The information received by a person from the surrounding world allows a person to imagine not only the external, but also the internal side of an object, to imagine objects in their absence, to foresee their changes over time, to rush with thought into the vast distances and the microworld. All this is possible thanks to the thinking process. In under thinking understand the process of cognitive activity of an individual, characterized by a generalized and indirect reflection of reality. Objects and phenomena of reality have properties and relationships that can be cognized directly, with the help of sensations and perceptions (colors, sounds, shapes, placement and movement of bodies in visible space).
The first feature of thinking- its indirect nature. What a person cannot know directly, directly, he knows indirectly, indirectly: some properties through others, the unknown through the known. Thinking is always based on the data of sensory experience - ideas - and on previously acquired theoretical knowledge. Indirect knowledge is mediated knowledge.
The second feature of thinking- its generality. Generalization as knowledge of the general and essential in the objects of reality is possible because all the properties of these objects are connected with each other. The general exists and manifests itself only in the individual, in the concrete.
People express generalizations through speech and language. A verbal designation refers not only to a single object, but also to a whole group of similar objects. Generalization is also inherent in images (ideas and even perceptions). But there it is always limited by clarity. The word allows one to generalize limitlessly. Philosophical concepts of matter, motion, law, essence, phenomenon, quality, quantity, etc. - the broadest generalizations expressed in words.
The results of people's cognitive activity are recorded in the form of concepts. A concept is a reflection of the essential features of an object. The concept of an object arises on the basis of many judgments and conclusions about it. The concept, as a result of generalizing the experience of people, is the highest product of the brain, the highest level of knowledge of the world.
Human thinking occurs in the form of judgments and inferences. Judgment is a form of thinking that reflects the objects of reality in their connections and relationships. Each judgment is a separate thought about something. The sequential logical connection of several judgments, necessary in order to solve any mental problem, understand something, find an answer to a question, is called reasoning. Reasoning has practical meaning only when it leads to a certain conclusion, a conclusion. The conclusion will be the answer to the question, the result of the search for thought.
Inference- this is a conclusion from several judgments, giving us new knowledge about objects and phenomena of the objective world. Inferences can be inductive, deductive, or by analogy.
Thinking is the highest level of human knowledge of reality. The sensory basis of thinking is sensations, perceptions and ideas. Through the senses - these are the only channels of communication between the body and the outside world - information enters the brain. The content of information is processed by the brain. The most complex (logical) form of information processing is the activity of thinking. Solving the mental problems that life poses to a person, he reflects, draws conclusions and thereby learns the essence of things and phenomena, discovers the laws of their connection, and then transforms the world on this basis.
Thinking is not only closely connected with sensations and perceptions, but it is formed on the basis of them. The transition from sensation to thought is a complex process, which consists, first of all, in isolating and isolating an object or its sign, in abstracting from the concrete, individual and establishing the essential, common to many objects.
Thinking acts mainly as a solution to tasks, questions, problems that are constantly put forward to people by life. Solving problems should always give a person something new, new knowledge. Finding solutions can sometimes be very difficult, so mental activity, as a rule, is an active activity that requires concentrated attention and patience. The real process of thought is always a process not only cognitive, but also emotional and volitional.
For human thinking, the relationship is more important not with sensory knowledge, but with speech and language. In a more strict sense speech- a process of communication mediated by language. If language is an objective, historically established system of codes and the subject of a special science - linguistics, then speech is a psychological process of formulating and transmitting thoughts through the means of language.
Modern psychology does not believe that internal speech has the same structure and the same functions as expanded external speech. By internal speech, psychology means a significant transitional stage between the plan and developed external speech. Mechanism that allows recoding general meaning into a speech utterance, i.e. inner speech is, first of all, not a detailed speech utterance, but only preparatory stage.
However, the inextricable connection between thinking and speech does not mean that thinking can be reduced to speech. Thinking and speech are not the same thing. Thinking does not mean talking to yourself. Evidence of this can be the possibility of expressing the same thought in different words, and also the fact that we do not always find the right words to express our thoughts.
The objective material form of thinking is language. A thought becomes a thought both for oneself and for others only through the word - oral and written. Thanks to language, people's thoughts are not lost, but are passed on as a system of knowledge from generation to generation. However, there are additional means of transmitting the results of thinking: light and sound signals, electrical impulses, gestures, etc. Modern science and technology widely use conventional signs as a universal and economical means of transmitting information.
Thinking is also inextricably linked with the practical activities of people. Every type of activity involves thinking, taking into account the conditions of action, planning, and observation. By acting, a person solves some problems. Practical activity is the main condition for the emergence and development of thinking, as well as a criterion for the truth of thinking.
Thought processes
Human mental activity is the solution of various mental problems aimed at revealing the essence of something. A mental operation is one of the methods of mental activity through which a person solves mental problems.
Mental operations are varied. This is analysis and synthesis, comparison, abstraction, specification, generalization, classification. Which logical operations a person uses will depend on the task and on the nature of the information that he is subjected to mental processing.
Analysis and synthesis
Analysis- this is the mental decomposition of the whole into parts or the mental isolation of its sides, actions, and relationships from the whole.
Synthesis- the opposite process of thought to analysis, this is the unification of parts, properties, actions, relationships into one whole.
Analysis and synthesis are two interrelated logical operations. Synthesis, like analysis, can be both practical and mental.
Analysis and synthesis were formed in the practical activities of man. People constantly interact with objects and phenomena. Their practical mastery led to the formation of mental operations of analysis and synthesis.
Comparison
Comparison- this is the establishment of similarities and differences between objects and phenomena.
The comparison is based on analysis. Before comparing objects, it is necessary to identify one or more of their characteristics by which the comparison will be made.
The comparison can be one-sided, or incomplete, and multilateral, or more complete. Comparison, like analysis and synthesis, can be different levels- superficial and deeper. In this case, a person’s thought comes from external signs similarities and differences to internal ones, from visible to hidden, from appearance to essence.
Abstraction
Abstraction- this is the process of mental abstraction from certain features, aspects of a particular thing in order to better understand it.
A person mentally identifies some feature of an object and examines it in isolation from all other features, temporarily distracting from them. Isolated study of individual features of an object while simultaneously abstracting from all others helps a person to better understand the essence of things and phenomena. Thanks to abstraction, man was able to break away from the individual, concrete and rise to the highest level of knowledge - scientific theoretical thinking.
Specification
Specification- a process that is the opposite of abstraction and is inextricably linked with it.
Concretization is the return of thought from the general and abstract to the concrete in order to reveal the content.
