Andrey Vladislavovich Yurevich(born August 13, 1957) - Russian scientist, Doctor of Psychology (1993), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2006), Deputy Director.
Biographical information
Since 2004, Deputy Director for Research at the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Member of the editorial boards of the journals “Questions of Psychology”, “Scientific Studies”, “Social Sciences”, “Psychological Journal”.
Expert of the Russian Humanitarian Foundation, Russian Foundation for Basic Research, New Eurasia Foundation.
Member of the Board of Curators of the Information-Science-Education Center.
Executive editor of the books “Russian Science: Current State and Strategies for Revival” (2003), “Scientific Studies and current problems development of modern Russian science"(2005) and other collections.
Monographs
- Yurevich A. V., Allahverdyan A. G., Moshkova G. Yu., Yaroshevsky M. G. Psychology of science. - M.: Flinta, 1998. - 312 p.
- Yurevich A.V. Smart but poor: scientists in modern Russia. - M.: MONF, 1998. - 201 p.
- Yurevich A.V., Tsapenko I.P. Does Russia need scientists? M.: URSS, 2001. - 200 p.
- Yurevich A.V. Social psychology science. St. Petersburg: RKHGU, 2001. - 350 p.
- Yurevich A.V. Psychologists joke too. - M.: Per Se, 2003. - 256 p.
- Yurevich A.V. Psychologists joke too. 2nd ed., add. - M.: PER SE, 2005. - 296 p.
- Yurevich A.V. Psychology and methodology. - M.: , 2005. - 312 p.
- Yurevich A. V., Martsinkovskaya T. D. History of psychology. - M.: Gardariki, 2008. - 416 p.
- Yurevich A.V., Tsapenko I.P. Science in modern times Russian society. - M.: , 2010. - 334 p.
- Yurevich A.V. Methodology and sociology of psychology. - M.: , 2010. - 272 p.
- Yurevich A.V. Social psychology scientific activity. - M.: , 2013. - 447 p.
Articles
- Yurevich A.V. Systemic crisis of psychology // Questions of psychology. - 1999. - No. 2. - P. 3-11.
- Yurevich A.V. Psychological characteristics Russian science // Questions of philosophy. - 1999. - No. 4. - P. 11-23.
- Yurevich A.V. Psychology and methodology // Psychological Journal. - 2000. - No. 5. - P. 35-47.
- Yurevich A.V. Methodological liberalism in psychology // Questions of psychology. - 2001. - No. 5. - P. 3-18.
- Yurevich A.V. The structure of psychological theories // Psychological Journal. - 2003. - No. 1. - P. 5-13.
Write a review of the article "Yurevich, Andrey Vladislavovich"
Notes
Links
- on the official website of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Excerpt characterizing Yurevich, Andrey Vladislavovich
After many balls and celebrations among the Polish magnates, among the courtiers and the sovereign himself, in June one of the Polish general adjutants of the sovereign came up with the idea of giving a dinner and ball to the sovereign on behalf of his general adjutants. This idea was joyfully accepted by everyone. The Emperor agreed. The general's adjutants collected money by subscription. The person who could be most pleasing to the sovereign was invited to be the hostess of the ball. Count Bennigsen, a landowner of the Vilna province, offered his country house for this holiday, and on June 13 a dinner, a ball, boating and fireworks were scheduled in Zakret, country house Count Bennigsen.On the very day on which Napoleon gave the order to cross the Neman and his advanced troops, pushing back the Cossacks, crossed the Russian border, Alexander spent the evening at Bennigsen’s dacha - at a ball given by the general’s adjutants.
It was a cheerful, brilliant holiday; experts in the business said that rarely so many beauties gathered in one place. Countess Bezukhova, along with other Russian ladies who came for the sovereign from St. Petersburg to Vilna, was at this ball, darkening the sophisticated Polish ladies with her heavy, so-called Russian beauty. She was noticed, and the sovereign honored her with a dance.
Boris Drubetskoy, en garcon (a bachelor), as he said, having left his wife in Moscow, was also at this ball and, although not an adjutant general, was a participant at a large amount in the subscription for the ball. Boris was now a rich man, far gone in honor, no longer seeking patronage, but standing on an even footing with the highest of his peers.
