When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Mussolini immediately volunteered to send troops to help his ally. The proposal to send them was accepted: thus the Italian Expeditionary Force in Russia (IEC) - CSIR (Corpo Spedzione Italiane in Russia) appeared, headed by Lieutenant General Giovanni Messe. There were 62 thousand people in the corps. It consisted of three divisions: two motorized infantry divisions "Pasubio" and "Torino" (both of the binary type, approved in 1938) and one mobile ("celere") "Prince Amedeo Duke d'Aosta", which included two cavalry regiments , a battalion of Bersaglieri cyclists, an artillery regiment and a light tank group, the CSIR was attached to various support units, services and specialized units, so that it was - by Italian standards - quite well equipped.
The corps in July 1941 was sent to the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, to Ukraine, and to initial stage fought very successfully, managing to occupy several cities and towns and thereby make a favorable impression on his ally. But still, despite the fact that the weapons, the best available, like other military equipment, were supplied primarily to the Expeditionary Force, they were not really suitable for local conditions and left much to be desired: although the regiments were called motorized, but that was just one name - the artillery consisted entirely of guns from the First World War, armored units were still forced to fight on useless tankettes, and anti-tank guns did not save them from enemy tanks. The Germans already realized at the end of 1941 that on the Soviet-German front, even well-equipped units quickly used up all their reserves, suffered setbacks and suffered combat losses, and it took quite a lot of time to restore strength. The very scale of the battles and the distances that the fascist troops had to overcome also indicated that even greater difficulties lay ahead.
Mussolini decided to take a more active part in the campaign on the Soviet-German front and thereby raise himself in the eyes of his Axis partners. Despite the hardships that befell the Expeditionary Force in the winter of 1941/42, and the objections of General Messe, in March 1942 he ordered seven more divisions to be sent to the East, from which the II and XXXV Army Corps were formed. The new formation was called the 8th Army. By August, the Italians reached the Don, where they united with Army Group B, under the command of which were 53 divisions: they were distributed among the 4th Panzer, 2nd and 6th German Field, 3rd and 4th Romanian, 2nd Hungarian and 8th Italian armies.
In November 1942, the 8th Army was stationed on the banks of the Chir River northwest of Stalingrad. It was then that Soviet troops began the grandiose Operation Uranus. They decided to take the German troops besieging Stalingrad into a pincer movement: both those that managed to infiltrate the almost completely destroyed city, and those that tightened the ring around it. Much better equipped, much more adapted to the situation and obviously more knowledgeable and understanding of what and for what they were fighting, units of the Red Army concentrated their main forces on those sections of the front line held by the Axis forces, which were defended by Germany’s weaker allies. First of all, Soviet troops attacked the Romanian positions, breaking through, although not without difficulty, their line of defense. On November 23, the operation to encircle the enemy was completed. And immediately after von Manstein launched his fateful Operation Winter Storm, intending to break through to Stalingrad from the southwest, the tank units of the Southwestern Front, commanded by Vatutin, with the support of the forces of the Voronezh Front, defeated the Italians; The Alpine Corps was cut off from its own, and the 8th Army virtually ceased to exist. In January 1943, the surviving Italian troops regrouped in Ukraine, and by March most units began to return to their homeland, while only a small number remained in Russia to fight the partisans.
The 8th Army's losses in manpower and equipment were catastrophic. Of the 229 thousand personnel, 85 thousand were killed or missing, and 30 thousand were wounded. The artillery suffered similarly devastating losses: out of 1,340 guns, 1,200 were destroyed or abandoned. The Italian army has always experienced a large shortage of cars and other self-propelled equipment, and the destruction of 18,200 vehicles out of 22,000 delivered to Russia was a heavy blow for it.