Mental activity is always aimed at obtaining some result. A person analyzes objects, compares them, abstracts individual properties in order to identify what they have in common, to reveal the patterns that govern their development, in order to master them.
Generalization, therefore, is the identification of the general in objects and phenomena, which is expressed in the form of a concept, law, rule, formula, etc.
Types of thinking
Depending on what place the word, image and action occupy in the thought process, how they relate to each other, There are three types of thinking: concrete-effective, or practical, concrete-figurative and abstract. These types of thinking are also distinguished based on the characteristics of the tasks - practical and theoretical.
Concretely actionable thinking
Visually effective- a type of thinking based on the direct perception of objects.
Concrete-effective, or objective-effective, thinking is aimed at solving specific problems in the conditions of production, constructive, organizational and other practical activities of people. Practical thinking This is, first of all, technical, constructive thinking. It consists of understanding technology and a person’s ability to independently solve technical problems. The process of technical activity is a process of interactions between the mental and practical components of work. Complex operations of abstract thinking are intertwined with practical human actions and are inextricably linked with them. Characteristic Features concrete-effective thinking are bright strong observation skills, attention to detail, particulars and the ability to use them in a specific situation, operating with spatial images and diagrams, the ability to quickly move from thinking to action and back. It is in this type of thinking that the unity of thought and will is most manifested.
Concrete-imaginative thinking
Visual-figurative- a type of thinking characterized by reliance on ideas and images.
Concrete-figurative (visual-figurative), or artistic thinking is characterized by the fact that a person embodies abstract thoughts and generalizations into concrete images.
Abstract thinking
Verbal-logical- a type of thinking carried out using logical operations with concepts.
Abstract, or verbal-logical, thinking is aimed mainly at finding general patterns in nature and human society. Abstract, theoretical thinking reflects general connections and relationships. It operates mainly with concepts, broad categories, and images and ideas play a supporting role in it.
All three types of thinking are closely related to each other. Many people have equally developed concrete-actional, concrete-imaginative and theoretical thinking, but depending on the nature of the problems that a person solves, first one, then the other, then the third type of thinking comes to the fore.
Types and types of thinking
Practical-effective, visual-figurative and theoretical-abstract - these are interconnected types of thinking. In progress historical development humanity, human intelligence was initially formed in the course of practical activity. Thus, people learned to measure plots of land experimentally, and then, on this basis, a special theoretical science gradually emerged - geometry.
Genetically the earliest type of thinking is practical thinking; actions with objects are of decisive importance in it (in its rudimentary form it is also observed in animals).
Based on practical-effective, manipulative thinking, a visual-figurative thinking. It is characterized by operating with visual images in the mind.
The highest level of thinking is abstract, abstract thinking. However, here too thinking remains connected with practice. As they say, there is nothing more practical than a correct theory.
The thinking of individual people is also divided into practical, imaginative and abstract (theoretical).
But in the process of life, for the same person, first one or another type of thinking comes to the fore. Thus, everyday affairs require practical thinking, and a report on scientific topic— theoretical thinking, etc.
The structural unit of practically effective (operational) thinking is action; artistic - image; scientific thinking - concept.
Depending on the depth of generalization, empirical and theoretical thinking are distinguished.
Empirical thinking(from the Greek empeiria - experience) gives primary generalizations based on experience. These generalizations are made at a low level of abstraction. Empirical knowledge is the lowest, elementary stage of knowledge. Empirical thinking should not be confused with practical thinking.
As noted famous psychologist V. M. Teplov (“The Mind of a Commander”), many psychologists take the work of a scientist and theorist as the only example of mental activity. Meanwhile, practical activity requires no less intellectual effort.
The mental activity of the theorist is concentrated primarily on the first part of the path of knowledge - a temporary retreat, a retreat from practice. The mental activity of a practitioner is focused mainly on the second part - on the transition from abstract thinking to practice, that is, on that “getting into” practice, for the sake of which a theoretical retreat is made.
A feature of practical thinking is subtle observation, the ability to concentrate attention on individual details of an event, the ability to use to solve a particular problem something special and individual that was not fully included in the theoretical generalization, the ability to quickly move from reflection to action.
In the practical thinking of a person, the optimal ratio of his mind and will, cognitive, regulatory and energetic capabilities of the individual is essential. Practical thinking is associated with the prompt setting of priority goals, the development of flexible plans and programs, and greater self-control in stressful operating conditions.
Theoretical thinking reveals universal relations and explores the object of knowledge in the system of its necessary connections. Its result is the construction of conceptual models, the creation of theories, the generalization of experience, the disclosure of patterns of development of various phenomena, the knowledge of which ensures transformative human activity. Theoretical thinking is inextricably linked with practice, but in its final results it has relative independence; it is based on previous knowledge and, in turn, serves as the basis for subsequent knowledge.
Depending on the standard/non-standard nature of the tasks being solved and operational procedures, algorithmic, discursive, heuristic and creative thinking are distinguished.
Algorithmic thinking focused on pre-established rules, a generally accepted sequence of actions necessary to solve typical problems.
Discursive(from Latin discursus - reasoning) thinking based on a system of interrelated inferences.
Heuristic thinking(from the Greek heuresko - I find) is productive thinking, consisting of solving non-standard problems.
Creative thinking- thinking that leads to new discoveries, fundamentally new results.
There is also a distinction between reproductive and productive thinking.
Reproductive thinking— reproduction of previously obtained results. In this case, thinking merges with memory.
Productive thinking— thinking leading to new cognitive results.
One of important aspects“purification of experience” Avenarius had the “principle of the least measure of force.” E. Mach developed it into the “principle of economy of thinking,” which combines biologism (position as a biologically economical adaptation to the environment), positivism (cognition as an economical “pure description” of phenomena) and subjectivism (the criterion of economy in cognition is determined by the subject, preceding any experience ).Avenarius formulated the “Principle of the least as follows: “In the case of the addition of new impressions, the soul communicates to its ideas the smallest possible change; or, in other words, after a new apperception, the content of our ideas turns out to be as similar as possible to their content before this apperception. The soul spends on a new apperception only as much effort as necessary, and in the case of many possible apperceptions, it gives preference to the one that performs the same work with less force." This principle further serves as a methodological basis for the requirement of “purification of experience” and no longer appears as an independent, much less a leading principle.
“The principle of the least measure of force” is a mechanical principle of the least action transferred to foreign science. This alone determines the metaphysical-mechanistic essence of this principle of knowledge. Avenarius then uses it as a principle of reduction, making the reduction of the unknown to the known, of a particular law to a general one, a principle of scientific knowledge in general. Therefore, the “principle of the least measure of force” prevents the qualitative increase in knowledge that is not reducible to what is already known and represents something truly new. But his general philosophical tendency is also important - the “principle of the least measure of force” degenerates in Avenarius into the requirement to eliminate “everything unnecessary.” except for sensations. Thus, the theory of reduction, which was previously a method of mechanistic materialism, turns into a tool of subjective idealism.