At twelve o'clock at night they were still dancing. Helen, who did not have a worthy gentleman, herself offered the mazurka to Boris. They sat in the third pair. Boris, coolly looking at Helen's shiny bare shoulders protruding from her dark gauze and gold dress, talked about old acquaintances and at the same time, unnoticed by himself and others, never for a second stopped watching the sovereign, who was in the same hall. The Emperor did not dance; he stood in the doorway and stopped first one or the other with those gentle words that he alone knew how to speak.
At the beginning of the mazurka, Boris saw that General Adjutant Balashev, one of the closest persons to the sovereign, approached him and stood un-courtly close to the sovereign, who was speaking with a Polish lady. After talking with the lady, the sovereign looked questioningly and, apparently realizing that Balashev acted this way only because there were important reasons, nodded slightly to the lady and turned to Balashev. As soon as Balashev began to speak, surprise was expressed on the sovereign’s face. He took Balashev by the arm and walked with him through the hall, unconsciously clearing three fathoms of wide road on both sides of those who were shunning in front of him. Boris noticed Arakcheev's excited face while the sovereign walked with Balashev. Arakcheev, looking from under his brows at the sovereign and snoring his red nose, moved out of the crowd, as if expecting the sovereign to turn to him. (Boris realized that Arakcheev was jealous of Balashev and was dissatisfied that some obviously important news was not conveyed to the sovereign through him.)
But the sovereign and Balashev walked, without noticing Arakcheev, through the exit door into the illuminated garden. Arakcheev, holding his sword and looking around angrily, walked about twenty paces behind them.
While Boris continued to make mazurka figures, he was constantly tormented by the thought of what news Balashev had brought and how to find out about it before others.
In the figure where he had to choose ladies, whispering to Helen that he wanted to take Countess Pototskaya, who seemed to have gone out onto the balcony, he, sliding his feet along the parquet floor, ran out the exit door into the garden and, noticing the sovereign entering the terrace with Balashev , paused. The Emperor and Balashev headed towards the door. Boris, in a hurry, as if not having time to move away, respectfully pressed himself against the lintel and bowed his head.
With the emotion of a personally insulted man, the Emperor finished the following words:
- Enter Russia without declaring war. “I will make peace only when not a single armed enemy remains on my land,” he said. It seemed to Boris that the sovereign was pleased to express these words: he was pleased with the form of expression of his thoughts, but was dissatisfied with the fact that Boris heard them.
- So that no one knows anything! – the sovereign added, frowning. Boris realized that this applied to him, and, closing his eyes, bowed his head slightly. The Emperor again entered the hall and remained at the ball for about half an hour.
Boris was the first to learn the news about the crossing of the Neman by French troops and thanks to this he had the opportunity to show some important persons that he knew many things hidden from others, and through this he had the opportunity to rise higher in the opinion of these persons.
The unexpected news about the French crossing the Neman was especially unexpected after a month of unfulfilled anticipation, and at a ball! The Emperor, at the first minute of receiving the news, under the influence of indignation and insult, found what later became famous, a saying that he himself liked and fully expressed his feelings. Returning home from the ball, the sovereign at two o'clock in the morning sent for secretary Shishkov and ordered to write an order to the troops and a rescript to Field Marshal Prince Saltykov, in which he certainly demanded that the words be placed that he would not make peace until at least one the armed Frenchman will remain on Russian soil.
Russian psychologist, doctor psychological sciences(1993), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2006), Deputy Director of the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (since 2004).
Specialist in the field of macropsychology, social psychology, methodology of psychology and science. Leader and organizer research projects on macropsychological analysis of social problems and phenomena, the study of the moral and psychological state of modern Russian society, the study of socio-psychological factors of scientific activity.
Born on August 13, 1957. In 1979 he graduated from the Faculty of Psychology of Moscow State University. M. V. Lomonosov.
In 1984, at the Faculty of Psychology of Moscow State University, he defended his doctoral dissertation on the topic “Causal explanation in the process of social perception,” and in 1993, at the same place, he defended his doctoral dissertation on the topic “Social-psychological analysis of scientific and everyday explanation.”
From 1990 to 2004 headed the Sector of Social Psychology of Science at the Institute of History of Natural Science and Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, from 2000 to 2004. - Center for Science Studies of this Institute.
Since 2004, he has held the position of Deputy Director for Research at the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
From 1993 to 1996 – Lecturer at the Moscow Branch of Stanford University (USA).
Laureate of competitions (RFBR, Soros Foundation, etc.) for the best scientific works. Laureate of the RAS Prize named after. S.L. Rubinstein.