Although the losses of the Italian army on the Soviet-German front were prohibitively heavy, due to the gigantic scale of the battles on the Eastern Front, they were not of particular importance. Strategists, perhaps, could indulge in abstract reasoning on this matter. Like, if such forces or - what is much more important - such equipment, and even in the same volumes and in the same quality, had guessed to send in 1941 to North Africa, and not to Russia, then, most likely, the scales of the then the confrontation would have tilted in favor of the Axis countries.
Combat schedule of the 8th Army for 1942
II Army Corps Infantry divisions "Sforzesca", "Ravenna" and "Cosseria"
XXXV Army Corps Motorized Infantry Divisions "Pasubio" and "Torino" 3rd Mobile ("Celere") Division "Prince Amedeo Duke of Aosta"
Alpine Corps Alpine divisions "Tridentina", "Julia" and "Cuneense" Infantry Division "Vincenza".
1. The cavalry, one must think, by that time - by 1941 - was very outdated, but, as this regiment proved, if the cavalry unit is skillfully deployed in the right place and in right time and direct it against a disorganized enemy, then this branch of troops is still capable of delivering deadly blows. August 24, 1942 settlement Chebarevsky on the Don River, one squadron of this unit, armed with sabers and hand grenades, bravely attacked a two-thousand-strong unit of Soviet infantry; At the same time, the remaining squadrons of the regiment dismounted and also went on the attack. As a result, the enemy was forced into a disorderly flight, although this took considerable effort. On the helmet of the 1933 model, a black cross is visible on the front - the emblem of the Savoy regiment. On the collar of the 1940 model uniform there are buttonholes in the shape of a black flame with three tongues, also indicating that this cavalryman belongs to the Savoy regiment (since 1942 they began to be trimmed with red piping). Another sign of the regiment is a red tie (in the Savoy regiment, such ties were worn in memory of the feat of a wounded messenger from this regiment: in the 18th century, he reached his general and reported important news to him, although the messenger’s white lace collar was already soaked in blood) . Leggings made of black leather, covering the lower leg from the ankle to the knee, are the same as in other cavalry units, but of the version worn by the lower ranks. The cavalryman is armed with a rifle M189//1938 (model 1891, which underwent changes in 1938) and a saber model 1871. Captured weapons were very popular in this regiment Soviet machine guns PPSh-41, and they were often used in battle.
2. In imitation of the German ally, a small Cossack unit was created in the 8th Italian Army, which fought in Russia, in September 1942 - a hundred. In total, they managed to recruit 360 Cossacks, commanded by four officers, and the Italians placed a colonel at the head of the entire hundred. Taking advantage of the opportunity, a hundred were attached to the lancers of the Novara regiment; after the departure of Italian troops from Soviet Union a hundred became part of the Cossack units of the Wehrmacht. Cossack, wearing a black sheepskin hat with a red top. His new employers provided him with an Italian uniform of the 1940 model, but his breeches and boots were the same ones from the Red Army. On the left sleeve you can see a chevron from the corners of the Russian national colors - white, blue and red. The Cossack's leather equipment is also the same, inherited from the Red Army, as is the Mosin rifle. He shows his new comrade a traditional Cossack saber.
3. M-battalions (M is short for “Mussolini”) were formed from battle-tested Blackshirt volunteers, and the army authorities entrusted them with more responsible sectors of the front and assigned them more complex combat missions than ordinary fascist units. Such units especially distinguished themselves in the fight against Yugoslav partisans, and these units ended up in the Soviet Union as part of the 8th Army. The rank of “camina pera scelta” (camicia pega scelta - selected black shirt) was considered equivalent to that of senior army private. His headdress was a black fez of the Volunteer Militia (MSVN) - in such fez the Blackshirts often even went on the attack. The collar tabs are black flames with two tongues with a capital handwritten Latin letter "M" intertwined with silver fasces. The blackshirt has a light machine gun “Vreda” model 1930 in his hands, and as a machine gunner he is entitled to a pistol holster on his belt and pouches with spare parts, accessories and ammunition for the machine gun suspended from the same belt.