“Economy of Thinking” E. Mach took up the problem of the “economic and mechanics of the economic approach” to knowledge in
connection with his research in the history of mechanics. In conditions when the mechanical model of all processes occurring in nature seemed to scientists to be their only and perfect image, Mach opposed this view. This is what A. Einstein wrote about this later. “Even Maxwell and H. Hertz, who, in retrospect, seem to have shaken the faith in mechanics as the final basis of all physical thinking, in their conscious thinking adhered entirely to mechanics as the reliable basis of physics. It was Ernst Mach who shook this dogmatic faith." This was an important achievement of Mach as a physicist, which marked the beginning of overcoming mechanism in the physical science and was then used by Einstein. However, Mach himself used his criticism of mechanism not for the positive development of physical theory, but for other purposes. In particular, he criticized Newton's understanding of the absoluteness of space and time, showing, on physical grounds, that the formulation of physical laws is related to the interaction of masses (“Mach’s principle”). This refuted Newton's assumption regarding the absoluteness of space and time in the sense of their independence from the distribution of gravitating masses.
However, the physical relativity of space and time established by this served as a basis for Mach to deny their objectivity. In other words, Mach, like Berkeley, did not want to notice that Newton’s idea of absolute space contains essentially two aspects: the objectivity of space and its physical absoluteness. Having justifiably rejected the second, Mach wrongfully extended his criticism to the first.
Denying the absoluteness of space meant denying its independence in relation to matter, which made the picture of the world in some way more compact, “more economical” (there is not matter and space, but spatially ordered matter). But Mach took the path of interpreting “economy” as the interpretation of space and time in the form of ordered systems of series of sensations, i.e., subjective formations. The indirect result of this was the rejection of the epistemological basis of classical physics, which consists in the requirement that physical laws correspond to the real state of affairs. In place of the latter, Mach puts the subjectivist “economy of thinking.” It was, generally speaking, an absolutization of the methodological requirement of logical and, if possible, substantive simplicity and unity of theory actually used by science. And this absolutization consisted in the fact that “economy” was opposed, as the supposedly highest methodological installation, to the requirement of correspondence between theory and facts.
We have already seen that Avenarius, who developed the “biological” side of economical thinking as “pure 1,
description" Well saving thinking, in fact
Ski excluded with his “principle of least force” the possibility of forming new concepts, deducing new laws that cannot be reduced to those already known. By recognizing the irreducibility of the laws of nature to mechanical ones, Mach thereby undermines the theory of reduction and at the same time casts doubt on the “principle of the least measure of force” as applied to cognition. Therefore, he focuses on the other side of the “economy of thinking”: he turns to the positivist doctrine of knowledge as “pure description”. His historical source was Berkeley's philosophy, which called for replacing the study of cause-and-effect relationships with a description of the visible results of actions. This is precisely the thought that Mach perceives.
Mach clearly underestimates logical thinking, believing that it cannot provide any new knowledge. The source of the latter is only observation, intuition (Anschauung). Correctly asserting that knowledge grows from sensations, Mach is mistaken when, on this basis, he comes to the conclusion that all knowledge is reduced to sensation. It was this idea that then served as the basis for the neo-positivist interpretation of the “principle of observability” in physics. The neo-positivist F. Frank wrote on this occasion: “According to Mach and his immediate followers, the fundamental laws of physics should be formulated in such a way that they contain only concepts that could be determined by direct observations, or at least connected by a short chain of thoughts with direct observations." But this is, on the one hand, an embryonic formulation of the neo-positivist “principle of verification”, and on the other hand, a revival of the Berkeleyan thesis “to exist means to be perceived.”
The subjective idealistic essence of this principle is undoubted. However, even apart from this, “pure description” reveals its inconsistency in that it essentially negates the active role of logical thinking, and science is replaced by flat empiricism. Therefore, Machism could not count on success in the conditions scientific development XX century, when problems of the logical structure of science increasingly began to occupy an important place in the theory of knowledge.
In the empirical description and application of the “economy of thinking,” three heterogeneous understandings of this principle are essentially mixed. First, this is the didactic desire to express the existing scientific content in the simplest possible form; secondly, the methodological requirement to formulate problems in the simplest way and use the simplest means to solve them; thirdly, the “metaphysical” statement that nature chooses the simplest means to carry out its actions [see 26, pp. 204-205] The latest understanding of “economy” adopted by Avenarius as the “principle of the least measure of force” turns into an essentially idealistic principle , excluding the objectivity of the material world. The more consistent positivist Mach understands the “economy of thinking” only as a principle of knowledge. But what is the origin of the latter? “If we do not recognize the objective reality given to us in sensations, then where can the “principle of economy” come from, if not from the subject? Sensations , of course, do not contain any “economy” This means that thinking gives something that is not in sensation! This means that the “principle of economy” is not taken from experience (= sensations), but precedes all experience, constitutes its logical condition, as a category of Kant”
As in all questions of the theory of knowledge, Mach and Avenarius are inconsistent in their application of the principles of “economy of thought” and “pure description”. Epistemologically, both principles are components of the empiriocritical theory of knowledge. But along with this, in the works of Avenarius and Mach we constantly come across spontaneously materialistic aspects in the interpretation of knowledge that are incompatible with the original subjectivist attitudes. Thus, Mach claims that “complete and simplest description”, about which the physicist Kirchjuf spoke, “the economic image of the real” is the formula of Mach himself, and the postulate “the agreement of thinking with being and the agreement of the processes of thinking with each other” expresses the same thought. “The adaptation of thoughts to facts turns, when communicating them to other people, into a description, into an economic image of the real with a complete and simplest description.” However, at the beginning of the second decade of the 20th century. Machism (empirio-criticism) disintegrated in the face of new facts of natural science, the epistemological conclusion of which was the conviction that subatomic physical reality is irreducible to simple combinations (complexes) of sensations. In “physical” idealism, the latter is replaced by a “logical construction”, which requires for its creation new logical means provided by mathematical logic. But it was precisely logic that constituted the stumbling block for Machism, which was based on narrow empiricism and the psychological interpretation of logical laws and forms of thinking. Therefore, Machism is quite quickly replaced by logical positivism - this first developed form of modern positivism, neopositivism or analytical philosophy.
