This topic has surfaced on social networks at the instigation of liberal “strategists” and is being actively discussed with the posting of “kind and affectionate” comments addressed to those who really care about maintaining the combat capability of the Russian army at the required level, even if there is a catastrophic lack of funds for this.
As an answer to this question, let me retell the article by Mikhail Barabanov, who is an employee of such an organization as the “Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies,” which is dated March 12, 2017.
We dance “from the stove”
or
“what we had yesterday and what we have today”
In 2005, the Russian Armed Forces had 23,000 tanks of various models in service. In 2016, 2,700 units remained. Citing these two figures, “experts” loudly declare that the huge Russian army, powerful and modern, is a fiction and a “Kremlin myth.” At the same time, they refer to the fact that even the Turkish or Syrian armies currently have more tanks.
T-72M1M with KAZ "Arena"
Where did the missing tanks go? And, most importantly, what are we going to fight with if the Russian army has only 2,700 tanks in service:
- T-90A;
- T-72B.
And the remaining 10,200 tanks are T-55, T-62, T-72 and T-64, which are in storage.
Where did the numbers 2700 + 10200 come from?
The modern Russian army is focused, first of all, on participation in limited armed conflicts. First of all, on the territory of the former USSR. For this, the remaining 10,200 tanks are enough to complete the assigned tasks.
There is currently no real threat of an unexpected large-scale land invasion of the territory of our state. Any potential adversaries who are hypothetically capable of such an invasion (the USA and NATO, China) will require a fairly long period of mobilization, subsequent deployment and concentration of significant groups of ground forces on the borders of Russia. Our country will get similar time for this.
In such a situation, “measuring by quantity” is pointless. The existing systems of modern communications, control and reconnaissance, the presence of high-precision weapons (ground and airborne) are, today, the main guarantee of achieving victory in the war, incl. and land.
In such a situation, only the most modern tanks are needed, equipped with thermal imagers and the latest protective equipment. Otherwise. A potential enemy will simply shoot “blind” tanks in a night battle. This is exactly what the Americans did with the tanks of the Iraqi army in 1991 during the Gulf War.
It is quite natural that Russia is not able to have a significant number of modern tanks due to the current economic situation.
T-90A "Vladimir"
Conclusion. It is better to have 2000 - 3000 tanks, but the most modern ones, or those that have undergone radical modernization.
Human resource
- Western Military District:
- 4th separate guards tank division Kantemirovskaya (military unit 19612);
- 1 Ural-Lvov Tank Brigade (military unit 63453);
- 6 Czestochowa Tank Brigade (military unit 54096);
- 1st Guards Tank Regiment of the 2nd Guards MSD (military unit 58190).
- Southern Military District:
- Tank regiment of the 150th MSD.
- Eastern Military District:
- 5th Guards Tatsinskaya Tank Brigade (military unit 46108). Deployed on the basis of the 2nd Guards Tank Division.
- Central Military District:
- 90th Guards Vitebsk-Novgorod, twice Red Banner Tank Division - Chebarkul, Chelyabinsk region. Deployed on 12/01/16 on the basis of the 7th Separate Guards Tank Brigade.
Individual parts:
- 240th training tank regiment (military unit 30632-6);
- 212 district training center of tank forces of the Siberian Military District (military unit 21250);
- 44th Training Guards Tank Regiment (military unit 30618-8);
- 522nd Guards Training Tank Riga Regiment (military unit 30616-7).
Elementary calculations indicate that the number of tanks and the tankers who control them is the same. That is, the number of tanks currently in service is precisely the number that we are able to control at a time.
Our neighbors
According to RIA Novosti, NATO has 10,000 tanks in Europe. Most likely, this number includes both vehicles in service and those in reserve.
According to information posted in open sources (including Wikipedia), as of 2016, the countries that were potential opponents had:
- First strike countries:
- Poland:
- Leopard2A5 - 105;
- Leopard2A4 - 142;
- Poland:
- T-72M - 505;
- RT-91 “Twardy - 233.
- Romania:
- T-55 - 250;
- TR-580 - 42;
- TR-85 - 91;
- TR-85M1 "Bizonul" - 54.
- Czech Republic:
- T-72 and its modifications - 154.
- Slovakia:
- T-72M - 245.
- Hungary:
- T-72 - 155.
- Germany:
- 1100 tanks of various modifications. It is planned that after the 2017 reform there will be 600 left.
Leopard2A6M
- Second strike countries:
- Britannia:
- "Challenger" - 70;
- "Chieftain" of various modifications - over 900;
- Britannia:
- Light tanks "Scorpion" - up to 300.
- France (total 776):
- "Leclerc" - 300 in service + 80 in reserve;
- Tanks of other models - 396 reserve
Leclerc
- Denmark - 69
- Italy (1730):
- C1-"Ariete" - 200;
- "Leopard1A5" - 120;
- M60A1 - 300 reserve;
- M47 - 510
- Bulgaria (524):
- T-72 - 362;
- T-55 - 165
- Spain (510):
- Leopard2A4 - 108;
- Other models - 402
- Portugal (224):
- Leopard 2A6 - 37;
- M60 - 101;
- Other models - 86
- Third strike countries:
- Türkiye (4504):
- M60 - 932;
- Leopard1 - 397;
- Türkiye (4504):
- Leopard 2A4 - 325;
- M48A5 - 2850
- USA (9125) of which M1 Abrams make up about 60%.
BHVT and CBRT
One of the most important questions, when fully considering a possible confrontation, becomes the following: “How quickly will Russia be able to reactivate the equipment stored at the BKhVT?” The outcome of the armed confrontation will largely depend on this.
What is the condition of the equipment in storage?
During long-term storage:
- oxidation of connectors occurs in electrical circuits;
- the insulation resistance of the existing electrical wiring decreases;
- all filled technical fluids (antifreeze, oils, hydraulic fluids, lubricants) become unsuitable for use;
- fuel tanks begin to rust from the inside;
- Rust appears on the mirror surfaces of hydraulic cylinders.
Despite the fact that high-quality conservation allows you to save equipment from all of the above, a certain percentage of equipment fails. It is precisely in order to reduce the number of such cases to zero that exercises are regularly held in Russia, in which equipment from the reserve is attracted to participate. Before exercises, it undergoes the necessary maintenance and testing.
During inspections carried out in 2016, the condition of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other armored vehicles was considered satisfactory.
The time required for an army to bring it into combat readiness is calculated by summing up the time:
- necessary for mobilization (staffing) of units and units;
- replenishment of ammunition and provisions;
- bringing materiel to the condition required to carry out any combat orders;
- the time given to a specific unit to complete its formation and recruitment.