1. This small unit was created in Croatia, when the country was occupied by Italy, specifically for fighting in Russia. The legion consisted of an infantry battalion, a mortar company and an anti-tank company. The volunteer is dressed in a woolen overcoat of the 1934 model - completely unsuitable for the conditions of the Russian winter. On the left sleeve is the Croatian national emblem: chessboard with red and silver or white cells under the inscription "Hrvatska" (i.e. "Croatia" in Croatian). The Legion emphasized its affiliation with the fascist militia, and therefore militia badges with a white, metallic announcer’s bun were attached to the collar of the overcoat and to the “bustin” of the volunteer. Under "bustina" is a purchased or custom-knitted "balaclava". Walking in boots studded with large nails from the 1912 model in the snow, especially in the Russian winter, is the same as deliberately dooming yourself to frostbite. The volunteer’s weapons are a 6.5 mm Carcano rifle, model 1891, and a Breda-35 grenade (on his belt).
2. This non-commissioned officer managed to equip himself for the Russian winter much better than most of his comrades in arms. He is wearing an insulated double-breasted, lined overcoat, and on his head is a Romanian “chakula”, which his commander got for his subordinate. The Romanian hat did not at all meet the statutory requirements for uniforms, although the soldiers who wore such hats tried to give them a more official look by sewing on them badges and other insignia that were supposed to be worn on the headdress. This sergeant was lucky enough to get a pair of canvas boots to wear over his boots, and he also has a woolen “balaclava” and mittens with “shooting toe.” The sergeant has a Polish anti-tank rifle “Maroszek” WZ.35, which the Germans, who were getting rid of their captured stocks, supplied in large quantities to their allies in the Italian expeditionary force that fought on the Soviet-German front. The fact that the Italians willingly accepted even such outdated weapons once again indicates desperation due to the fact that they had nothing to oppose the Soviet tanks.
Given that the Italians' ancestors, the Romans, built a large, strong and warlike empire, the question of why the Italians fought so unconvincingly in the 20th century has puzzled many. Basically, everything comes down to psychology, they say, pampered by the warm climate, wine and beautiful women, Italian men are not eager to leave this so seductive world, as a result of which they panic and tear up their slippers at any naught.
There are no bad warring nations. And there are no nations that fight well. Germans in Napoleonic wars they fought very poorly, despite Frederick’s legacy, and despite the descendants who twice took Paris, and once hung over him with the sword of Domocles. Every era produces its own nature of war, and the wars of the industrial era became the battlefield of the Germans.
Italians are such noisy bullies, dangerous mafiosi, brave and reckless guys. And pay attention to the Karabakh conflict, where the same noisy, expressive Armenians and Azerbaijanis fought. The armies of both sides suffered low level disciplines, videos are circulating on the Internet showing panic, confusion and the inability of commanders to organize people and assess the situation. One comrade once instructed me, young and inexperienced, not to get involved with the Georgians under any circumstances, because if he takes out a knife, nothing will help in dealing with him. But remember the panic of the Georgian army in 2008.
These different peoples there are some things in common (not just the inability to form a combat-ready regular army). They are excellent individual fighters. Breter, fearless and dexterous, does not like to obey, considers himself smarter than everyone around, and does not value himself much lower than a marshal, much less a general. It is difficult to unite people with such a temperament into an army of hundreds of thousands of people. It is also impossible to saturate them with ideology, so you cannot force these people to die for an idea, due to their developed individualism.
There were similar problems in the Russian army after the introduction of all-class conscription. Even in a shameful and disastrous Crimean War, the army showed high level professionalism, or even rather corporate ethics. A recruited warrior is a professional, to one degree or another, but a conscript is not, he has something to lose, and it is difficult to force him to fight when there is a household and family at home.