4. CONVENTIONALISM A. POINCARE
On a number of epistemological issues, the famous French mathematician, physicist and scientific methodologist Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) joined empirio-criticism. In his philosophical views we see even more clearly than in Mach or Avenarius the dependence of empirio-criticism on the ideological processes associated with the revolution in natural science at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.
If Mach in many matters, especially
A. Poincaré, during his formative years, spoke about the “crisis of physics”
doctrine, was based not so much on
new discoveries, opposed to classical physics, as much as to state the weak points in the latter, but A. Poincaré already clearly saw these changes and tried to subject them to epistemological analysis.
In the book “The Value of Science” (1905), Poincaré formulated the well-known position that “the progress of science endangers the most stable principles - even those principles that were considered fundamental” As a result - “the modern crisis of mathematical physics”, to which he devoted the eighth chapter of your labor. Here is his reasoning. Brownian motion casts doubt on Carnot's principle, according to which there is a constant dissipation of motion: in this case, we see how, before our eyes, either mechanical motion turns into heat (through friction), or, on the contrary, heat turns into mechanical motion, and all this without any losses, since the movement is carried out constantly. The principle of relativity in the classical (Galilean) sense is questioned, since the experiments of Michelson and Morley showed that the speed of light is absolute, that is, it does not depend on the speed of the light source. Newton's third law is compromised by the fact that the energy emitted by a radio transmitting device has no rest mass and there is no equivalence of action and reaction. The principle of conservation of mass is undermined by the fact that the mass of microparticles is “electrodynamic mass”, depending on the speed and direction of movement. The Law of Conservation of Energy is questioned in connection with the discovery of intra-atomic energy, etc. [see 84, p. 127-140]
What will remain untouched among all these catastrophes? asks Poincaré. And what is the epistemological status of science, which so recently was firmly convinced that the knowledge it had achieved represented objective truth?
We have already seen the conclusion to which Machism comes: science does not reflect a reality independent of sensations. Poincaré agrees with this conclusion. “It is impossible,” he writes, “a reality that would be completely independent of the mind that comprehends it, sees it, feels it. Such an external world, even if it existed, would never be accessible to us. But what we call objective reality - in final analysis - is that which is common to several thinking beings and could be common to all; this common side, as we will see, can only be harmony, expressed by mathematical laws” [ibid., p. 9-10].
„ But in this case, before Poincaré
Conventionalism J g j g
the question arises about the essence of mathematical laws, as well as the laws of nature in general. Already in the book “Science and Hypothesis” (1902), Poincaré argued that the laws of nature should be understood as conventions, that is, conditionally, by agreement, accepted provisions. “These conventions are the products of the free activity of our spirit, which, in this field, knows no obstacles. Here he can assert, since he also prescribes...”
It was this concept of law as a conditionally accepted provision, i.e., a convention, that became the leading concept of the epistemological teaching of Poincaré, hence the name conventionalism. It represents an illegitimate conclusion from some actual facts of the development of science. First of all, among these facts one should highlight the creation of non-Euclidean geometries, which showed that Euclidean geometry is not the only possible geometric system. Different systems of geometry differ from each other, according to Poincaré, by different conventionally accepted definitions of some of their initial concepts. “What is the origin of the original principles of geometry? - asked Poincare. - Are they prescribed to us by logic? Lobachevsky, having created non-Euclidean geometry, showed that this is not the case. Do our feelings open up space for us? Also no, because the space revealed by our senses is completely different from the space of the geometer. Does geometry come from experience? A deeper discussion will show that it is not. We have to conclude that these principles are nothing more than conventions." Poincaré even argued that the mathematician himself “creates the facts of this science, or, to put it another way, they are created by his whim.”
In support of this point of view, we find two lines in Poincaré. One leads to the rather vague assertion that conventional principles are chosen by the subject on the basis of his “convenience,” his views of “utility,” etc. “No geometry can be more true than another; it can only be more convenient." The second boils down to the assertion that the conventions (prescriptions) we choose must be mutually consistent, and, in addition, must be chosen in such a way as to reflect the relationships between things. “These prescriptions are necessary for our science, which would be impossible without them; they are not necessary for nature. Does it follow from this that these regulations are arbitrary? No, then they would be useless. Experience retains our freedom of choice, but it guides the choice, helping us to recognize the most convenient path." But this is not enough. If science were built on the basis of arbitrary conventions, then it “would be powerless. But we see it working before our eyes every day. This would be impossible if it did not give us knowledge of something real; but what it can ultimately achieve are not things in themselves, as naive dogmatists think, but only the relations between things. Outside of these relationships there is no knowable reality."
Poincaré's reasoning above is striking in its combination of incompatible epistemological principles. On the one hand, this is a pragmatic installation of the subjective “convenience” of the accepted principles, on the other hand, the recognition of the basis for the choice of relations between things. If the conventions we accept are determined only by the subject, then how can they express different relations between natural things? If conventions are accepted on the basis of “convenience,” then why not clarify this multifaceted concept and recognize that “convenience” is a consequence of the truth of the theory, and not a self-sufficient quality of the chosen system of axioms? Here we must take into account that, having put forward a whole series of epistemological propositions, Poincaré does not develop them consistently [see 2, vol. 18, p. 267] But the generally idealistic principles of the approach to knowledge that he put forward became the basis for many idealistic speculations. One of the first to come up with a similar “development” of Poincaré’s views was the French idealist philosopher Edouard Leroy (1870-1954), who tried to carry out a “synthesis” of Catholicism, Bergson’s intuitionism and... science. He reasoned as follows: if the truths of science are conditional, conventional, and if science cannot cognize objective reality, then it should be recognized that science has practical significance only for a certain area of human action. Religion has every right to exist in another area of human action and in the area of worldview , and science has no right to deny theology
The latter devoted an entire chapter of his book “The Value of Science” to refuting the conclusions drawn by Leroy from the philosophical positions of Poincaré. However, he could dissociate himself from agnostic conclusions regarding science, irrationalistic and fideistic regarding the worldview, only by resorting to an inherently materialistic interpretation of the epistemological foundations of science
Poincaré contrasts Leroy with the criterion of practice, arguing that “if scientific “recipes” have the meaning of rules of action, this is because they... lead to success. But knowing this already means knowing something, and in that case, why are you telling us that we are not able to know anything? . Science foresees, continues Poincaré, and the success of foresight is the reason that it can be useful and serve as a rule of action. Science can improve its predictions and thereby confirm its objectivity. Finally, the criterion for the objectivity of science is that it reveals objective connections between things. The measure of objectivity for the connections revealed by science is “exactly the same as for our faith in external objects. These latter are real in the sense that the sensations they evoke in us seem to us to be connected to each other as if by some indestructible connection, and not by an accident of the moment. Likewise, Science reveals to us other connections between phenomena, more subtle, but no less strong... They are no less real than those that impart reality to external objects” [ibid., p. 189].