Member of the editorial boards of the “Psychological Journal”, the journals “Questions of Psychology”, “Social Sciences” (at English), as well as a number of foreign magazines.
Member of the Bureau of the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation, State Scientific Fund, expert of the Russian Science Foundation.
Member of the Dissertation Councils of the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Faculty of Psychology of Moscow State University.
Member of the Presidium of the Russian Psychological Society.
Chairman of the State Examination Commission of the Faculty of Psychology of Moscow State University, the Higher School of Psychology and the Faculty of Psychology of Tver State University.
Author 360 scientific articles and 14 monographs on current issues in psychology and science.
Main publications:
Psychology of science. M.: Flinta, 1998. - 312 p. (co-authors: A.G. Allahverdyan, G.Yu. Moshkova, M.G. Yaroshevsky).
Smart, but poor: scientists in modern Russia. M.: MONF, 1998.
Does Russia need scientists? M.: URSS, 2001. (co-author - Tsapenko I.P.).
Social psychology science. St. Petersburg: RKHGU, 2001.
Psychologists joke too. M.: Per Se, 2003.
Psychology and methodology. M.: Institute of Psychology RAS, 2005.
History of psychology. M.: Gardariki, 2008 (co-author – Martsinkovskaya T.D.)
Science in modern Russian society. M.: Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2010 (co-author – I. P. Tsapenko).
USSR →
Russia
Andrey Vladislavovich Yurevich(born August 13, 1957) - Russian scientist, Doctor of Psychology (1993), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2006), Deputy Director of the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Biographical information
1984, candidate's dissertation, “Causal explanation in the process of social perception” (Faculty of Psychology, Moscow State University), 1993, doctoral dissertation, “Social-psychological analysis of scientific and everyday explanation” (ibid.).
Since 2004, Deputy Director for Research at the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Categories:
- Personalities in alphabetical order
- Scientists by alphabet
- Born on August 13
- Born in 1957
- Doctor of Psychology
- Corresponding Members of the RAS
- Psychologists of the USSR
- Psychologists of Russia
- Graduates of the Faculty of Psychology of Moscow State University
Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.
- Yurevich, Alexander Vladimirovich
- Yuredei-Yaha
See what “Yurevich, Andrey Vladislavovich” is in other dictionaries:
YUREVICH Andrey Vladislavovich- (b. August 13, 1957), Russian scientist psychologist, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (since 2006), Doctor of Psychological Sciences (1993). Graduated from the Faculty of Psychology of Moscow University (see MOSCOW UNIVERSITY (MSU)) (1979). Works at the Institute of History... ... Encyclopedic Dictionary
Yurevich, Andrey Vladislavovich- (born 1957) Russian psychologist, Doctor of Psychology (1993), corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2005), deputy director of the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (since 2004). Specialist in the field of social psychology, psychology methodology, social... ... Who's who in Russian psychology
Yurevich- (Belorussian Yurevich) Belarusian surname; formed on behalf of Yuri. Known media: Yurevich, Alexander Vladimirovich (born 1979) Belarusian football player. Yurevich, Andrey Vladimirovich (born 1957) Archpriest of the Russian Orthodox Church,... ...Wikipedia
Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences - Full list Corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences (St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, Imperial Academy of Sciences, Imperial St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Russian Academy sciences). # A B C D E E F G H H I J K L M N O P R ... Wikipedia
Corresponding members of the RAS throughout its history- Full list of corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences (St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, Imperial Academy of Sciences, Imperial St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences). # A B C D E E F G H ... Wikipedia
Corresponding Members of the RAS- Contents 1 List of corresponding members 2 Abbreviations ... Wikipedia
attribution- (from the English attribute to attribute, endow) attribution to social objects (person, group, social community) characteristics not represented in the field of perception. The need for A. is due to the fact that the information that can be given to a person... ...
