforts on consolidating the occupied line. Therefore, the second echelons and reserves of the corps were located at a distance of 2–3 km from the front edge, and then the depth of defense gradually increased. The defense was focal in nature with the creation of a system of tank ambushes, anti-tank areas and mine-explosive barriers. The ambushes were located in a checkerboard pattern at a depth of 2–3 km, together with submachine gunners and anti-tank artillery units. Anti-tank areas were created in the corps and army units in particularly important areas as part of each anti-tank artillery division or regiment. The army had a single-echelon formation and low density of forces and assets. It carried out defensive actions together with the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 6th Guards Army. The success of the defense organization was facilitated by reliable management and clearly organized interaction at all levels. The commanders of the formations made decisions on the map, clarified them on the ground, and then quickly communicated the tasks to the troops, widely practicing personal communication with their subordinates.
While the troops were organizing defense, the Supreme Command Headquarters on August 12 made a decision on the development of the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. Directive No. 10165 ordered the Voronezh Front to strike the 1st Tank Army in the general direction of Valki, Novaya Vodolaga, together with the 5th Guards Tank Army, to cut off the Kharkov group’s retreat routes to the south and southwest. After the defeat of this group and the capture of the city of Kharkov, it was prescribed to continue the offensive in the general direction of Poltava, Kremenchug and by August 23-24 to reach the line Yareski station, Poltava, (leg.) Karlovka with the main forces. In the future it was necessary to advance to the river. Dnieper and reach it in the Kremenchug, Orlik section, providing for the capture of crossings across the river by moving parts. To ensure the offensive of the strike group, it was necessary for the right wing of the front to reach the river by August 23–24. Psel, where to firmly gain a foothold.
After capturing Kharkov, the Steppe Front was supposed to continue the offensive in the general direction of Krasnograd, Verkhnedneprovsk and by August 24–25 reach the line Karlovka, Krasnograd, and Kegichevka station with its main forces. In the future, develop the offensive towards the river. Dnieper, providing for the capture of river crossings by moving parts.
According to the headquarters of the 1st Tank Army, at the line Trefilovka, Fastov, Butovo, Trirechnoye, high. 233.2 in the first line defended three infantry divisions (255, 332, 167th) and two tank divisions (3rd and presumably 6th) of the enemy, which were staffed with an average of 40–50% personnel, 35–40% tanks and up to 70% artillery. In the area of Trefilovka, (claimed) Novaya Goryanka, Yamnoye, Pushkarnoye, Zagotskot, a defensive zone up to 7 km deep was created in advance with a highly developed system of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, along the entire front edge there are wire barriers of 2-3 stakes and full-profile trenches . Bunkers and fortified observation posts were built at the front edge and in the depths, and shelters were built on the reverse slopes. On average, per 1 km of front there was one bunker, 3–4 shelters, and up to 0.8 battalions of manpower. In the same sector, the enemy had 25–30 regimental artillery guns, up to 12 105 mm batteries. Tank-dangerous directions were blocked by minefields. Intelligence of the 1st Tank Army was unable to establish the outline of the true front line of the enemy's defense. On the second defensive line of Borisovka, Bessonovka, there were supposedly an SS tank corps and an SS tank division “Great Germany”. On the main and second lines it was assumed that, in addition to standard artillery, there would be three infantry divisions and three tank divisions, four artillery regiments of the RGK (40, 54, 70 and 52nd regiments of six-barreled mortars).
Meanwhile, the enemy did not abandon his plan to break through the defenses of the Voronezh Front troops. For two days, August 15 and 16, he tried to do this on the left flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, but was unsuccessful. Then an attack was launched on the morning of August 18 from the Akhtyrka area with the forces of two tank and two motorized divisions and a separate tank battalion equipped with Tiger and Panther tanks. They managed to break through the defenses of the 27th Army. At the same time, from the area south of Krasnokutsk, the Totenkopf tank division attacked Kaplunovka. The commander of the Voronezh Front advanced the 4th Guards Army with the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 3rd Mechanized and 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps to meet the enemy counterattack group. By striking the enemy’s flank, they stopped his advance towards Bogodukhov. Having reliably covered the Akhtyrka direction, General Vatutin decided to strike at the rear of the Akhtyrka enemy group with the forces of the 40th and 47th armies, the 2nd and 10th tank and 3rd Guards mechanized corps.