Considering Poincaré’s polemic against Leroy’s attempts to derive fideism from his epistemological constructs, V. I. Lenin wrote: “That the author of such reasoning can be a major physicist is acceptable. But it is absolutely indisputable that only the Voroshilov-Yushkevichs can take him seriously as a philosopher. They declared materialism destroyed by a “theory”, which, at the very first onslaught of fideism, escapes under the wing of materialism. For this is pure materialism if you believe that sensations are caused in us by real objects and that “faith” in the objectivity of science is the same as “faith” in the objective the existence of certain objects." However, materialism, in which Poincaré seeks refuge from fideism, is immediately replaced by statements that “everything that is not thought is pure nothing,” that one cannot “think anything but thought,” etc. Again he cannot deal with “constructs” in theory.
Not only that, but Poincaré often identifies reality with the relationships of things that are supposedly unthinkable without connection with the mind that perceives them. The objectivity of these relations lies in the fact that they are “common and remain common to all thinking beings.” This point of view, apparently, was borrowed by Poincaré directly from the French “neo-criticist” C. Renouvier, but goes back to the English philosophers of the 19th century, the epigones of the Scottish school W. Hamilton and G. Mansel. It is associated with the opposition of the “absolute” (analogue of Kant’s “thing in itself”) to specific things connected by relationships with each other. Since cognition is a relation, the supporters of the “philosophy of the relative” reasoned, the “absolute” (reality as it exists in itself) is unknowable: having entered into a relationship with the knower, he ceased to be an “absolute”. This agnostic concept comes uncritically from Renouvier and is accepted by Poincaré.
„ Nevertheless, when Poincaré dis-
Science and Hypothesis J
"judges like a natural scientist,
he expresses a number of interesting thoughts about science, the ways of its development and the progressive change of scientific theories. Objectively, these thoughts to a certain extent helped to overcome the crisis in physics. Thus, in his “Last Thoughts” (the book was published posthumously), he comes to the idea of the reality of atoms as material particles, each of which has infinite complexity, representing “a whole world.” Poincaré, in many ways, correctly approaches the fact of the replacement of Newtonian mechanics with a new mechanics based on the principle of relativity (he associated the latter with the name of Lorentz), seeing in it not a bare negation of the previous theory, but a rise to a qualitatively higher level. new level knowledge. He highly appreciated the quantum hypothesis of M. Planck [see. 83, ch. VI, VII]. Poincaré's works, devoted to the analysis of new physical theories, are imbued with faith in the ability of science to increasingly reveal the secrets of matter.
These conclusions of Poincaré are to a certain extent based on his teaching about the role of hypothesis in science, developed in the book “Science and Hypothesis.” Already in it, Poincaré tried to avoid the extremes of skepticism and dogmatism, because in the latter case, a scientific theory is taken on faith as an absolute truth, due to the fact that it is a scientific theory. Meanwhile, Poincaré emphasizes, scientific theories are rather hypotheses, fruitful approaches to the truth, each of which, however, then does not die entirely, but leaves something stable, enduring, and “it is this that we must strive to capture, since in it and only it contains true reality."
The development of science is carried out, according to Poincaré, in a contradictory way. Progress scientific knowledge combines the unification of knowledge, the discovery of new connections between phenomena that previously seemed to us isolated from each other, and the discovery of more and more different phenomena that can find their place in the system of scientific knowledge only in the future. Two opposing tendencies - towards unity and simplicity, on the one hand, towards diversity and complexity, on the other, constantly compete with each other. At the same time, the forms of unification of knowledge are changing: if in the 19th century it seemed that the unity of science was achievable on the basis of classical mechanics, then at the beginning of the 20th century. a decisive turn is brewing, consisting in the fact that the place of mechanical principles is taken by electromagnetic principles.
And yet Poincaré comes to such a worldview conclusion from his interpretation of the relationship between science and hypothesis, with which one cannot agree. Since our knowledge concerns only the relations between phenomena, Poincaré believes, it must meet only the requirement that the same relations be established between the models that we put in place of “things” as between the “things” themselves [see. 234, p. 190]. Therefore, it is completely indifferent what kind of “reality” we are talking about - it is important that two contradictory hypotheses express the same relations, for “it may happen that both express true relations, while the contradiction is rooted in those images in which we have clothed reality." In a completely positivistic manner, Poincaré argues that questions about “true reality” should be excluded from the everyday life of scientific research" “... they are not only insoluble, they are illusory and meaningless"
Thus, the relativity of our knowledge leads Poincaré again and again to relativism, and then to the denial of the ideological significance of philosophy. At first, he came to this result based on an understanding of the laws of science as conventions, now he comes to them based on an understanding of science as a hypothesis that speaks only about relations of things, but not about the things themselves. His thought regarding the illusory and meaningless nature of philosophical questions echoes the later constructions of neopositivism, just as Poincaré’s conventionalism echoes with them. The difference is that Poincaré considers philosophical concepts as metaphors “ It is no more necessary for a scientist to avoid them than for a poet to avoid metaphors; but he must know their value. They can be useful, giving satisfaction to the mind, and they cannot be harmful, since they remain indifferent hypotheses."
Of course, philosophical concepts that are built on the basis of scientific knowledge (or consciously opposed to it) cannot be indifferent to scientific knowledge. They contribute to the development of science if they clearly see its prospects, identify and improve its methods, formulate real problems of scientific research, or they slow down this development by introducing elements of agnosticism, fideism, and idealism that are alien to science. In the works of Poincaré himself, we constantly encounter precisely this dual function of philosophical concepts.
Conventionalism of Poincaré and his Poincaré and the problem of the interpretation of scientific axioms as the foundation of mathematics
theses left a significant imprint on his understanding of the foundations of mathematics and logic. Poincare took an active part in the development that unfolded at the beginning of the 20th century. debate about the foundations of mathematics. This dispute was caused by the development of the doctrine of logicism, which reduced mathematics to logic and denied any significance of its “intuitive” justification. Poincare was one of the first to criticize logicism.
As V.F. Asmus rightly noted [see. 11, ch. 8], the French scientist’s defense of intuition in mathematics contains two aspects that are essentially indistinguishable to him: purely mathematical and philosophical.