attribution causal- (from the Latin causa reason and attribuo I give, I endow) the subject’s interpretation of the interpersonal perception of the reasons and motives of other people’s behavior. The study of A.K. is based on the following provisions: 1) people, getting to know each other, are not limited to... ... Great psychological encyclopedia
List of deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation of the 5th convocation- ... Wikipedia
Deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation from single-mandate constituencies- Elections of deputies from single-mandate constituencies were held in the State Duma of the Russian Federation of the 1st and 4th convocations (1993, 1995, 1999, 2003). The territory of the state was divided into 225 electoral districts (according to the number of half of the seats in the State Duma of the Russian Federation allocated to single-mandate deputies) ... Wikipedia
One of the main features current state psychological science is its departure from those methodological positions with which it seemed to have forever grown together since the time of Fechner. Its main features are Firstly, the increasing distance from each other of research and practical psychology, secondly, the isolation of humanistic psychology, which opposed itself to traditional psychology, thirdly, attempts to create such unique systems of psychological knowledge as Christian psychology or the psychology of the soul, fourthly, a significant expansion of the field influence of parapsychologists, “psychological magicians”, etc. Such phenomena, which mark a crisis in rationalistic psychology, have not yet received an intelligible analytical assessment. At the same time, they urgently require comprehension - if, of course, psychologists want to maintain at least some methodological standards in their science and avoid its transformation into a game without rules, described by L. Carroll in his far from children's book "Alice in Wonderland" . And their comprehension requires turning not only to the methodology of psychological science, but also to its asymmetrical reality - the psychological background of the methodology.
TIRED OF RATIONALISM
One of the main reasons for the “methodological anarchism” that has taken over psychology is that the scientific community is dependent on society, focuses everything that happens in it, and the “softer” the science and, accordingly, the less it is protected by intradisciplinary standards for obtaining knowledge and the behavior of scientists, the this dependence is greater than “...”
“...” Rationalism, which is considered to be a system of worldview that underlies the development of the market, science and modern Western civilization in general, has another important side - it is a type of mass psychology, which, like any psychology, has three components: 1) cognitive (certain style of thinking); 2) emotional (the desire for the dominance of reason over feelings, etc.) and 3) behavioral (activity, patience, liberalism, hard work, etc.). Many reasons for the displacement of this psychology by the “irrationalization of all public life"also lie on the psychological plane and are usually seen in a kind of fatigue from rationalism; in the need for outlets from its many limitations; in the human need to believe in miracles, which is characteristic of both Australian Aboriginal, both the builder of communism and the representative of modern Western society; in the inability of the mind to control emotions for a long time, etc. “...”
Paradoxically, rational science, which seemed to have completely and forever overcome irrationalism, did a lot for its renaissance. She not only set an example social organization and cognitive representation of knowledge, but also gave rise to hypotheses: about the existence of biofields, the possibility of extrasensory perception, the influence of space on the human body, etc., which are used by representatives of parascience as explanatory principles. With her discoveries, which more than once destroyed the usual worldview, she inspired the mass consciousness that, in principle, everything is possible, even what looks absolutely unreal. She armed modern mystifiers with technical means - from video tape, on which specialists in spiritualism “record” the spirits of Caesar or Napoleon, to the highly complex equipment used by D. Copperfield. She made a decisive contribution to the democratization of thought, to the establishment in society of a tolerant attitude towards its most unusual manifestations, teaching that dissidents should not be burned at the stake. And finally, it was science that gave life science fiction(not only as the once most popular literary genre, but also as a state of mind), which deceived the average person, promising him contacts with representatives of other worlds and the solution to all the main, at least technical, problems of humanity by the end of our century and giving rise to illusions, the destruction of which the average person does not forgive.
In fairness, we must admit that rationalism and irrationalism are not separated by an insurmountable line. Any, even the most absurd, system of views is rational - in the sense that it is built and justified by some logic, and, say, mysticism differs from science not in that it is irrational in general, but in that it is based on other, very specific criteria of rationality. The criteria of rationality are pluralistic and changeable over time.
"..." system development scientific knowledge accompanied by changes in ideas about what is considered rational. In conditions of pluralism and historical variability of the criteria of rationality, the mimicry of irrationalism under rationalism erases the normative boundaries between them, leaving only one demarcation criterion - the idea of the sphere of the possible, which itself cannot be built in a rational way, but belongs to the realm of faith. "..."
“...” the external cause of the crisis of rationalistic psychology - the “irrationalization of all social life”, multiplied by the irrationalistic traditions of Russian intellectual culture, does not appear to be some kind of artifact spiritual development(or degradation) of society, but a complex phenomenon, in turn, which, like rationalism, has psychological roots.
POSITIVIST OVERVOLTAGE
The second reason for the “methodological anarchism” experienced by psychology has an internal character - in relation to the psychological community - and is associated with the fact that not only psychological science has its own methodology, but any methodology expresses a certain psychology.