Let's try to figure this out. This difference is probably related to social origin. Let's take a look social structure armies. Since the 50s of the 19th century, Germany has been an industrial power (or rather, a fragmented Germany that has set a course for unification); the proletarian becomes the main resource for replenishing the mass army. The proletarian of that era was a beggar, deprived of significant property, accustomed to discipline. A peasant of that era is already a personally free person, independently building and responsible for his own life. Proletarians fill the armies of the Germans, French, and British. Peasants - armies of less industrially developed Italians, Austro-Hungarians, Russians. This is probably why the armies of the latter in WWII turned out to be so prone to moral “decay,” panic, fraternization and mass surrender or desertion. The peasant will not want to fight over nonsense or someone else's ambitions; he has more important things to do at home.
World War II probably didn't have much of an impact on this situation. And the Italians did not become more disciplined, and the workers' and peasants' red army began a war with the Germans with giant cauldrons and millions of prisoners, disoriented and completely unmotivated to die. Therefore, the Westphalian steelworkers and Saxon miners continued to beat everyone on both fronts, but again did not take care of their meager resource capabilities.
The Italians could not become a powerful militaristic power for the following reasons:
- Individualism, an individualistic temperament, is poorly conducive to building a disciplined army.
- More reverent attitude to life. Sunny Italy is washed by warm seas, with fertile land and friendly nature. Try, after living your whole life in these conditions, to find yourself in a trench for countless months under the roar of bombs and shells.
- Lack of militaristic mentality and traditions. The absence of the cult of expansion in the minds of people for many centuries, before unification into a single and “hungry” power for conquest.
Pavel, great answer, thank you. In Golovushkin’s book “The Battle for Africa. A View from Russia” there was a statement that one of the reasons was the huge social stratification between ordinary soldiers and command, yesterday's peasants did not want to die for the interests of the aristocrats, who decided to begin the redistribution of spheres of influence and restore the Roman Empire. Do you think this factor might be influential?
Answer
Thanks for interesting question, which have been in short supply for a long time.
Of course it's possible. But as a historian, you understand that many factors have an influence, to varying degrees, but many. This cannot be explained by stratification alone (usually it is the prerogative of learned Marxists to explain everything by stratification). Was there no stratification in Great Britain or in Germany? Were.
In general, it is very difficult to answer such questions. And my answer is very general. It is impossible to answer it with specific cause-and-effect relationships. After all, the question of why German soldiers turned out to be so persistent, skillful, brave and proactive on the fields of world wars, because they had never shown anything like this before (well, maybe with the exception of the Prussians), is also very interesting, and it is also unclear how to objectively explain this. You can also speculate.
Let's try to look at this anthropologically. When you find yourself in battle (neither I nor you have such experience, but there are obvious things) and they are trying to kill you, bombs are exploding around you, fragments are falling, bullets are flying, etc., will the soldier care about why he Here. Because of money, because of love for his homeland, because of awards, or he is simply forced, it doesn’t matter, he begins to care about one thing - saving his life. What difference does it make where you are from and what nationality? Therefore, we must look for answers first in natural factors before moving on to social factors.
Of course, ordinary Italians did not want to die for the interests of the fascists, but even in the First World War, when they fought with the Austrians (also not the coolest soldiers) for disputed lands, that is, one might say for their homeland, they did it no better than in Africa in the 30s. 40s.
Answer
Comment
Before Italy entered the war, it had a large army; in Africa alone the number of soldiers numbered 300-400 thousand people.
Against the small British troops in Egypt, Mussolini sent divisions whose personnel amounted to more than one hundred thousand people. But they were defeated, and things got to the point where the allied forces were approaching Tripoli (the capital of the colony of Italy - Libya)
For what reasons did the army of such an ambitious country suffer defeat after defeat?
1. Italy, unlike its ally Germany, did not have such a developed infrastructure and industry; many factories, factories and enterprises were located in the northern and central regions of the country. Southern part was more agrarian, the rural population significantly predominated.
2. The state did not have enough material and natural resources to uninterruptedly supply the army and conduct major military operations. This is evidenced by the poor supply of troops in Africa; many Italians complained about poor food, lack of ammunition, and especially medical supplies and medicines. One soldier noted that he saw Italian (not German) ambulance cars and transport only a few times.