On the one hand, Poincaré argues as a mathematician trying to find out what exactly in mathematical research cannot be achieved in a formal-logical way and needs other, meaningful means. Such a means, according to Poincaré, is intuition, which allows the mathematician “not only to prove, but also to invent.” If mathematicians did not have intuition, then all mathematics would be reduced to tautologies and could not create anything new. In his polemic against logicism, Poincaré was right in that mathematics really cannot be reduced to logic. Many of the mathematical problems he solved, related, in particular, to the relationship to actual infinity, are still the object of controversy in mathematical science [see. 105, p. 300-302; 106, p. 50-51].
As for, on the other hand, the philosophical interpretation of Poincaré’s intuition, it combines the recognition of intuition as a way of formulating indefinable initial concepts and unprovable propositions (axioms) of mathematics with the essentially Kantian understanding of intuition as the ability to carry out “synthetic judgment a priori.” The first statement is a statement of the fact that in addition to logical discursivity in mathematics, another method is also needed that allows us to formulate some substantive provisions. Poincare calls this method intuition; the question of its action within the framework of mathematics is a mathematical question. “Logic and intuition each have their own necessary roles. Both of them are inevitable. Logic, which alone can give certainty, is an instrument of proof; intuition is a tool of invention." But the question of the meaning of the very concept of intuition is a philosophical question, and the assessment of its solution given by Poincaré, perhaps, from the point of view of dialectical materialism, is only negative.
After all, what Poincaré understood as spontaneous intuition is, in essence, something completely different, namely the act of conscious fixation of positions that have developed and crystallized in mathematical thinking on the basis of billions of times repeated practice. And since the logical laws of thinking also act as a consolidation of human practice repeated billions of times, in this latter dialectical materialism sees the common root of both “intuition” and consistent logical thinking, which Poincaré contrasts with each other.
We can add to this that, introducing intuition, Poincaré inevitably includes essential elements of psychologism in his mathematical concept. Polemicizing with logicists, he wrote: “Russell, without a doubt, it seems to me, is not engaged in psychology, but in logic and epistemology; I will be forced to answer that there is no logic and epistemology independent of psychology; and this recognition will probably end the dispute, since it will reveal an irreparable difference of opinion.” And in fact: a new positivist movement, neopositivism, which grew on the basis of the philosophical understanding of logicism, diverged from Machism, abandoning psychologism, although it owed much to Machism, and above all the subjective-idealistic interpretation of the sensory-empirical basis of science.
At the beginning of the 20th century. Empirio-criticism became widespread both in bourgeois philosophy and among the Social Democratic intelligentsia. Under the guise of “newest positivism,” its supporters spread revisionist ideas, trying to emasculate the materialist and revolutionary content of Marxism by “combining” it with Machism. Therefore, V.I. Lenin sharply criticized Machism, both in the person of its founders and their followers. Lenin's conclusions about the epistemological essence and social role of empirio-criticism retain their significance today, even more confirmed by the trends that emerge in the course of the evolution of modern positivism.
V.I. Lenin points out the following. First, comparison theoretical foundations Machist philosophy and dialectical materialism reveals the idealistic and agnostic essence of empirio-criticism. Secondly, empirio-criticism (Machism) is one of the many schools of our time, the place of which is determined by the fact that it went from Kant to Berkeley and Hume, thereby completing the trend begun by neo-Kantianism and the immanent school. Thirdly, Machism was associated with idealistic conclusions from the revolution in natural science at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. and reflected the epistemological crisis of natural scientific materialism of the last century. On this basis, Machism came to a relativistic denial of the objectivity of scientific knowledge, to agnosticism and idealism. Finally, fourthly, “behind the epistemological scholasticism of empirio-criticism one cannot help but see the struggle of parties in philosophy, a struggle that ultimately expresses the tendencies and ideology of the hostile classes of modern society. ...The objective, class role of empirio-criticism is entirely reduced to serving the fideists in their struggle against materialism in general and against historical materialism in particular.”
Having acted as the second historical form of positivist philosophy, Machism largely prepared the further development of positivism. Among the elements borrowed from Machism by neopositivism are the doctrine of “neutrality” (in philosophical sense) of sensory experience, the concept of “fundamental coordination” of subject and object and the “principle of observability,” as well as conventionalism, extended in its semantic interpretation by neopositivists from the sphere of logic to the entire science, and then to the worldview. However, neopositivism could not accept Machian psychologism in the theory of knowledge and logic, which too openly gravitated towards subjective idealism and was not in harmony with the formalistic tendencies that prevailed in neopositivism.
The influence of thinking on perception
Introduction
Chapter I. Perception and its properties
§1. Concept of perception
§2. Properties of perception
Chapter II. Thinking as a psychological phenomenon
§1. Psychological essence thinking and its types
§2. Individual psychological characteristics of thinking
Chapter III. The influence of thinking on perception
Conclusion
List of used literature
Introduction
Perception is a process that has been intensively studied in psychology for a long time. This is explained, firstly, by the great practical significance of perception, which stands, as it were, at the beginning of all mental development of the individual. In this regard, the problems of sensory education of the child are raised as the basis for the development of mental processes proper, and the problems of organizing perception, teaching it and the appropriate selection of operators for specific activities in conditions modern technology, and problems of visual culture, etc.
The emergence of the first hypotheses about the nature of perception dates back to antiquity. Significant contributions and development of scientific ideas about perception were made by philosophers, physicists, physiologists, and artists. In the second half of the 19th century, ideas about perception became one of the important components of the system of psychological knowledge. In general, early theories of perception corresponded to the provisions of traditional associative psychology. A decisive step in overcoming associationism in the interpretation of perception was made, on the one hand, thanks to the development of I.M. Sechenov’s reflexive concept of the psyche, and on the other hand, thanks to the works of Gestalt psychology, which showed the conditionality of the most important phenomena of perception (such as constancy) by unchanging relationships between the components of the perceptual image.
Currently, the study and development of the perception process has important, since there is an intensive development of technology and science, and therefore the complexity of perceived objects, the need high level thinking for mastering new objects, phenomena, etc. Based on this, the theme of the work was chosen as follows: “The influence of thinking on perception.”
The purpose of the work is to consider the relationship between thinking and perception.
To achieve this goal, we have put forward the following tasks:
Give general characteristics process of perception, study the types and properties of perception.
To study the mechanism of the perception process.
Chapter I. Perception and its properties
Cognition is the assimilation of the sensory content of the experienced, or experienced, state of affairs, states, processes in order to find the truth. Cognition refers to both (in a broad sense) a process, which would be more correctly designated by the word “cognition,” and (in a narrow sense) the result of this process. Cognition contains an assessment that is based on experience.