The main layer between rationalism as a global system of worldview and research practice, requiring more specific methodological settings, was positivism as a normative methodology of scientific knowledge, based not on self-evident principles of knowledge, but on a number of mythologies that are deeply ingrained in the self-consciousness of science and largely determine its perception society. Basic positivist mythologies sound like this: 1. Scientific knowledge is based on solid empirical facts. 2. Theories are derived from (and therefore secondary to) facts. 3. Science develops through the gradual accumulation of facts. 4. Since facts form the basis of our knowledge, they are independent of theories and have independent meaning. 5. Theories (or hypotheses) are logically deduced from facts through rational induction. 6. Theories (or hypotheses) are accepted or rejected solely on the basis of their ability to withstand the test of experiment.
The listed statements serve as objects of fair irony, and the image of science that emerges from them is characterized as “fairy-tale”, or even “caricatured”. Firstly, as P. Feyerabend notes, “science does not know “naked” facts at all, and those “facts” that are included in our knowledge have already been considered in a certain way, and, therefore, essentially conceptualized.” Even the readings of impartial instruments take on meaning only within the framework of " life world"observer, dependent on all sorts of circumstances of a psychological nature, integrated by the concept of "personal equation", etc. Secondly, contrary to the gloomy maxim of T. Huxley - " great tragedy science is that a nasty fact can kill a beautiful theory" - it is not facts that determine the fate of theories, but, on the contrary, theories determine the interpretation of facts. A theory can only be "killed" by a rival of the same "weight category" - another theory, but a dispute between they are conducted in the language not of empirical facts, but of the so-called " general meanings", which are represented by paradigms, research programs, traditions, etc. Thirdly, scientific knowledge is built not by rational induction (or deduction) (4), but on the basis of intuition, insight, what M. Planck called “artistic creative imagination“and others. That is, in all its key points, the positivist image of scientific knowledge does not correspond to reality and, although it gives rise to a number of “useful illusions,” but after the appearance of the works of T. Kuhn, P. Feyerabend, M. Polanyi, W. Sellars and other methodologists science has actually been written off.
However, rejected in natural science, under the influence of the distortion of whose experience it arose, and in the philosophy of science, where it took shape, this image turned out to be very tenacious in the human sciences, especially in psychology, which always strived to be like the exact sciences and suffered from a complex of otherness from them, even further intensifying this desire. It is difficult not to see a paradox in this, since psychology, having a very developed, although isolated from philosophical, methodological reflection, at the same time reveals clear signs of methodological anachronism in its desire to be like the exact sciences, focusing not on them, but on their long-refuted positivist image. Another side of this paradox is that the orientation towards the exact sciences was seen as an alternative to fruitless philosophizing, but was realized through their image, which again developed not in them, but precisely in philosophy. In addition, the spread of positivism in psychology was not a methodological necessity, did not follow from the internal logic of its development, and generally did not have any intelligible methodological justification.
“...” The subordination of psychology to positivist standards was manifested in forced mathematization, in the need for empirical verification of any statements, in a sacred attitude towards correlation coefficients, in the standard structure of psychological research, which assumed that hypotheses are derived from theories, and from them - empirically verifiable operational consequences, etc. . "..."
The first and most typical reaction to this overstrain is a positivist camouflage - not the construction, but the description of the research process in such a way that the hypotheses are derived from theories, the conclusions obtained are drawn only on the basis of empirical experience, etc., i.e. artificial “processing” of reality in accordance with positivist standards “…”
The second type of reaction is a cognitively formalized and sometimes institutionalized rejection of the positivist standards themselves - either “quiet”, as in the case of the formation of practical psychology, or loudly advertised, as in the creation of the Association of Humanistic Psychology. And the third and most radical type of reaction is the projection of disappointment in positivism onto rationalism as a whole, expressed in the emergence of non-rationalistic trends in psychology, such as the psychology of the soul or Christian psychology “...”
As a result, to external reason The departure of psychology from rationalism - “the irrationalization of all social life” - is also added internally: the disappointment in it of a significant part of the psychological community, and in combination with each other they form strong rails for its departure from rationalistic positions. And, if in itself the inconsistency of the positivist methodology with real research practice can be considered only in the cognitive plane (and even then with a fair share of stretches created by the artificial cutting off of its social aspects), then the phenomenon of positivist overvoltage and typical reactions to it (manifesting according to different psychologists) -differently depending on their personal characteristics) have a clearly expressed psychological component “...”