3. The Italian army was inexperienced. A significant part of the officers were incompetent in military affairs, and the general staff lacked experience in waging war. As Australian and English veterans who fought in Africa said, the Italians were untrained soldiers who quickly fled when exposed to artillery fire or tank advances. Some even noted that it was a pleasure to fight with them.
4. The country's economy was not suitable for waging such a long and exhausting war. After the defeat in Greece, many were confident that Italy would either lose the war or become another puppet of the formidable Germany.
There are many more reasons, but I have named only the most basic ones.
A very interesting question, Anastasia. It's true, the Italian army was very ineffective in places and was consistently not as effective as the Wehrmacht. To be honest, I am not a great expert on the Italian armed forces, but I would venture to point out two reasons:
1) Emphasis on the Italian Navy and not on the ground contingent. Italy had a very strong fleet (4 battleships for example).
2) Weak tactical training of infantry generals, lack of understanding of modern warfare
The result of these two factors was the lack of modern tanks, for example. How can you fight in World War II without tanks?
The same one that managed to lose to Abyssinia in the first Ethiopian-Italian war? Well, who knows, knows, knows, knows (the echo responded)
The reason is that the Italians, simply put, did not need this war. Fighting in Ethiopia or the Balkans is one thing; Italy had interests here, one can understand (although the war with Greece is certainly a disaster for the Italians), but still. Imagine that you are an Italian soldier on the eastern front. You are in a very huge, cold, unfriendly country, and you don’t understand what you are doing here. At least, if at first the Italians joyfully went on a crusade against Bolshevism, they ended sadly. Regarding the eastern front, it was very difficult for the Italians, pampered by the warm climate, to conduct military operations in the USSR.
And we can also remember that in Italy, in fact, not everyone shared the alliance with Germany and believed that such friendship would lead Italy to collapse.
There are many factors:
1. The greatness of Ancient Rome is to blame for everything.
If the pasta makers had not looked up to him, then there would have been no bitterness of defeat. Azerbaijanis are also warriors, unimportant, but no one points this out to them. And the Italians are full of arrogance! A logical question arises: are modern Are Italians descendants of the Romans?
2. Frankly bad soldiers. Of course, there were also their heroes, outstanding personalities, but in general... Knowledge of military affairs left much to be desired (confirmation of this is the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia)
Imagine - Italy enters the war in the spring of 1941, fully prepared for it
The fleet is headed by a decisive and courageous admiral, the training of fleet personnel is not inferior to that of England, the submarines have completely modern performance characteristics, the ships are prepared for night battles, the fleet has its own powerful aviation (SM79 torpedo bombers). The army is an excellent junior officer, good preparation privates, proactive generals. The 10th Army (Messe), having superiority in strength, advances towards Cairo and Alexandria. They are supported by the 10th Luftwaffe Air Corps! In East Africa - Duke of Aosta's units capture British Somalia, approach Khartoum, and take Nairobi by storm. Thanks to effective propaganda, the East African units of the British Army do not put up proper resistance, but simply retreat. In the Balkans - expeditionary forces (Graziani), with the support of the Wehrmacht and Bulgaria, capture Greece. Yugoslavia joins the Axis. Supermarine, with the support of the Luftwaffe, inflict huge losses on the British Fleet and force it to retreat to Haifa and Gibraltar. The Barham, Malaya, Illustrious and Eagle were sunk. An airborne assault on Crete (joint German-Italian) captures the island. Next in line are Cyprus and Malta. Spain joins the Axis - the Germans, French and Italians bomb Gibraltar, making it impossible for the British fleet to stay here. The Germans and Italians are creating a submarine base in the Azores. And so on...
Answer“When God created armies, he arranged them in one rank according to their strength. And it turned out that the Austrian army found itself on the far right. “Lord,” the Austrians prayed, “should we at least beat someone?!” And then God created the Italian army..."