Cognition as an activity includes mental processes: perception, imagination, thinking, which act as the most important components of any human activity. Without the participation of mental processes human activity impossible, they act as its integral internal moments.
Perception in the process of practical activity acquires its most important human qualities. In activity, its main types are formed: perception of depth, direction and speed of movement, time and space.
Imagination is also connected with activity. Firstly, a person is not able to imagine or imagine something that has never appeared in experience, was not an element, subject, condition or moment of any activity. The texture of imagination is a reflection, although not a literal one, of the experience of practical activity.
§1. Concept of perception
perception thinking individual psychological
Perception is a process of formation through active actions<#"justify">§2. Properties of perception
The reception and processing by a person of information received through the senses ends with the appearance of images of objects or phenomena. The process of forming these images is called perception (sometimes the term “perception” or “perceptual process” is also used).
The main qualities of perception include the following: 1) Perception depends on past experience, on the content of a person’s mental activity. This feature is called apperception. 2) The world in which we exist is perceived by us not only as organized and structured, but also as relatively stable and constant. This feature of perception is called constancy. 3) A person perceives the world not in the form of a set of unrelated sensations or states of his organs, but in the form of separate objects that exist independently of him and oppose him, that is, perception is objective in nature. 4) Perception, as it were, “completes” the images of the objects it perceives, supplementing the data of sensations with the necessary elements. This is the integrity of perception. 5) Perception is not limited to the formation of new images; a person is able to be aware of the processes of “his” perception, which allows us to talk about the meaningfully generalized nature of perception, its categorical nature.
In accordance with which analyzer dominates, visual, auditory, tactile, kinesthetic, olfactory and gustatory perceptions are distinguished.
Modern views on the process of perception have their origins in two opposing theories. One of them is known as the Gestalt (image) theory. Adherents of this concept believed that the nervous system of animals and humans perceives not individual external stimuli, but their complexes: for example, the shape, color and movement of an object are perceived as a whole, and not separately.
Gestalt psychology (originated in the first third of the 20th century) is one of the major trends in foreign psychology, which arose in Germany, which was substantiated by M. Wertheimer, W. Keller, K. Koffka. Within the framework of this direction, a holistic approach to the analysis of complex mental phenomena is put forward. Human mental activity is considered as a combination of individual mental phenomena, which are combined into a single whole according to the principle of associations. Particular attention in Gestalt psychology is paid to the study of higher mental functions of a person (perception, thinking, etc.) as integral formations - Gestalts, primary in relation to their constituent components. For example, perception as mental cognitive process cannot be reduced to the sum of its components, its sensations, and the properties of a figure are not described through the properties of its parts. The internal systemic organization of perception also determines the properties of the sensations included in it.
Danish psychologist I. Rubin studied the phenomenon of “figure and ground”. The phenomena of figure and ground clearly appear when considering dual images, where figure and ground seem to spontaneously change places: a sudden “restructuring of the situation” occurs. For example, if two circles are inscribed one inside the other, a person can always see either one version of this circle or the other, but never both at the same time.
The process of perception is a process of active interaction between subject and object. Therefore, the properties of perception exhibit characteristics of both.
Perceptual images reflect such parameters of perceived objects as location (localization), distance from the subject, direction of movement relative to the observer or each other, shape, size, time sequence and duration of impact. These characteristics determine the spatiotemporal structure of perception. Perception is also characterized by modality and intensity. The modality reflects the qualitative differences between the stimuli. Intensity parameters of perception reflect the quantitative and energetic characteristics of the influencing objects. Listed characteristics perceptions are determined by the properties of the object and form a group of initial, primary properties of perception, resulting from similar properties of sensations.
Properties of a higher order, conditioned by objects as integral systems and their relationships with subjects of perception, should include objectivity, structure, integrity and contrast (constancy) of perception.
And finally, the properties determined by the subject of perception include meaningfulness, generality and selectivity (purposefulness) of perception. Perception acquires these characteristics thanks to the work of consciousness as a whole, which includes other processes of mental reflection (memory, thinking, imagination, attention, emotions, will). Then perception experiences regulatory and organizing influence from these processes. The highest manifestation of the dependence of perception on the perceiving person himself, on the characteristics of his personality, is the so-called apperception.
Chapter II. Thinking as a psychological phenomenon
The main feature of the human psyche is that, in addition to hereditary and personally acquired forms of behavior, a person has a fundamentally new, most important means of orientation in surrounding reality- knowledge, which represents the concentrated experience of humanity, transmitted through speech.
§1. The psychological essence of thinking and its types
According to the well-known provision of I.P. Pavlov, the patterns of nervous activity are the same for the first and second signal systems, and the connection between these systems is two-way in nature: “verbal stimulus - immediate reaction” or “immediate stimulus - verbal reaction” [Pavlov 1951]. From the analysis of the features of perception, we move on to the features of thinking.
Thinking - " mental process a generalized and indirect reflection of stable, regular properties and relationships that are essential for solving cognitive problems. In thinking, subjective mental images are reorganized in accordance with their meaning and significance in a given problematic situation"[Big Psychological Dictionary 2007, p. 247].
V.V. Petukhov, separating thinking and perception, pointed to the basic unit of thinking - the concept: “First, concepts reflect not the specific properties of objects (as in sensations) and not even the objects themselves as a whole (as in images of perception), but certain classes of objects , related in one way or another, the generalization of which are concepts. Secondly, this feature is not always accessible even to direct systematic observation; it can be identified during the active interaction of a person with a cognizable object, which requires practical or theoretical means. Thirdly, the meaning in a given human interaction reveals the relationships between things and, thereby, their essential properties, which are the content of concepts.” In a broad sense, thinking is understood as “active cognitive activity subject, necessary for his orientation in the surrounding natural and social world.” In a narrow sense - as a “problem solving process”.
There are many typologies of thinking. We will focus on genetic classification, since it is based on perceptual characteristics and has practical applications in learning. Psychologists distinguish three levels of human thinking: visual-effective, figurative-artistic and verbal-conceptual (abstract, logical) [Big Psychological Dictionary 2007]. We present the reasons for this division in the form of a table.
Table 1
Levels of Thinking
Level of thinkingThe form in which a cognizable object or situation can be presented to a subject so that it can be successfully operated (the left side of the term) The way in which a person himself imagines and cognizes the world around us (right side term) Visual-effective Object as such in its materiality and concreteness Through practical actions with the object Figurative-artistic Image in a picture, diagram, drawing Using figurative representations Verbal-conceptual Description in one or another sign system Using logical concepts and other sign images
§2. Individual psychological characteristics of thinking
Physiologists associate the predominance of a visual or verbal-logical type of thinking with the asymmetry of the brain, the greater development of its right or left hemisphere.