The mentioned period is significantly influenced by the initial state of the unit in peacetime, as well as the distance from the place of its deployment to the places where reserves are received.
What about tanks?
Modern warfare is a remote war. And today, few people bet on tanks, since modern anti-tank weapons (starting with RPGs) are capable, with a high degree of probability, of destroying almost any tank.
But this is not the type of weapon that can stop the war.
Modern tanks are vulnerable from the air, they can be suppressed by artillery fire, destroyed by opposing them with special units whose task is to destroy the armored vehicles of a potential enemy (ATGM, etc.).
Based on this, the high command of the Russian Armed Forces and the leadership of our country acted quite pragmatically, reasoning: fighting head-on is futile today. Therefore, the Russian Armed Forces do not require an excessive number of tanks. What we have today is quite enough.
T-14
But a tank is still armor - fire and maneuver. And we are not going to abandon it completely, which is confirmed by the appearance of the T-14 and the entire line of armored vehicles on the Armata platform.
On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the armored forces of the Red Army (it should be noted that the name of this type of troops changed several times: before the war they were called “armored”, and from the end of 1942 - “armored and mechanized troops”) consisted of mechanized corps, several tank divisions and tank regiments that were part of cavalry divisions. The military tank units and units and units of the Reserve of the High Command (RGK) that existed until mid-1940 were sent to staff them during the formation of mechanized corps.
By the beginning of the war, there were 29 mechanized corps in various stages of formation, consisting of two tank, one motorized divisions, a motorcycle regiment, a separate communications battalion, a separate engineering battalion and other corps units.
In general, taking into account corps units and subunits, the mechanized corps was supposed to have over 36 thousand people, 1031 tanks (including 546 KV and T-34), 358 guns and mortars, 268 armored vehicles.
However, it should be noted that the simultaneous deployment of such a large number of corps did not correspond to the capabilities available at that time to provide them with personnel, military equipment, weapons and vehicles. By mid-1941, the vast majority of these formations were understaffed. The shortage of military equipment and weapons, as well as the highly maneuverable nature of combat operations in the initial period of the war, confronted the Soviet command with the need for changes in the organizational structure of tank units. At the end of July 1941, the abolition of mechanized corps began and continued until September. Tank divisions were transferred to the subordination of army commanders, and motorized divisions were reorganized into rifle divisions.
At the same time, 10 tank divisions were created from the mechanized corps located in the internal military districts. They were supposed to have two tank, motorized and artillery-anti-tank regiments, a reconnaissance battalion, an anti-aircraft division and other units.
At the end of August 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense approved the staff of a regimental tank brigade with 93 tanks. The brigade's tank regiment consisted of three tank battalions. It was planned to equip one battalion with heavy and medium tanks, the other two with light tanks. Already in September, changes took place in the tank battalions of the regiment in the direction of reducing the number of tanks, after which the brigade had 67 vehicles. The experience of using regimental brigades revealed a number of shortcomings in their organization. Thus, the presence of an intermediate authority (regiment) complicated management; the brigade commander and headquarters were sometimes deprived of the ability to quickly respond to changing situations. Taking all this into account, the formation of battalion-level brigades began in September.
Simultaneously with the creation of new tank brigades, separate tank battalions were formed. The main reason for their appearance, as combat practice has shown, was the need to strengthen the rifle divisions defending important directions or lines, since the fragmentation of brigades for this purpose led to the dispersion of their efforts, complicated the management of units and complicated logistics.
The first staff of a separate wartime tank battalion was accepted in the same September 1941. According to this state, the battalion was supposed to have three tank companies (one company of medium and two companies of light tanks). The staff provided for 130 people and 29 tanks. Soon the need for more powerful tank battalions, which would also include heavy tanks, became apparent. Such battalions were created in November 1941. They were to consist of a company of heavy tanks with two platoons, a company of medium tanks and two companies of light tanks. In total, such a battalion was supposed to have 202 people and 36 tanks (heavy - 5, medium - 11, light - 20).
In 1941 and the winter of 1942, separate tank battalions were maintained in other, and different, states. This was explained mainly by the conditions for the formation of units, which were staffed with the material available in reserve. Often individual battalions outnumbered tank brigades in the number of combat vehicles.
At the beginning of January 1942, the formation of tank brigades for cavalry and infantry began. It was assumed that they would be light in composition, with a minimum number of support and service units. Each such brigade was to have a staff of 372 people and 46 tanks. (A tank brigade for infantry was supposed to have 10 heavy, 16 medium and 20 light tanks; a tank brigade for cavalry was supposed to have 20 medium and 26 light vehicles.) However, it was not possible to form the required number of such brigades. In February 1942, it was decided to create tank brigades consisting of 282 people, 27 tanks and include them in the staff of rifle divisions. But very few such brigades were able to be formed.
The experience gained in conducting combat operations in the winter of 1941/42 confirmed the correctness of the theory of deep offensive operations developed in our country at the end of the 1920s. War practice showed that the absence of large tank formations in fronts and armies did not allow us to fully solve such an important offensive task as developing tactical success into operational success.
Therefore, in March 1942, the formation of the first four tank corps began, which included the corps administration, first two, and soon three tank and motorized rifle brigades. According to this staff, the corps should have had 5,603 people and 100 tanks (of which 20 heavy KVs, 40 medium T-34s and 40 light T-60s or T-70s). The created formations did not at all provide for artillery units, engineer-sapper, reconnaissance units, as well as their own corps rear. The corps administration actually consisted of a small group of officers intended to coordinate the combat operations of the brigades.
The first experience of the combat use of such corps in the spring of 1942 in Voronezh and other directions showed that the new formations did not have the necessary operational and tactical independence when conducting combat operations, which negatively affected their results.
In July 1942, a separate guards mortar division, numbering 250 people and 8 BM-13 rocket launchers, reconnaissance and motorcycle battalions, were included in the corps staff. Somewhat later, the corps received two mobile repair bases, as well as a fuel and lubricants delivery company to provide a second refueling of fuel and oil.
In parallel with the deployment of tank corps, tank armies (TA) began to be created in May 1942.
The first two tank armies (3rd and 5th) were formed in May - June 1942. At the end of July of the same year, directly on the Stalingrad Front, using the field directorates of the 38th and 28th armies, the 1st and 4th tank armies were created, respectively, which were disbanded about a month later.
Initially, the combat composition of the TA was determined by the directives for their formation and was not the same. The experience of using tank armies in the summer of 1942 in defensive and offensive operations in the Voronezh direction (5 TA), in the Kozelsk region (3 TA) and especially in the counter-offensive near Stalingrad (5 TA) allowed us to draw a number of important conclusions about their combat capabilities and organizational structure. The presence in them of rifle divisions, tank and cavalry corps, which had different combat capabilities and mobility, negatively affected the organization, implementation of interaction, management and logistics. In general, the TAs turned out to be bulky, unmaneuverable and difficult to control.