Anecdote from the First World War
Infantry of the Italian Expeditionary Force in Stalino
On the night of August 20, 1942, Soviet troops carried out intensive artillery and mortar preparation of the positions of the elite Italian divisions “Sforzesca”, “Celere” and “Pausubio”, which occupied positions on the Don in the area of \u200b\u200bSerafimovich and were involved in the attack on Stalingrad. Immediately after the artillery barrage, Soviet troops struck the far right sector of the Italian front. This was the beginning of the end for the Italian Expeditionary Force on the Eastern Front.
The Soviet High Command pursued the goal of easing the alarming German pressure on Stalingrad and, in the event of a favorable development of the operation, continuing a large-scale offensive against Paulus's 6th Army. The timing for the operation was chosen very well. Only 7 days had passed since the Italians arrived at their current positions, and there was no way for them to equip them for defense, since harassing attacks Soviet troops stopped for only a few hours a day.
Senior Sergeant A. Gladky's ML-20 howitzer gun fires
The Italian participants in the battle subsequently noted that the “Russian divisions thrown against them were fully staffed, and the infantry regiments were equipped with mortars, automatic and anti-tank weapons. The bulk of the attackers were party and Komsomol members, and most of the attacks took place under the leadership of political instructors, which spoke of the special ideological preparation of the operation and the serious intentions of the Russians.”
Soviet ZiS-3 cannon fires at the enemy
The Soviet attack by three divisions of the 63rd Army began at 2:30. Quickly crushing the troops leading edge Italian defense, our soldiers began to occupy strategic positions for the development of the subsequent offensive. On the central lines, the Italians still managed to hold out with the help of hastily brought up reserves, but on the left flank their position was critical. The next day, the Soviet command secretly transported another 10 rifle battalions to the other side and the position of the Italians worsened even more. Only the 179th German Infantry Regiment and the Croatian Legion, quickly transferred to the area, saved the failed heirs of the Roman Empire from complete defeat. After regrouping the troops, the Italians even tried to counterattack, but were caught in the crossfire of mortars and suffered even greater losses. The command of the 1st German Corps, to which the Italians called for help, was unable to come to their rescue, which subsequently drove a wedge between the German and Italian allies.
Croatian soldiers who fought on the side of Germany
The remnants of the Italian troops were saved only by the fact that the Soviet side was forced to slow down the pace of the offensive in order to consolidate the captured positions. In this battle, the Italians lost their best and most combat-ready troops (if such a concept is generally applicable to Italian soldiers during the Second World War). Subsequently, during the counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad, the area of fascist defense controlled by the Italians crumbled like a house of cards.
Column of captured Germans, Romanians and Italians in Stalingrad
The actions of the troops of the 63rd Army, which seized a bridgehead on the Don near the city of Serafimovich, played a crucial role in the transition of the Soviet troops to the counteroffensive.
Captured Italian soldiers at agricultural work in the USSR
If you have photographs of the elite Italian divisions “Sforzesca”, “Celere” and “Pausubio”, please post them in the comments of this post.
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As you know, Nazi Germany had 2 main allies during World War II, who voluntarily helped Hitler and had their own political and economic goals. Like Germany, Italy suffered enormous human and material losses in World War II.
Benito Mussolini's policies that led Italy to war
The development of Italy and Germany in the 1930s had much in common. Both states became strong economically, but all protest movements were suppressed and a totalitarian regime was established. The ideologist of Italian fascism was the Prime Minister of the state, Benito Mussolini. This man had monarchical aspirations, but it cannot be said that he, like Hitler, was preparing for war. The country was not economically and politically ready for it. Main goal- creation of an economically strong totalitarian regime.
What did Mussolini achieve before 1939? Let's note a few points:
Italy after World War II
Consider the consequences of the war for this country. They can be divided into several groups: political, economic and social.