Thus, the movement of psychology along the positivist orbit at all its key points: a) initiation into the positivist paradigm (8), b) its universalization and c) disappointment in it - has a clearly defined psychological background. And such seemingly asymmetrical realities, such as the methodology of psychology and the psychology of methodology, reveal a close relationship and two-way dependence, built on the principle of the “ontological circle” “...”
BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS
Another paradoxical feature of the methodological state of psychology is that positivism coexists in it with what at first glance looks like its opposite - with phenomenologism, which manifests itself in the following: psychologists study psychological reality in the form in which it appears to their perception , i.e. essentially not this reality itself, but their perceptions, as evidenced by, for example, language scientific psychology, little different from the ordinary language that expresses our phenomenal experience. There are no exceptions to the areas of psychology that are considered free from subjectivity, for example, behaviorism. Trying to avoid relying on the phenomenology of the subjects and therefore studying not their internal experience, but behavior, the behaviorist shifts the center of gravity to his own phenomenology and even analyzes the behavior of rats in terms of it. "..."
All psychological “empires” - such as behaviorism, cognitivism, psychoanalysis - speak a phenomenological language, and the difference between them is only what kind of word of this language - “action”, “image”, “motive” or any other - they consider the main thing, which in itself is quite absurd………At the same time, oddly enough, the methodological reflection of psychology itself does not pay due attention to phenomenologism. As a result, another methodological paradox arises: in its desire to resemble the exact sciences, or more precisely, their image distorted by positivism, psychology ignores one of their main features - their fundamentally non-phenomenological character.
Categories in which physical or biological reality is studied - atoms, electrons, cells, molecules, etc. - have little in common with the categories in which we perceive this reality; they describe this reality itself, and not our perceptions, which makes it possible to identify its immanent, and not ascribed by us due to the peculiarities of this perception (as, say, in the case of the geocentric model of the Universe) patterns. And that scientific knowledge, which has become a symbol of science of the 20th century, is not only non-phenomenological, but also counter-phenomenological, that is, it contradicts our perception of the world and does not fit into our mind at all “...”
Non-phenomenologicality and its extreme version, counter-phenomenologicality, in the exact sciences is ensured not only by the use special language, expressing the nature of the reality being studied, but also the multiple separation of this reality and its researcher. Here, the objects being studied are almost never subjected to direct observation. So, in physics, when studying, for example, neutrinos, it is not this particle itself that is observed, but the results of its interaction with the radioactive isotope of argon. The more mediating links are built into the research procedure, the greater the increase in knowledge it gives, and as science develops, the number of such mediations increases “...” And with each of the mediating steps, which take the researcher further and further from what he can observe and perceive directly, that is, from his own phenomenology, scientific knowledge is increasingly cleared of it, and research penetrates deeper into the reality being studied.
In psychology, the use of the traditional - positivist - version of empirical research not only does not allow one to overcome phenomenologism, but also aggravates it, since the phenomenology of the subject is superimposed on the phenomenology of the researcher, who formulates tasks for the subject in terms of his perception of psychological reality, and on top of this is again the phenomenology of the researcher , interpreting the actions of the subject in terms of his perceptions. The formation of mathematization only camouflages this “layered” phenomenologism, since the mathematical processing of subjective experience does not make it objective, although it is capable of generating such an illusion. "..."
This oversaturation is characteristic not only of those primary interpretations that a psychologist-researcher gives to the actions of a subject or a psychologist-practitioner - the words of a patient (client), but also to those generalizations that seem to be as far removed from anyone’s phenomenology as possible, for example, psychological theories. In fairness, it should be noted that theories are phenomenologically loaded in any science, not excluding the “leader of natural science” - physics “...”
“...” Even in the exact sciences, theories cannot be reduced to the mathematical formulas that express them, and this is largely why few people understand the theory of relativity, although the formula E = mc2 is known to schoolchildren. But the proportion of phenomenological content of theories in humanities incomparably more, since here they, as a rule, are formulated not in the form of compact mathematical formulas, but in multi-volume works, the content of which, like the meaning of any texts “...”
As a result, it is hardly possible to find at least two psychologists who would equally understand, say, activity theory, as well as any other psychological theory, fitting it into the same semantic space. And in those cases when psychological theories, under the influence of the fashion for mathematization, are presented in the form of formulas (such as, for example, the “theory of justice” (9), popular in foreign social psychology), these formulas are overgrown with so many unformalized additions that they look more like a conventional logo , than as a formalized equivalent of the content of theories “...”