In September 1942, the formation of mechanized corps (MK) began, taking into account the experience of creating tank corps. Therefore, already at the very beginning, units and subunits of special troops were included in the new formations. However, the organization of the corps was still unequal. So, for example, the 1st and 2nd mechanized corps each had three mechanized and one tank brigade, an anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a guards mortar division, an armored vehicle, repair and restoration battalions, as well as an engineering mine company, control and delivery companies for fuel and lubricants. The 3rd and 5th mechanized corps had two tank brigades instead of one, and the 4th and 6th corps, instead of tank brigades, were each equipped with two separate tank regiments.
Thus, out of the six mechanized corps, fully formed by the beginning of 1943, there were three types of organization, which affected the size of the new formations. In particular, for tanks it looked like this. The 1st and 2nd MKs were supposed to have 175 tanks, the 3rd and 5th - 224, and the 4th and 6th - 204 tanks. However, the main one was the staff, which contained the first two corps. This state became the basis for the formation of all new corps, and corps that had a different organization were subsequently transferred to it.
In the first half of 1942, tank brigades, both individual and part of corps, were formed and staffed in various states. The presence of battalions and companies in brigades that had heavy, medium and light tanks negatively affected their use. In July 1942, a single staff was approved for all tank brigades, to which previously created brigades were gradually transferred.
Mechanized brigades began to be created in September 1942, that is, from the moment the mechanized corps were formed. In addition, there were several separate mechanized brigades.
In 1942, the required number of motorized rifle brigades were formed, which were included in the tank corps, and several similar brigades were made separate. All brigades were created according to a single staff and were supposed to have three motorized rifle battalions. artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, as well as support and service units.
Along with the formation of separate tank brigades intended to support the infantry, in September 1942 the formation of separate tank regiments began, which were also supposed to strengthen rifle formations. The organization of such a regiment was similar to the organization of a tank regiment of a mechanized brigade.
Almost simultaneously, in October 1942, separate heavy tank breakthrough regiments of the RGK began to be created. The regiment consisted of four companies (each with 5 tanks) and a technical support company. In total, it was supposed to have 214 people and 21 KV heavy tanks. To staff these regiments, heavy tanks were sent, withdrawn from mixed separate tank battalions and heavy tank brigades that were being disbanded at that time, created in small numbers in the summer of 1942.
As a result of the implementation in 1942 of a truly grandiose program for the construction of tank forces, by January 1943 the Red Army had two tank armies, 24 tank armies (two of them were in the process of formation), 8 mechanized corps (two of them were completing formation), as well as a significant the number of different brigades, regiments and battalions intended for joint operations with infantry.
Subsequently, the improvement of the organizational structure of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army continued.
Thus, to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of a motorized rifle battalion of a tank brigade, in January 1943, a company of anti-tank rifles was added to its staff, and in March - an anti-aircraft machine gun company. More significant changes occurred at the end of 1943, when a new tank brigade staff was accepted. In connection with the adoption of the T-34–85 tank, whose crew consisted of five people (which, however, was not always observed), the anti-tank rifle company of the motorized rifle battalion in April 1944 was turned to complement the crews of the new tanks. Tank brigades were gradually transferred to this state, primarily brigades that were part of tank and mechanized corps. Subsequently, until the end of the war, the organization of the tank brigade remained virtually unchanged.
In January 1943, in order to strengthen the striking force of the mechanized brigade, another company of medium tanks was added to the staff of the tank regiment. The total number of tanks in the regiment remained the same - 39. However, there were 32 medium tanks, instead of the previously available 23, and light tanks decreased by 9 vehicles. In February of the same year, the anti-aircraft artillery division was excluded from the brigade, and an anti-aircraft machine gun company was introduced in its place. At the same time, an engineering mine company was included in the staff, and all vehicles intended for transporting personnel of motorized rifle battalions were consolidated into a brigade auto company.
Further changes in the organization of the mechanized brigade occurred mainly in connection with the improvement of the organization of its tank regiment. So, in February 1944, the tank regiment was transferred to a new state, according to which it had three tank companies, equipped only with medium tanks. As a result, the regiment received 35 T-34 tanks, and light tanks were excluded from the staff. After this, no changes occurred in the brigade until the end of the war.
In order to strengthen the firepower of the tank corps, in January 1943, the RGK mortar regiment (36 120-mm mortars) and the RGK self-propelled artillery regiment (25 self-propelled guns) were added to its staff. Somewhat later, a reserve of tanks (40 vehicles) with crews and 100 drivers was added to some corps. At the same time, the capabilities of the fuel and lubricants delivery company were increased.
In February, instead of engineering mine companies, a sapper battalion was included in the corps, and in March - an anti-aircraft artillery regiment. In April, a fighter-anti-tank artillery regiment (20 45-mm guns) and a fighter-anti-tank division (12 85-mm anti-aircraft guns) were added to the corps staff. However, already in August 1943 they were replaced by two self-propelled artillery regiments (SU-76 and SU-152). In October, in individual tank corps, and in November in all others, instead of an armored car battalion, a separate motorcycle battalion was introduced, which included two motorcycle companies, a tank company, a company of armored personnel carriers and an anti-tank artillery battery.
In August 1944, in order to increase the fire capabilities of the corps, a light artillery regiment was included in its composition, which had 24 76-mm cannons.
From the above it follows that the organization of the tank corps was improved mainly in the direction of increasing fire and striking power, increasing the mobility and independence of the corps during combat operations.
The organization of the mechanized corps was also improved taking into account the experience of its combat use and in connection with the arrival of new military equipment into the troops. In January 1943, the anti-aircraft artillery division was excluded from the mechanized brigade, and the army air defense regiment was excluded from the corps. At the same time, a mortar regiment (36 120-mm mortars), a mixed self-propelled artillery regiment (8 SU-122, 17 SU-76), as well as a tank reserve (40 tanks and 147 crew members) and 100 drivers were introduced into the corps. In February, instead of an engineering mine company, a sapper battalion was included in the corps, and in March the control company was reorganized into a communications battalion. At the same time, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment (16 37-mm guns, 16 DShK) joined the corps staff. In April, a fighter-anti-tank artillery regiment and an aviation communications unit - 3 aircraft - were introduced into the state. In May, the corps received an anti-tank artillery division and a chemical defense company. In August 1943, instead of the anti-tank fighter regiment, the SU-76 self-propelled artillery regiment (21 units) was introduced into the corps staff, and instead of the anti-tank fighter division, the SU-85 regiment (16 units and one T-34 tank).