The main political result was the fall of the regime of Benito Mussolini and the return of the country to a democratic path of development. This was the only positive moment that the war brought to
Economic consequences:
A 3-fold drop in production levels and GDP;
Mass unemployment (more than 2 million people were officially registered as looking for a job);
Many enterprises were destroyed during the fighting.
Italy in the Second World War found itself hostage to two countries which, as a result, ceased to exist.
Social consequences:
Italy after World War II lost more than 450 thousand soldiers killed and about the same number wounded;
At that time, mostly young people served in the army, so their death led to a demographic crisis - about a million babies were not born.
Conclusion
After the end of World War II, Italy was very weak economically. That is why the number of communist and socialist parties and their influence on the life of the state constantly grew. To overcome the crisis in 1945-1947, more than 50% of private property was nationalized in Italy. The main political moment of the second half of the 40s was that in 1946 Italy officially became a republic.
Italy never again strayed from the path of democratic development.
The Italian Duce Benito Mussolini was informed that Hitler was starting a war against the Soviet Union only on the night of June 22, 1941. He immediately instructed the Minister of Foreign Affairs (and, concurrently, son-in-law) Ciano Galeazzo to inform the Soviet envoy that Italy, in accordance with the “Pact of Steel” it had with Germany (the German-Italian Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, signed in May 1939 year. - Ed.), declares war on the USSR. Mussolini himself wrote a letter to the Fuhrer with a proposal to send Italian troops to the Eastern Front.
Benito Mussolini (ookaboo.com)
A “crusade against communism” was a long-standing dream of the Duce. In the magazine “Vita Italiana” - the official mouthpiece of propaganda - immediately after Italy entered the war, a short note appeared: “In the war against the USSR - the war waged by the Axis - Italy stands on the first line shoulder to shoulder with the Reich. The sending of the Italian expeditionary force to the Russian front symbolizes Italy's presence on the front line from a military point of view; it at the same time demonstrates brotherhood in arms and Italian military power."
The experienced politician Mussolini understood well and for a long time that war with the USSR would begin sooner or later. However, he hoped that this would happen between 1945 and 1950, when, in his opinion, Italy would be ready for a “big war.”
His plans were disrupted by a secret document obtained by Italian intelligence dated December 18, 1940, containing general comments on the development of the Barbarossa plan. In it, Hitler made it clear that Germany counted on Finland and Romania to actively participate in the war against the Soviet Union. There was also talk about the possible participation of Hungary. The document did not even mention Italian troops.
The German Fuhrer did not really count on them after June 22. In a response letter to the Duce, he recommended that he concentrate his forces and resources on the Mediterranean Sea and in North Africa, where, despite all the efforts of the German General Rommel, things were not going well.
But Mussolini was eager to embark on a “Russian campaign.” “Italy cannot be absent from the new front and must actively participate in the new war,” he told his ministers. “That’s why I gave the order to immediately send three divisions to Russia - they will be at the front at the end of July. I asked myself the question: will our troops have time to arrive on the battlefield before the fate of the war is decided and Russia is destroyed? Overwhelmed by doubts, I called the German military attache, General Enno von Rintelen, and asked him this question. I received assurances from him that the Italian divisions would arrive in time to take an active part in the fighting."
The Italian leader, apparently, really sincerely believed that he might be late for active military operations in the USSR, since the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, Dino Alfieri, during the farewell of the expeditionary force, turned to the German officer standing next to him: “These soldiers will have time to arrive in time to take part in any major battle?” He was surprised and answered the question with a question: “Is this your only concern, Mr. Ambassador?”
Italian officers in Soviet captivity. Western Front(waralbum.ru/2815)
However, Benito Mussolini wanted to fight not only for “noble allied” purposes. It was about the struggle for the redivision of the world. The Duce understood that Hitler’s promises to turn Ukraine into a “common food and military supply base” would remain empty words if the balance of forces within the fascist bloc did not allow Italy to insist on its share.