“...” Sandwiched between the Scylla of positivism and the Charybdis of phenomenologism, psychology is tormented, but not idle, trying either to squeeze into the narrow passage between them, or to find an alternative to them. All the variety of attempts to avoid this trap is difficult to discern; their polar forms, forming the idea of the breadth of the continuum, are, on the one hand, a kind of verbal escapism - “withdrawal into metaphors and categories”; on the other, attempts to revive one of the oldest in psychological science - physiological - paradigm.
Psychology “goes into metaphors” when the terms of everyday language expressing our phenomenological experience are replaced by expressions that have a purely metaphorical meaning - such as “I” and “It” - or those metaphors - “computer”, etc. - which are used by modern cognitive psychology (see). At the same time, psychological reality is viewed through the prism of its metaphorical descriptions, and the question of their relationship to it is not only not subjected to empirical study, but is not even raised - reality is replaced by metaphors or, to paraphrase one of the terms of activity theory, “a shift of metaphors to reality” . Thus, until now, no attempts have been made to prove that the realities behind the metaphors introduced by S. Freud really exist, but psychoanalysis is confidently based on the presumption of their existence. Of course, any system of knowledge is based on a number of empirically unverifiable postulates, but when almost all of its content is covered, and the system of knowledge is replaced by systematized faith, it is not surprising that the same psychoanalysis is often compared with the religion “...”
Such a widespread phenomenon in psychology as “withdrawal into categories” also has a similar meaning. In this case, a certain set of categories is introduced, as a rule, having a philosophical origin and a very distant relationship to the actual psychological reality - “subject”, “individual”, “activity”, etc.; abstract relationships are established between them, to which an ontological meaning is artificially assigned. Playing with categories replaces the clarification of reality, and Diamatov’s tradition of penetrating into it with the help of concepts such as “subject” or “activity” gives rise to speculation that is difficult to equate with knowledge. Thus, attempts to avoid the positivist-phenomenological trap with the help of abstract categories, as well as with the help of metaphors, lead to the construction of artificial languages that only distance one from comprehending one’s own language of psychological reality.
The polar form of psychology’s reaction to positivist phenomenologism, in relation to “withdrawal into metaphors and categories,” is the regularly undertaken attempts to revive the physiological paradigm, i.e. explanations of psychological phenomena based on physiological mechanisms. One of the main reasons that modern psychology This paradigm has few supporters, and most psychologists squeamishly classify it as “physiological reductionism,” consists of the following: physiological mechanisms are too meager and monotonous to explain the entire rich palette of mental phenomena, and reference to their undifferentiated physiological basis is not perceived as an explanation. At the same time, the physiological paradigm is too attractive - for its simplicity, the prospect of control over mental processes, closeness to the natural sciences - in order to abandon it altogether. In this situation, its supporters perform typical actions described by T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, K. Popper, L. Laudan and other scientific methodologists as attempts to save the paradigm (research program, research tradition etc.) by differentiating it, expanding the range of its values or various Ad hoc constructions. "..."
And even if we imagine the ultimate development of this paradigm - the possibility of establishing point correspondences between mental phenomena and physiological processes, which would probably satisfy the external consumer of psychological knowledge, ensuring both control over mental processes and strict attachment of each of them to a specified material substrate, - these processes would still look like a substrate, and not the essence of the psyche.
However, in attempts to save and develop the physiological paradigm, it would be wrong to see another methodological artifact, depriving them of heuristic significance. The development of a synthetic paradigm that would solve the main methodological problem of psychology, “building bridges” between phenomenological and physiological knowledge of the psyche, is hampered by the fact that the first (due to the development of this science mainly in a phenomenological direction) is much more developed and differentiated than the second. “Pulling up” physiological knowledge through its differentiation brings us closer to establishing the parity of the two types of knowledge, which would serve as the basis for their synthesis. And, apparently, in the persistence of the rescuers of the physiological paradigm one can discern not only emotional reaction on the dominance of phenomenology and the spread of irrationalism, unacceptable for the materialistic mind, but also on the methodologically justified concentration of romantic psychologists, still trying to solve the “main question” of psychology on the main thing that prevents its solution - the disproportion of phenomenological and physiological knowledge.