At the same time, armored vehicles were excluded from the mechanized corps that were part of such armies, and separate motorcycle battalions were introduced instead.
In 1944, the tank regiment of the mechanized brigade was transferred to a new staff. As a result, the regiment had 35 medium tanks, and light tanks were completely eliminated.
As for the tank armies, a special meeting of the State Defense Committee was held at the end of January 1943, dedicated to the development of regulations on their formation. Previously, the opinions of some prominent military leaders were heard on this issue. Everyone agreed that it was necessary, first of all, to remove non-motorized rifle divisions from tank armies and to organizationally separate their tank core. Thus, tank armies were supposed to consist, as a rule, of two tank and one mechanized corps, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a guards mortar, howitzer artillery, anti-tank fighter and motorcycle regiments. The support units included a communications regiment, an aviation communications regiment (Po-2 aircraft), an engineering battalion, an automobile regiment and two repair and restoration battalions. The rear units and institutions included field service units and units, army departments, food, supply, medical and chemical institutions, artillery supply bodies, fuel and lubricants supplies, as well as units for the collection, reception and evacuation of captured property. However, it should be noted that the composition of the tank armies was determined by the orders for their formation and was not the same. So, for example, out of 64 offensive operations carried out by tank armies of the above composition, in 32 cases they operated in a two-corps composition. Only one tank army (3rd Guards) had three corps throughout the war.
At the beginning of 1944, it was decided to introduce self-propelled artillery and light artillery brigades into the tank armies. By the end of September 1944, all six tank armies already had these brigades. However, to successfully carry out operations, tank armies were reinforced with artillery and anti-tank brigades and regiments.
At the end of the war, the three-corps tank army, as a rule, had over 50 thousand people, 850–920 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 800 guns and mortars, and more than 5 thousand vehicles. However, in the vast majority of offensive operations, tank armies did not have a full complement of people, weapons and military equipment.
In February 1944, the heavy breakthrough tank regiments mentioned above were transferred to new states, and they began to be called heavy tank regiments. The new regiments consisted of 375 people, four IS-2 tank companies (21 tanks), a company of machine gunners, engineer and utility platoons, and a regimental medical center. When these regiments were formed, they were given the honorary name “Guards”.
Individual tank regiments were also reorganized. The essence of this reorganization, carried out at the beginning of 1944, was to exclude light tanks from them and strengthen the support and service units. In total, the regiment was supposed to have 386 people and 35 tanks.
In December 1944, the formation of separate Guards heavy tank brigades began. Organizationally, the brigade consisted of three heavy tank regiments, a motorized battalion of machine gunners, and support and service units. In total, the brigade consisted of 1,666 people, 65 IS-2 heavy tanks, three SU-76 self-propelled artillery mounts, 19 armored personnel carriers and 3 armored vehicles.
In addition to the units and formations considered, the tank forces had tank regiments and special-purpose brigades. In mid-1943, an engineering tank regiment was formed. It included two T-34 tank companies and support units. The regiment had 22 medium tanks, 18 trawls and means of transporting them.
The organization of tank units and formations is briefly discussed here. However, this does not mean that the regiments, brigades and corps were all the same in strength. In reality, especially in the tank and mechanized corps, there were significant discrepancies with their main staff.
In general, it should be noted that during the war, the organizational structure of the tank forces was in full accordance with the methods of conducting combat operations and significantly contributed to the achievement of high combat effectiveness of this type of troops.
Abbreviations adopted in the diagrams:
BMP - battalion medical station,
GAP - howitzer artillery regiment,
ZPU - anti-aircraft machine gun installation,
MZA - small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery,
SME - motorized rifle battalion,
SME - motorized rifle regiment,
OZAD - a separate anti-aircraft artillery division,
PTA - anti-tank artillery,
PTD - anti-tank division,
PTO - anti-tank defense,
PTR - anti-tank rifle,
RTO - maintenance company,
TB - tank battalion,
TP - tank regiment.
A comprehensive analysis of the experience of the combat use of tank troops in the operations of 1942, taking into account changes in the nature and methods of conducting combat operations by our troops, in the organization and methods of conducting combat operations by the Nazi army, as well as the increasing role of tank troops in subsequent operations allowed the party and government continue to pay special attention to the organizational development of this type of troops. A further increase in the combat capabilities of tank forces and their share in our army was facilitated by a qualitative improvement in armored vehicles and an increase in their production by defense industry factories.
In January 1943, due to the need to strengthen the troops advancing in the central and southwestern directions, the 1st and 2nd tank armies were formed. They included tank and mechanized corps, three or two rifle divisions, and were in fact the same armies that were formed in 1942. The 3rd Tank Army, which conducted combat operations in the Kharkov direction, had approximately the same composition. Subsequently, as these armies were withdrawn to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, they were all transferred to a new organization.
Before the Great Patriotic War, our army did not have self-propelled artillery. However, combat reality showed that in maneuverable forms of combat and operations, mechanically driven artillery lagged behind, especially behind tank formations, and when solving combat missions in the operational depths of the enemy, they were often left without fire support. At the same time, there was a need to have guns to accompany infantry and tanks when breaking through the prepared enemy defenses. These problems were solved by the release of self-propelled artillery units, which had more powerful weapons than tanks, reliable armor protection and high maneuverability.
In connection with the advent of new equipment, at the beginning of 1943, the first self-propelled artillery regiments were formed, which were subordinate to the commander of the artillery of the Red Army. The regiments were not the same both in organization and in terms of equipment. The use of these units in combat and operations yielded positive results. At the same time, experience has shown that it is inappropriate to have them subordinate to the commander of the artillery of the Red Army. This was due to the fact that they were created on the basis of tanks, and there were no training units in the artillery to train crews. Along with this, the problem of maintaining and repairing vehicles arose, since the artillery department did not have the necessary repair units and units capable of restoring new material. In addition, self-propelled guns, being a means of qualitatively enhancing the fire of tanks, carried out their tasks in close cooperation with them not only when breaking through the enemy’s defenses, but also when developing an offensive in its operational depth. Therefore, it was required that self-propelled artillery units be organizationally part of the tank forces. Therefore, at the end of April 1943, all self-propelled artillery regiments available at that time were transferred to tank forces.
In May 1943, self-propelled artillery regiments were transferred to new states in order to have the same type of vehicles in the regiments. In this regard, three types of regiments were created: light, self-propelled artillery regiments SU-76, self-propelled artillery regiments SU-122. In addition, the previously created heavy self-propelled artillery regiments SU-152 remained. All regiments had command and control platoons, ammunition supply platoons, a repair platoon, a transport platoon, a regimental medical center and a utility department. At the end of 1943, all regiments were transferred to a four-battery structure. The number of vehicles in the shelves remained the same. This event made it possible to strengthen the firepower of the battery as the main combat unit.