The idea of functional heterogeneity of different parts of the brain was first expressed by Franz I. Gall. According to his ideas, all human abilities are determined by the activity of specific areas of the brain.
The foundations of neurophysiology in our country were laid by V.M. Bekhterev. According to the scientist, “it is impossible to recognize complete identity in the functions of the right and left frontal lobes” [Bekhterev 1994, p. 384]. As a result of numerous observations and experiments, the physiologist concluded that “for mental activity, the left prefrontal region seems to be more important, as it is closely related to the production of speech” [ibid.].
The constant functional interaction of the cortical centers of both hemispheres is ensured by brain spikes, and, as V.M. established. Bekhterev, these adhesions are of decisive importance in mental activity: “the relationship between the centers of both hemispheres, established with the help of cerebral adhesions, seems essential for the development of mental abilities, and only thanks to their presence is it possible to fully flourish mental activity” [Bekhterev, p. 399].
Experimental data by V.M. Bekhterev were confirmed and clarified by the research of A.R. Luria. Studying brain aphasia, that is, diseases in which the reproduction or understanding of articulate speech is impaired due to brain damage, and not due to changes directly in the speech apparatus, the neurosurgeon divided them into two categories: syntagmatic and paradigmatic. The first are associated with difficulties in the dynamic organization of speech utterance and are observed with damage to the anterior parts of the left hemisphere. The latter occur with damage to the posterior parts of the left hemisphere and are associated with a violation of speech codes (phonemic, articulatory, semantic).
Chapter III. The influence of thinking on perception
There are both similarities and differences between solving a perceptual problem and solving a mental problem. In both cases, you have to look for a hypothesis that would explain the observed facts, in both cases there are elegant and inelegant solutions, in both cases the solution often comes unexpectedly, like a sudden insight. However, perceptual problem solving usually occurs super-fast, it is unconscious and not expressed verbally (this does not mean that thinking always occurs slowly, consciously and is expressed verbally, but often this is still the case or partly so); it does not seem to require the strict motivation that demonstrative thinking requires; Unlike most difficult problems of thinking, in perception the correct result is almost always achieved; and finally, solving a perceptual problem results in a perception rather than an idea.
Obviously, perception is unreasonable in one respect. We often perceive phenomena not as we know them, or we perceive what we know very well as unlikely or simply impossible. What is perceived may at times contradict what is known about the situation.
Perception is an active process that involves learning. Hunters can recognize birds from incredible distances in flight, and they are able to use small differences to identify objects that look the same to other people. The same thing occurs when doctors look at x-rays or microscopic slides to look for signs of pathology. There is no doubt that perceptual learning takes place in this case, but we still do not know exactly how far the influence of learning on perception extends.
A brick and a piece of explosive may look and feel very similar, but they will behave very differently. We usually define objects not by their appearance, but rather by their purpose or by their basic properties. A table can have different shapes, but it is an object on which other objects can be placed; it can be square or round, but still remain a table. In order for the perception to correspond to the object, that is, to be true, our expectations must be met.
According to modern science, “the hemispheres are responsible for a variety of mental activity, manifested in attention, perception, memory, thinking, emotions and motivation” [Leutin 2008, p. 11]. With left-hemisphere thinking, information is processed inductively - logically, linearly, sequentially, from analysis to synthesis. The right hemisphere is characterized by the use of deduction; information processing is carried out in the form of synthesis and simultaneous integration of different influences (V.P. Leutin, M. Grinder). The left hemisphere is considered the basis of formal logical thinking, the right hemisphere - associative-empirical, metaphorical (V.L. Deglin, N.N. Nikolaenko). According to M. Grinder, people with a pronounced left-hemisphere organization “are successful in mastering writing, symbols, language, reading, phonetics, arrangement of details, conversation and recitation, auditory associations” [Grinder, p. 137-138]. The prerogative of people with right-hemisphere specialization is imagination, random awareness, figurative memory, spatial connections, color sensitivity, singing, music, artistry, kinesthetic experiences (M. Grinder, M.A. Pavlova). Verbal information is better perceived by the left hemisphere, non-verbal information by the right.
If at the lower levels the process of perception proceeds as if “spontaneously”, “by itself”, regardless of conscious regulation, then in its highest forms associated with the development of thinking, perception turns into a consciously regulated activity of observation. Perception raised to the level of conscious observation is an act of will. In its most advanced forms, observation, based on a clear goal setting and acquiring a planned, systematic character, turns into a method of scientific knowledge. Perception in everyday life relatively rarely reaches the conscious direction to which it rises in the conditions of scientific knowledge, but it never descends to the level of a purely passive, completely undirected experience. Either going down a little lower, or rising up, it is usually located somewhere between these two poles.
Thus, perception is not a simple sum of sensations; it is complex holistic process, or even purposeful activity. This statement means, firstly, that sensations and the irritations that cause them do not remain externally side by side, but interact in the process of perception, so that even taken only in its sensory composition, perception represents something more and different than a simple aggregate of sensations. Secondly, from this statement it follows that perception is not at all limited to the sensory basis formed by sensations. Human perception is in fact the unity of the sensory and the logical, the sensory and the semantic, sensation and thought. It is always not only a sensory given, but also an understanding of its objective meaning.
List of used literature:
1.Bodalev A.A. Perception and understanding of man by man. - M.: MSU, 1983. .Large psychological dictionary / comp. and general ed. B.G. Meshcheryakova, V.P. Zinchenko, - St. Petersburg: Prime-EUROZNAK, 2007. .Velichkovsky B.M., Zinchenko V.P., Luria A.R. Psychology of perception. - M.: Nauka, 1973. .Vygotsky L.S. Psychology. - M.: Vlados, 2002. .Grinder, M. Correction of the school conveyor / M. Grinder. - M.: B/i, 1994. .Logvimenko A.D. Psychology of perception. - M.: Education, 1987. .Nemov R.S. Psychology. In 3 books. - M.: Vlados, 2002. .Pavlov, I.P. Full collection op. / I.P. Pavlov. - M.: Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the RSFSR, 1951. - T. III. - Book 2. .Petrovsky A.V., Eroshevsky M.G. Psychology. - M.: Vlados, 2000. .Petukhov V.V. Psychology of thinking. - M.: Education, 1987. .Psychological Dictionary. / Ed. Yu.L. Namera. - Rostov n/d: Phoenix, 2003. .Rean A.A., Bordovskaya N.V., Rozum S.I. Psychology and pedagogy. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2003. .Rubinshtein S.L. Fundamentals of general psychology. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2002.