Thus, the totality of phenomena in modern psychology that looks like its “irrationalization” is itself largely psychologically conditioned and represents a complex cognitive-social phenomenon due to three main reasons. Firstly, the “irrationalization of all social life”, in our country supplemented by having its own national characteristics irrationalization of Russian life. Secondly, psychology lacks a “protective belt” - a solid and adequate methodology that would make it as resistant to external influences as the natural sciences, which remain faithful to rationalism regardless of the mood in society. Thirdly, the futility of this discipline’s attempts to put on someone else’s clothes - a positivist overstrain that generates disappointment with positivism, which, in accordance with the standard scheme of shifting cognitive attitudes from paradigms to metadigms, is projected onto rationalism in general “...”
Russian psychologist, Doctor of Psychology (1993), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2005), Deputy Director of the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (since 2004).
Specialist in the field of social psychology, methodology of psychology, social psychology and sociology of science. Leader and organizer of research projects to study the state of the Russian scientific community and socio-psychological factors of scientific activity.
Under the leadership of Yu., research was carried out for the first time on the social situation of the development of science, categories of social psychology of science were developed (Social Psychology of Science. 2002), and methodological principles for the study of scientific schools.
Born on August 13, 1957. In 1979 he graduated from the Faculty of Psychology of Moscow State University. M. V. Lomonosov.
In 1984, he defended his doctoral dissertation at the Faculty of Psychology of Moscow State University on the topic “Causal explanation in the process of social perception”; in 1993 (ibid.) he defended his doctoral dissertation on the topic “Social-psychological analysis of scientific and everyday explanation.”
Specialist in methodology of psychology, social psychology, scientific studies. One of the founders of a new direction of psychological research - quantitative macropsychology.
From 1990 to 2004 headed the Sector of Social Psychology of Science at the Institute of History of Natural Science and Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, from 2000 to 2004. - Center for Science Studies of this Institute.
Since 2004, he has held the position of Deputy Director for Research at the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
From 1993 to 1996 – Lecturer at the Moscow Branch of Stanford University (USA).
Laureate of competitions (RFBR, Soros Foundation, etc.) for the best scientific works. Laureate of the RAS Prize named after. S.L. Rubinstein.
Member of the editorial boards of the “Psychological Journal”, the journals “Questions of Psychology”, “Social Sciences” (in English), as well as a number of international journals.
Member of the Expert Council of the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation, head of the Section of Science Studies and History of Science of the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation.
Member of the Scientific Council of the Information-Science-Education Center.
Member of the Dissertation Councils of the Faculty of Psychology of Moscow State University, Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academy of Management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.
Member of the Moscow Council of the Russian Psychological Society.
Member of the Scientific Council under the Security Council of the Russian Federation.
Expert of the “Increasing Security” Program traffic» Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.
Member of the series international programs and projects.
Chairman of the SAC High school psychology, at the Tverskoy Faculty of Psychology State University, at the Faculty of Psychology of the Black Sea Branch of Moscow State University.
Main publications
- Does Russia need scientists? M.: URSS, 2001. - 200 p. (co-author - Tsapenko I.P.).
- Psychology and methodology. M.: Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2005. – 312 p.
- History of psychology. M.: Gardariki, 2008. – 416 p. (co-author – Martsinkovskaya T.D.)
- Science in modern Russian society. M.: Institute of Psychology RAS, 2010. – 334 p. (co-author – Tsapenko I.P.).
- Methodology and sociology of psychology. M.: Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2010. – 272 p.
Monographs
- Psychology of science. M.: Flinta, 1998. - 312 p. (co-authors: A.G. Allahverdyan, G.Yu. Moshkova, M.G. Yaroshevsky).
- Smart, but poor: scientists in modern Russia. M.: MONF, 1998. - 201 p.
- Does Russia need scientists? M.: URSS, 2001. - 200 p. (co-author - Tsapenko I.P.).
- Social psychology science. St. Petersburg: RKHGU, 2001. - 350 p.
- Psychologists joke too. M.: Per Se, 2003. - 256 p.
Articles
- Systemic crisis of psychology // Questions of psychology, 1999, N 2, p. 3-11.
- Psychological features of Russian science // Questions of Philosophy, 1999, N 4, p. 11-23.
- Psychology and methodology // Psychological Journal, 2000, N 5, p. 35-47.
- Methodological liberalism in psychology // Questions of psychology, 2001, N 5, p. 3-18.
- Structure of psychological theories // Psychological Journal, 2003, N 1, p. 5-13.