The last reorganization of self-propelled artillery regiments was carried out in February 1944. The need for it was determined by the experience of combat use of self-propelled gun regiments and the arrival of new brands of heavy vehicles ISU-152, ISU-122. After this restructuring, three types also remained - heavy, medium and light self-propelled artillery regiments. However, each regiment already had 21 vehicles, and companies of machine gunners and technical support were included in it.
In May 1944, the staff of a separate self-propelled artillery division was approved, consisting of three batteries (12 SU-76 units in total). In June, these divisions began manning several guards rifle divisions, which to a certain extent contributed to the increase in their combat capabilities.
The experience of offensive operations carried out in 1943 showed that it is necessary for commanders of combined arms and tank armies to have powerful maneuverable means to combat enemy tank groups during operations. This served as the basis for the formation of self-propelled artillery brigades in February 1944.
In December 1944, guards heavy self-propelled artillery brigades were created on the basis of several tank brigades. These compounds had a slightly different organization. The new formations consisted of three regiments, support and service units.
The brigade had 1,804 people, 65 heavy self-propelled guns ISU-152 and three SU-76. At the same time, self-propelled artillery brigades were being formed in the same states, which had 1,492 people, 65 SU-100 self-propelled guns and three SU-76. Both brigades were intended to strengthen the combined arms and tank armies that carried out operations in the directions of the main attacks, and were a means of the RGK.
These were the organizational forms of self-propelled artillery of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War.
In the years under review, the tank brigade did not undergo fundamental organizational changes. Taking into account the combat experience of using brigades, some organizational measures were taken. Thus, in order to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of the motorized rifle and machine gun battalion, in January 1943, a company of anti-tank rifles was included in the brigade staff, and in March 1943, an anti-aircraft machine gun company was introduced.
More significant changes occurred at the end of 1943. War practice showed that a tank brigade, either separate or part of a tank or mechanized corps, should have a significantly greater striking force, which it needs both when breaking through enemy defenses and when developing offensive However, the presence in the brigade of two tank battalions, equipped with medium and light tanks, to some extent made it difficult to determine the most optimal option for constructing a battle formation in accordance with combat conditions and complicated the management of units. In this regard, in November 1943, a new staff of the tank brigade No. 010/500-010/506 was accepted.
An analysis of the organization of a tank brigade shows that the presence of only T-34 medium tanks in its composition significantly increased its striking force, firepower and mobility. Overall, the brigade's combat capabilities have increased significantly.
In connection with the adoption of the T-34-85 tank, whose crew consisted of five people, a company of anti-tank rifles of a motorized battalion of machine gunners in April 1944 was turned to complement the crews of new tanks.
Tank brigades were gradually transferred to this state. First of all, brigades that were part of tank and mechanized corps were transferred to this organization. Subsequently, until the end of the war, the organization of the tank brigade remained virtually unchanged.
In the period 1943 - 1945, taking into account the experience of fighting in the mechanized brigade, some organizational changes took place. In January 1943, in order to strengthen the brigade's striking force, another company of medium tanks was added to the tank regiment. The total number of tanks in the regiment remained 39. However, there were 32 medium tanks, instead of the previously available 23, and light tanks decreased by 9 vehicles.
In February of the same year, due to its bulkiness and low mobility, the anti-aircraft artillery division was excluded from the brigade, and an anti-aircraft machine-gun company was introduced in its place. At the same time, an engineering mine company was activated, and all vehicles intended for transporting personnel of motorized rifle battalions were consolidated into a brigade auto company.
Further changes in the organization of the mechanized brigade occurred mainly in connection with the improvement of the organizations of its tank regiment. So in February 1944, the tank regiment was transferred to a new staff, in which there were three tank companies, equipped only with medium tanks. As a result of this restructuring, the regiment received 35 T-34 tanks, and light tanks were excluded from the regiment's staff. After this, no changes occurred in the brigade until the end of the war.
As a result of the increase in industrial production of tanks, self-propelled artillery units and other military equipment in the last two years of the war, a number of changes occurred in the organization of tank corps.
In order to strengthen the firepower of the corps in January 1943, the RGK mortar regiment (36 120-mm mortars) and the RGK self-propelled artillery regiment (25 self-propelled guns) were added to its staff. Somewhat later, a reserve of tanks (40 vehicles) with crews and 100 drivers was introduced into some corps. At the same time, the capabilities of the fuel and lubricants delivery company were increased.
In the following months, significant changes took place in the staff of the tank corps, as a result of which its combat capabilities were increased. So, in February, instead of engineering mine companies, an engineer battalion is activated, and in March, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment. In order to increase the corps' capabilities to combat enemy tanks and assault guns, in April a fighter-anti-tank artillery regiment (20 45-mm guns) and a fighter-anti-tank division (12 85-mm anti-aircraft guns) were added to the corps' staff. Significant changes in the tank corps took place in the second half of 1943. The experience of offensive operations showed that the anti-tank artillery available in the corps, as a rule, lagged behind the first echelon brigades and when encountering enemy tank groups, tanks were forced to fight them. This negatively affected the pace of the offensive, and often the corps suffered significant losses, losing to a certain extent their combat effectiveness.
Therefore, the anti-tank artillery regiment and the anti-tank artillery division were replaced in August 1943 by two self-propelled artillery regiments (SU-76 and SU-152). In October 1943, in individual tank corps, and in November 1943 in all others, instead of an armored car battalion, a separate motorcycle battalion was introduced (staff number 010/432), which included two motorcycle companies, a tank company, a company of armored personnel carriers and an anti-tank artillery battalion. battery. In this regard, the corps' reconnaissance capabilities have increased significantly. At the same time, workshops for the repair of weapons, equipment and clothing were introduced into the rear of the corps, and a corps exchange office (COP) was included in the corps of the tank armies. Due to the inclusion of the third tank battalion in tank brigades and the replacement of light tanks with medium tanks, the combat capabilities of the corps as a whole increased.
In 1944, the organization of the tank corps was improved mainly in the direction of strengthening its firepower, maneuverability and increasing operational-tactical independence. In connection with the transfer of self-propelled artillery regiments to a single staff in February, the number of self-propelled guns in the corps increased by 14 vehicles. In May, a medical battalion was included in all corps.
In order to increase the fire capabilities of the corps' artillery, in August a light artillery regiment (lap) was introduced into its composition, which had 24 76-mm cannons.