2nd Tank Corps of General A.F. Popov, developing a strike to the south, on August 19, together with the 52nd Rifle Corps of the 40th Army, captured Lebedin. After this, the main forces of the 2nd Tank Corps reached Tarasovka, and the 4th Guards Tank Corps of General P.P. Poluboyarova - to Akhtyrka. 10th Tank Corps of General V.M. Alekseev, together with the 100th Rifle Division of the 40th Army of the Voronezh Front, was liberated by Trostyanets, cut the Sumy-Bogodukhov railway, disrupting the systematic transfer of the motorized division “Great Germany” from the Oryol bridgehead to the Akhtyrka area. Using the success of tank formations, the troops of the 40th and 27th armies reached the line of Boromlya, Trostyanets, Akhtyrka, Kotelva.
However, the enemy managed to stop the advance of the Voronezh Front troops and even push them back in some places. The formations of the 1st Tank Army suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment. This forced the army commander to withdraw six tank brigades to the rear by August 22.
On August 23, troops of the Steppe Front liberated Kharkov. This ended the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation, and with it the entire Battle of Kursk. The prerequisites were created for the transition to a general offensive, the liberation of Left Bank Ukraine and access to the Dnieper. Colonel General G. Guderian stated: “As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat... The initiative completely passed to the enemy.”
During the operation, the losses of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were: irrecoverable - 71,611, ambulance - 183,955 people, 1,864 tanks and self-propelled guns, 423 guns and mortars, 153 combat aircraft. The enemy lost more than 500 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft.
After the completion of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, the 1st Tank Army (6th, 31st Tank Corps, 1547th Self-Propelled Artillery, 79th Guards Mortar Regiments, 385th Separate Communications Aviation Regiment) in accordance with Directive No. 40717 of the General Staff dated 8 September 1943 was transferred to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters in the Sumy area. Over two night marches, the army concentrated in the indicated area. Here the troops were put in order, received reinforcements, and engaged in combat training. In October, the 6th Tank Corps was reorganized into the 11th Guards Tank Corps for its heroism, courage, perseverance, courage, organization and skillful performance of combat missions. For the excellent conduct of the operation in the Belgorod direction, all units that were part of the 3rd Mechanized Corps were awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the corps was given the name 8th Guards Mechanized Corps.
On November 26, 1943, the army headquarters received a new General Staff directive No. 42690 on its transfer on the morning of November 29 by rail to the Brovary, Darnitsa area. The army command, the 8th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 11th Guards Tank Corps, army reinforcement and support units, and rear institutions were subject to transfer. The 31st Tank Corps was withdrawn from the army and became directly subordinate to the Supreme Command Headquarters.
A day later, on November 28, a new directive from the General Staff followed, which noted that by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the 18th and 1st Tank Armies arriving in the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters from 24.00 on November 29 were included in the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The formations of the 1st Tank Army were to concentrate on the right bank of the river. Dnieper in the area of Svyatoshino, Tarasovka, Zhulyany. The army needed to be supplemented with reinforcements arriving for this purpose, tanks, weapons, transport and other types of property. Tanks, materiel and heavy cargo were to be unloaded in the area of Svyatoshino, Boyarka, and the remaining echelons were to be unloaded in the areas of Darnitsa, Brovary and Darnitsa, Boryspil with further concentration in marching order. On December 9, by directive No. 30263 of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the army concentration area was changed to the Kolonshchina, Bashev, Shnitki area.
By December 10, combat units of the 1st Tank Army were transferred by rail from the Sumy area to the right bank of the Dnieper and concentrated in the Svyatoshino area. The rear arrived here by December 20th. On the night of December 11, the advancement of corps and then army units to the Myshev area began. Army troops were to take part in the Berdichev offensive operation. By this time, it included one mechanized and one tank corps, a separate tank brigade, self-propelled artillery and guards mortar regiments, and two engineer battalions (see table No. 17). The army consisted of more than 42 thousand people, 546 serviceable tanks and self-propelled guns, 585 guns and mortars, 31 rocket launchers and 3,432 vehicles.
Table No. 17
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