Hitler gave the go-ahead for sending Italians to the USSR only on July 10, 1941. At first, the Duce wanted the “Italian Expeditionary Force in Russia” (Corpo di Spedizione Italiane in Russia - C.S.I.R.) to include one tank and one motorized division. However, economic problems affected Russia, and eventually one motorized division (Prince Amedeo Duke d'Aosta) and two motorized divisions (Pasubio and Torino) with a small number of tanks were able to move into Russia. The latter two consisted of two infantry regiments, motorized artillery regiment, as well as engineering units. The Prince Amedeo Duke d'Aosta division had a much more exotic composition: a regiment of Bersaglieri (a special type of Italian infantry trained in shooting and forced marches), two cavalry regiments, a horse artillery regiment, a tank group. "San Giorgio" The 63rd Legion “Tagliamento” and the “Voluntary National Security Police” (the so-called “Black Shirts”) were also subordinate to the corps.
The Blackshirts never achieved glory on the Eastern Front (lyra.it)
In total, the C.S.I.R. Corps. 62,000 people went to the Eastern Front.
The corps was eventually attached to the German 17th Army, which was based in Ukraine. However, it quickly became clear that the hastily assembled Italian units were much worse prepared for war than the Germans. Moreover, supplies came to them through the same Germans, and the Italians, especially in the conditions of the approaching winter, were supplied on a residual basis. Willy-nilly, almost the entire Italian corps was forced to engage in looting, not hesitating to steal even from German army warehouses. True, the majority of Soviet citizens who survived the occupation testify that the Italians never committed atrocities like the Germans, and even the partisans recalled that they treated the Italians with some degree of pity.
Giovanni Messe (until November 1942 - commander of the “Italian Expeditionary Force in Russia”, later - Marshal of Italy - Ed.) wrote after the war: “I will give an interesting “scale of villainy” of various foreign formations fighting in the territory Soviet Russia. It was compiled on the basis of various surveys of residents and has the following gradation of cruelty:
1st place - Russian White Guards;
2nd place - Germans;
3rd place - Romanians;
4th place - Finns;
5th place - Hungarians;
6th place - Italians."
Giovanni Messe - Marshal of Italy (laguerre-1939-1945.skyrock.com)
Meanwhile, after the first defeats of the Italians in the USSR, Mussolini’s enthusiasm disappeared. However, now Hitler began to demand that his allies send new troops to the Eastern Front. The Italians had no choice but to promise to increase the corps into an army. However, Italian generals were able to assemble and equip this army only by the summer of 1942. By this time, the Italian army in Russia, under the command of General Italo Gariboldi, numbered 8, consisted of 7,000 officers and 220,000 soldiers. These troops fought stubborn battles against Soviet units on the Upper Don all summer and autumn. In December 1942, the 8th Italian Army suffered a crushing blow from units of our Southwestern Front: a total of 43,910 Italian soldiers and officers were killed, another 48,957 were captured. During Operation Uranus (a successful attempt by the Red Army to circle the German 6th Army in Stalingrad) Italian forces tried to hold back the Soviet advance, but were defeated.
By the spring of 1943, there were practically no combat-ready units of the 8th Italian Army on the Eastern Front. Mussolini, however, once again suggested that Hitler send his soldiers to Russia, but on the condition that the Germans arm and equip them. Outraged by this initiative, Hitler told his generals: “I will tell the Duce that this makes no sense. Giving them weapons means deceiving ourselves... There is no point in giving the Italians weapons to organize an army that will throw down weapons in the face of the enemy at the first opportunity. In the same way, there is no point in arming the army if there is no confidence in its internal strength... I will not allow myself to be deceived again.”
Hitler still left some of the Italian troops in the western regions of Ukraine. To protect rear communications.
After Mussolini was arrested in 1943 and Italy announced its withdrawal from the war, several thousand Italian soldiers who refused further service under German command, were shot by their recent “allies”.