At the end of the year, a significant reorganization of repair units and units was carried out. The need for this reorganization was due to a number of reasons. The two field repair brigades (FRT) in the corps carried out repairs of both armored and tractor-tank vehicles. Because of this, the principle of specialization of repairs was not observed, which negatively affected its quality, and the machines themselves were idle for a lot of time for repairs. Therefore, in November 1944, two repair bases were created in the corps: a mobile tank repair base (PTRB) and a mobile vehicle repair base (PARB). The first was intended only for the repair of tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and the second only for the repair of wheeled vehicles and tractors.
Thus, during the war years, significant changes occurred in the organization of the tank corps, which are shown in the table.
Changes in the organizational structure of the Red Army tank corps during the Great Patriotic War
| Names | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
| I. Organization | ||||
| Tank brigades (tbr) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Motorized Rifle Brigade (MSBR) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| - | 3 | 3 | 3 | |
| Light Artillery Regiment (Lap) | - | - | - | 1 |
| Mortar Regiment (MinP) | - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| iptap | - | - | - | - |
| iptadn | - | - | - | - |
| ogmdn | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| omtsb (obarb) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Sapper battalion | - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Signal Battalion | - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Tank battalions | 6 | 6 | 9 | 9 |
| 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | |
| II. Number | ||||
| Personnel | 7 800 | 10 977 | 12 010 | 11 788 |
| Tanks and self-propelled guns | 168 | 257 | 270 | 270 |
| .. heavy | - | - | - | 21 |
| .. average | 98 | 208 | 207 | 207 |
| .. lungs | 70 | - | - | - |
| .. self-propelled guns | - | 49 | 63 | 42 |
| Artillery and mortars | 30 | 60 | 130 | 174 |
| BM-13 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
Analysis of the table data shows that the organization of the tank corps was improved in the direction of increasing fire and striking power, increasing mobility, maneuverability and independence of the corps during combat operations.
During the war years, the number of personnel more than doubled, the number of tanks and self-propelled guns increased 2.7 times, the number of artillery and mortars almost doubled, and the number of vehicles almost tripled.
The organization of the mechanized corps was also improved taking into account the experience of its combat use and in connection with the entry into the troops of new, more advanced military equipment and weapons.
In January 1943, due to its bulkiness and low mobility, the anti-aircraft artillery division was excluded from the mechanized brigade, and the army air defense regiment was excluded from the corps. At the same time, to strengthen the firepower of the mechanized corps, a mortar regiment (36 120-mm mortars), a mixed self-propelled artillery regiment (8 SU-122, 17 SU-76 installations), as well as a tank reserve (40 tanks and 147 members) are introduced into its composition. crews) and 100 drivers. In February, instead of an engineering mine company, an engineer battalion was included in the corps, and in March the control company was reorganized into a communications battalion. At the same time, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment was added to the corps staff, which had 16 37-mm cannons and 16 DShK machine guns.
In the following months, significant changes occurred in the corps staff. By order of the NKO, a fighter-anti-tank artillery regiment (20 45-mm guns) was introduced in April. At the same time, the corps included an aviation communications unit - 3 aircraft. In addition, in order to increase the combat capabilities of the corps to combat enemy tanks and assault guns, in May a fighter-anti-tank artillery division (12 85-mm guns) was added to the corps. To ensure anti-chemical protection of parts and connections of the corps, a chemical protection company was introduced into its staff.
Significant changes in the organization of the mechanized corps took place in August 1943. Instead of the anti-tank artillery regiment, the SU-76 self-propelled artillery regiment (21 units) was introduced into the corps staff, and instead of the anti-tank fighter division, the SU-85 regiment (16 units and one T-34 tank).
At the same time, armored car battalions were excluded from the mechanized corps that were part of the tank armies, and separate motorcycle battalions were introduced instead.
During 1944 - 1945 There have been some changes in the organization of the corps. In connection with the transfer of self-propelled artillery regiments to unified states in February 1944, the number of self-propelled artillery units increased by 14 vehicles. In addition, the tank regiment of the mechanized brigade was transferred to a new staff. As a result, the regiment received 35 medium tanks (three tank companies), and light tanks were completely excluded.
In order to improve the organization and implementation of logistics, a corps exchange office was introduced into the corps rear staff in September. In November of the same year, a mobile tank repair base and a mobile automobile repair base were included in the corps.
Thus, the mechanized corps, unlike the tank corps, underwent slightly fewer organizational changes. This is explained by the fact that these formations were created taking into account the experience of forming tank corps and in their initial organization had divisions and units of military branches, as well as rear units and institutions.
The dynamics of changes in the organization and strength of the mechanized corps are shown in the table.
Changes in the organizational structure of the mechanized corps of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War
| Names | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
| I. Organization | ||||
| Mechanized Brigades (MBBs) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Tank brigade (tbr) | 1 - 2 or 2 tp | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Tank regiments (tp) | 3 - 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Self-propelled artillery regiments (SAP) | - | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Mortar Regiment (MinP) | - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Anti-aircraft artillery regiment (zap) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| iptap | 1 | - | - | - |
| iptadn | - | - | - | - |
| ogmdn | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| omtsb (obarb) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Sapper battalion | - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Signal Battalion | - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Tank battalions | 2 - 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Motorized rifle battalions (MBB) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| II. Number | ||||
| Personnel | 13559 | 15 018 | 16 442 | 16 318 |
| Tanks and self-propelled guns | 175 | 229 | 244 | 226 |
| .. average | 100 | 162 | 183 | 183 |
| .. lungs | 75 | 42 | - | - |
| .. self-propelled guns | - | 25 | 63 | 63 |
| Artillery and mortars | 90 | 108 | 234 | 234 |
| BM-13 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
The organization of the mechanized corps was improved in the same main areas as the tank corps. At the same time, a successful organizational combination of motorized infantry, tanks and artillery ensured that the corps conducted successful combat operations in various conditions and terrain.
Conclusions drawn from the experience of using tank armies in the operations of 1942 formed the basis for the subsequent reorganization of these formations.
At the end of January 1943, a special meeting of the State Defense Committee was held, dedicated to the development of regulations on the formation of tank armies. Previously, the opinions of some prominent military leaders were heard on this issue. Everyone agreed that it was necessary, first of all, to remove non-motorized rifle divisions from tank armies and to organizationally allocate the tank core of new formations. It was believed that such an approach to determining the combat composition of tank armies would provide them with high mobility and greater striking force, and therefore the conditions for control and logistics would significantly improve.
The composition of each army was different and was established by a separate formation directive, but its typical structure was established by GKO Resolution No. 2791. It was indicated that tank armies should, as a rule, consist of two tank, one mechanized corps, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a guards mortar, howitzer artillery, anti-tank fighter and motorcycle regiments. As support units it was planned to have a communications regiment, an aviation communications regiment (Po-2 aircraft), an engineering battalion, an automobile regiment and two repair and restoration battalions. The rear units and institutions included divisions and service units of the field administration of the army, food, baggage, medical and chemical institutions, artillery supply bodies, fuel and lubricants supplies, as well as units for the collection, reception and evacuation of captured property. However, it should be noted that the composition of tank armies was determined by directives (orders) for their formation. Therefore, their combat composition was not the same (Table 7).
As can be seen from the table, the tank armies of the new composition, unlike previous tank formations, were supposed to have, in addition to artillery and mortar formations and units, support and service units, tank and mechanized corps, which formed the core of the army and had approximately the same combat capabilities and mobility. This gave the new tank formations high mobility and greater striking power, as a result of which real opportunities were created to deliver deep strikes on the enemy and conduct combat operations at a faster pace than before. The new tank armies were a powerful means of the Supreme Command Headquarters, which reinforced with them the fronts that delivered the main attacks.
At the same time, depending on the role of tank armies in operations and the conditions for their conduct, the combat and numerical composition of tank formations was unequal.
Table 8 shows that out of 64 offensive operations carried out by tank armies of a homogeneous composition, in 32 cases they operated in a two-corps composition. Only one tank army (3rd Guards) had three corps throughout the war.
War experience showed that when tank armies had two corps, their ability to carry out wide maneuver in the enemy's depths was limited. In addition, the army's operational formation was shallow, as there was no strong second echelon. With the decrease in the width of the front of the strategic offensive of our troops, the reduction in the number of important operational directions, as well as due to the need to defeat strong enemy groups in a short time, the tank armies had three corps by the end of the war. This is confirmed by the experience of the Berlin and Manchurian operations.
In general, the experience of the combat use of tank armies, especially in offensive operations of the last war, showed the advisability of having at least three corps in such formations, including one of them should be mechanized, as was the case in the 3rd Guards Tank Army.
With this composition, as the war has shown, a tank army is capable of successfully performing all combat missions, such as breaking through hastily occupied enemy lines, crossing water barriers, conducting combat operations in mountainous, forested, wooded and swampy areas, and capturing large populated areas. Assessing the tank army's reconnaissance capabilities, it should be noted that at first they were insufficient. Therefore, starting from mid-1944, separate motorcycle regiments (omtsp) were introduced into almost all tank formations. This made it possible, taking into account the capabilities of the corps and brigades, to ensure simultaneous reconnaissance by the army throughout its entire offensive zone and on the flanks.
Until mid-1944, the artillery capabilities of the tank army were also insufficient. This in a number of cases had a negative impact on its combat operations, and especially in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense, when the army had to independently break through the lines of enemy defense or fight against strong counterattack groups. Therefore, at the beginning of 1944, it was decided to introduce self-propelled artillery and light artillery brigades into the tank armies. By the end of September 1944, all six tank armies already had these brigades. However, to successfully carry out operations, tank armies were reinforced with artillery and anti-tank artillery brigades and regiments.
Directly as part of the tank armies, as the experience of combat operations showed, there were not enough anti-aircraft artillery weapons. Therefore, in the vast majority of operations, each tank army was reinforced, as a rule, by one anti-aircraft artillery division.
During offensive operations, all tank armies experienced a lack of engineering forces and equipment. The presence in the army of 1 - 2 engineer battalions did not allow the necessary engineering activities to be carried out on an army scale. In this regard, in the spring and summer of 1944, a number of organizational measures were carried out. In the tank armies in July - August 1944, motorized engineering brigades (mibr) were formed, which included two motorized engineering battalions (mib), one pontoon-bridge battalion (pomb). As a result, the capabilities of the army's engineering troops have increased significantly. However, since the tank armies did not have the required number of pontoon-bridges and airborne transport means, this to a certain extent made it difficult for the tank armies to cross water barriers.
The signal troops were not equally represented in both quantitative and qualitative terms. All tank armies had a separate communications regiment, an aviation communications regiment (with the exception of the 2nd Guards TA) and other communications units. In general, the tank armies were fairly well equipped with radios, mobile and wired communications. However, when conducting combat operations in mountainous and forested areas (the Transylvanian Alps, areas southwest and west of Vienna, the Greater Khingan mountain range), there was a need to strengthen tank armies with more powerful radio stations.
Analyzing the capabilities of tank armies in providing material and technical support to troops, it should be noted that the presence of motor transport units and subunits generally ensured the delivery and evacuation of material resources and property. However, the insufficient staffing of units and subunits with motor vehicles in a number of operations had a negative impact on material support, especially on the supply of fuel and lubricants. During this period, the organizational structure was improved and the capabilities of repair and evacuation units and subunits that were part of the tank armies increased. At the end of 1944, specialized repair battalions were created in them to repair tracked armored vehicles (1 - 2 oatrb) and automotive vehicles (1 - 2 oarb). Taking into account military repair units in tank armies, 85% of all medium repairs were carried out during the war.
Thus, the organizational structure of tank armies in 1943 - 1945. continuously improved. The organizational measures taken were aimed at increasing the firepower, striking force, mobility and maneuverability of tank armies, which was determined by the requirements of warfare.
At the end of the war, the three-corps tank army, as a rule, had over 50 thousand people, 850 - 920 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 800 guns and mortars, and more than 5 thousand vehicles. However, in the vast majority of offensive operations, tank armies did not have a full complement of people, weapons and military equipment.
In the years under review, the tank forces included separate tank battalions, regiments, heavy tank regiments and brigades, as well as special tank units and formations of the RVGK.
In February 1944, the existing heavy breakthrough tank regiments were transferred to new states. At the same time, several such regiments were re-formed. The new regiments had 375 people, four IS-2 tank companies (21 tanks), a company of machine gunners, an engineer platoon, a utility platoon and a regimental medical center (RPM). When these regiments were created, they were given the honorary name “Guards”.
Individual tank regiments were also reorganized. The essence of this reorganization, carried out at the beginning of 1944, was to exclude light tanks from them and strengthen the support and service units. In total, the regiment was supposed to have 386 people and 35 T-34 tanks.
In December 1944, the formation of separate Guards heavy tank brigades began. The creation of these formations was necessitated by the need to concentrate heavy tanks in the directions of the main attacks of fronts and armies in order to break through, in cooperation with infantry and artillery, heavily fortified defensive lines and fortified areas in order to ensure the introduction of development echelons into the breakthrough, as well as to combat enemy tank groups during operations . Organizationally, the brigade consisted of three heavy breakthrough tank regiments, a motorized battalion of machine gunners, and support and service units. In total, the brigade consisted of 1,666 people, 65 IS-2 heavy tanks, three SU-76 self-propelled artillery mounts, 19 armored personnel carriers and three armored vehicles.
In addition to the units and formations considered, the tank forces had tank regiments and special-purpose brigades.
In connection with the development of enemy defense, in which mine-explosive barriers, including anti-tank ones, were widely used, the need arose to make passages in minefields during the attack. To accomplish this task, a mine-resistant tank trawl was developed and put into service. All this necessitated the creation of special tank units. Therefore, in mid-1943, an engineering tank regiment was formed. It had two T-34 tank companies and support units. The regiment had 22 medium tanks, 18 trawls and means of transporting them.
These are, in general, the main directions along which the organizational development of tank forces was carried out during the Great Patriotic War. A large number of changes that took place in the organization of units and formations were explained mainly by changes in the methods of conducting combat operations during the war years and were aimed at achieving constant correspondence between the forms of organization of tank forces and the methods of warfare and operations.
This chapter reveals the organization of parts and connections. However, this does not mean that the regiments, brigades and corps were all the same in strength. In reality, especially in the tank and mechanized corps, there were significant discrepancies with their main staff. This was explained by various reasons and, mainly, by the country’s economic capabilities for the production of weapons and military equipment.
* * *
An analysis of the organizational structure of the tank forces of our army during the years of the last war allows us to conclude that this type of troops was repeatedly and radically reorganized. A characteristic feature of this process was that the tank forces organizationally consisted of separate tank units and formations intended for joint actions with infantry, but not organizationally included in the staff of rifle formations. In addition, large tank (mechanized) formations and tank formations were created as part of the tank forces, the main purpose of which was: in the offensive - developing tactical success into operational success, in defense - delivering powerful counterattacks against an intruded enemy.
At all stages of the organizational development of tank forces, a number of main trends were clearly visible: a constant increase in the firepower and striking force of units, formations and formations; giving, especially to corps and armies, the necessary autonomy when conducting combat operations in isolation from rifle formations; constant desire to ensure all organizational forms of high flexibility and mobility; providing units, formations and formations with the capabilities to successfully conduct combat and operations in various terrain conditions; creation of an easily manageable organization of regiments, brigades, corps and armies.
In general, it should be noted that during the war, the organizational structure of the tank forces was in full accordance with the methods of conducting combat operations and significantly contributed to the achievement of high combat effectiveness of this type of troops.
The ground forces of any country are armed with special large-sized multi-purpose combat vehicles with a terrifying appearance - tanks. These hulking monsters combine armor, high levels of protection and firepower to counter the enemy and support infantry with fire to capture and hold territory. That is why they are an important element of the weapons of any country and number thousands of units.
If an armed monster weighing 70 tons is moving towards someone at a speed of 65 km/h, then he will think several times whether to get in the way of a strong and modern combat vehicle. It is very difficult to name the exact number of tanks, since some states that are proud of their weapons openly declare the number of these combat vehicles, while others deliberately suppress information. The same figures that are already known are very contradictory. Therefore, when compiling the review, data declared by national governments was taken into account.
10. Türkiye: 3,763 main battle tanks
Türkiye occupies a worthy place in the world in terms of the number of armed forces. The country is armed with many American and German-made tanks, for example, the M48 Patton and Leopard 2A4. Leopard main battle tanks from Germany are considered the best of their kind in the world, and the 2A4 modification is adapted for urban combat. Türkiye is interested in having large tank forces as a counterweight to the forces of its militarized neighbors, Iran and Syria.
9. Ukraine: 3,784 main battle tanks
Taking into account the turbulent situation in Ukraine associated with the military conflict, it is not surprising that the state wants to have a large number of tank troops. Ironically, a situation has arisen where the majority of tanks are T-64s left over after the collapse of the USSR.
8. Pakistan: 4,000 main battle tanks
Pakistan is one of the countries where the numbers regarding the number of tanks fluctuate greatly. But the fact that the state is armed with tanks is undeniable. Pakistan purchased most of the tanks, and, surprisingly, from China. The Pakistani Al-Zarrar tank is based on the Chinese Type 59 tank, and the country also has a Type 85 tank in service.
7. Egypt: 4,145 main battle tanks
Most Egyptian tanks are of American origin, such as the M60-2000 and M1 Abrams tanks. It is sad that they actively showed themselves on the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities in recent confrontations. The country also uses tanks from the former Soviet Union, including the Ramses II main tank, which is based on the Soviet T-54.
6. Syria: 4,750 main battle tanks
It is not surprising that Syria has a large number of tank troops. The country is in a zone of constant conflict, and the current situation determines the use of heavy equipment against the Syrians themselves. Syria received most of its tanks from Russia, including the T-55. The T54/55 tank is considered the most numerous; the Soviet Union produced 100,000 copies of this model until 1981, when it was discontinued (until 1983 it was still produced in Czechoslovakia).
5. North Korea: 5,500 main battle tanks
Any figures regarding North Korea must be questioned, since the state strives to secure superiority over its eternal enemy, South Korea, through false, inflated statistics. China and the former USSR supplied tanks to North Korea, while the country itself increased production of the T-62-based Chonma-ho and P'okpoong-ho tanks, built in North Korean factories (North Korean Second Machine Industry Bureau).
4. India: 5,978 main battle tanks
Every military historian and fan of The Princess Bride knows to never get involved in a war in Asia. But if a country is forced to enter into a military conflict on this vast territory, it is obliged to have large tank forces. The four largest tank armies in the world belong to Asian countries. Most of the tanks in Indian service are T-72 with 125mm cannon and powerful destructive capabilities.
3. China: 9,000 main battle tanks
According to statistics, China is in second or third place in the number of tank troops in the world. In service are Type 59 and Type 96 tanks, and a large number of Type 99s with a 125 mm gun. The tank's armor is equipped with laser defense systems, and the tank itself can reach a speed of 80 km/h.
2. USA: 9,125 main battle tanks
The United States' neighbors are Canada and Mexico, and it would seem to make no sense for the state to build up its weapons for fear of invasion by land. Indeed, there is no need for the United States to increase the number of main battle tanks, since the state is mainly relying on the development of the navy and air force. The United States is armed with thousands of units of the M1 Abrams tank and its modifications. The future of US tank forces lies with the M1A3 Abrams tank, which competes with South Korea's highly modernized tank, the K2 Black Panther.
1.Russia: 22,710 main battle tanks
Not surprisingly, Russia is at the top of our list. The amount of weapons is determined by the long border of the state, 19,312 km, which must be controlled and protected. Most of the tanks are in a mothballed state - the T-54, T-64 tanks, and the modern T-90 tank is ready to fight at any moment. In the future, Russia hopes to create a fully remote-controlled tank based on the Armata platform. Everything is heading towards the fact that tanks on the battlefield will fight without crews and be controlled from a distance. And it is possible that over time all military equipment will be converted